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I.  INTRODUCTION
The  Federal  Communications  Commission  (FCC)  moved  swiftly  in
2005  to extend E91  1 and  CALEA2 requirements-two  "social policies" 3
that had been applied to  telephone  companies-to  broadband  internet  ac-
cess providers and providers of online  applications.  E9 11,  broadly  speak-
ing,  requires  telephone  companies  to  provide  location  information  to  a
dedicated call center for anyone calling 911.4  CALEA, in general, requires
telephone  companies  to design their services  so that they are easily tappa-
ble  by law  enforcement. 5 In the E911  context, dominant  vendors  of out-
sourced E911  compliance services persuaded  the FCC to insist that online
businesses  find ways to make their services work with 30-year-old  legacy
emergency  hardware  (access  to which  is controlled by those vendors).  In
the  CALEA  context,  law  enforcement  persuaded  the  Commission  to re-
quire online businesses  and broadband access providers  to make their ser-
1.  In re IP-Enabled  Services  and E911  Requirements  for IP-Enabled  Service  Pro-
viders,  20  F.C.C.R.  10,245  (May  19,  2005)  [hereinafter  E911  Order],  available at
http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-116A1  .pdf. The  E911  Order
requires  providers  of "interconnected  VoIP"  services  (roughly,  Voice over Internet  Pro-
tocol online services that connect to the traditional telephone network) to make traditional
911  access  available  to  their subscribers  by November 28,  2005.  Id. at  10,246,  10,267;
E911  Requirements for IP-Enabled  Services,  70 Fed. Reg. 37,273  (June 29,  2005) (to be
codified at 47 C.F.R. pt. 9) (stating effective date and compliance date).
2.  In re Commc'ns  Assistance  for Law Enforcement  Act and  Broadband  Access
and  Servs., 20  F.C.C.R. 14,989  (Aug. 5,  2005)  [hereinafter  CALEA Order],  available at
http://www.askcalea.net/docs/20050923-fcc-05-153.pdf.  The  Communications  Assis-
tance for Law  Enforcement Act (CALEA)  Order states that providers  of interconnected
VoIP  services  and  broadband  internet  access  are  required  to  comply  with  CALEA  by
May 2007 by making their applications and facilities easily tappable by law enforcement.
Id.  3; Communications  Assistance  for  Law Enforcement  Act  and Broadband  Access
and  Services,  70  Fed. Reg.  59,664  (Oct.  13,  2005)  (to be  codified  at 47  C.F.R. pt. 64)
(stating effective date and compliance date).
3.  The Commission uses the term "social policies"  as a blanket descriptor  for a list
of regulations  that have  been applied  to traditional  telephones  and are  not related  to the
rates charged for particular  services. See,  e.g., In re IP-Enabled  Servs.,  WC No.  04-36,
36  (Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm'n  Mar.  10,  2004)  [hereinafter  IP  NPRM],  available at
http://www.askcalea.net/docs/20040310.fcc.04-28.pdf.  "We...  focus  primarily  on  [dis-
tinguishing] services that might be viewed as replacements  for traditional voice telephony
([raising] social  policy concerns  relating to emergency  services,  law  enforcement, access
by individuals  with disabilities,  [etc.])  from other  services ( ...  not [raising]  these same
regulatory questions to the same  extent)." Id.  36 (emphasis added); see Susan P. Craw-
ford, Shortness of Vision: Regulatory Ambition in the Digital  Age, 74  FORDHAM  L. REv.
695,  714-19 (2005)  (describing the IP NPRM and "social  policy" approach  in global con-
text of internet regulation).
4.  E91 1 Order, supra note 1, at 10,246.
5.  CALEA Order, supra note 2, IT 2-8.
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vices  acceptable  to  law  enforcement--either  before  those  services  are
launched,  thus  constraining  innovation,  or  for  existing  services  at  great
retrofitting  expense.  In  both settings,  the  FCC plunged  quickly  ahead  to
apply these policies  to the internet with littte  consideration  either  for the
economic  impacts  of its  choices  or  for  alternative  strategies  that  might
have  been  employed.  And  both  policies  have  been  lifted  largely  un-
changed from  the world of telephony,  even though the internet presents a
very different technical and economic context.
These proceedings, taken together, provide a case study in a new form
of digital era regulatory  capture.  Where  an independent agency believes it
has a broad delegation of power from Congress over new technology, and
has  a political  agenda  and the  technical  assistance  of dominant,  unregu-
lated entities intent  on retaining  the  advantages  that old technology  gave
them, incumbents  can  easily use  regulation to raise the costs  of entry  for
new  competitors.  In  this  case,  assistance  came  from  providers  of out-
sourced  compliance  services  to  telephone  companies,  and  from  the  De-
partment  of Justice,  a  powerful  sister  agency.  Unlike  the  usual  tale  of
regulatory  capture,  the work of FCC staff on these  rulemakings  was not
necessarily  corrupt,  and  can  be  explained  in part  by  the  cultural  back-
ground of staff-their traditional telephony  or "bellhead"  orientation. But
the  interplay among  the key  players  in this  new form of capture  has re-
sulted  in  a  toxic  environment  for  new  online  businesses  established  to
compete  with traditional  telecommunications  providers:  The combination
of hard social questions, the  ever-present threat of terrorism, captured but
well-meaning staff, law enforcement heavy-handedness,  dominant vendors
of compliance  services, and well-funded  activities of rent-seeking  incum-
bents has  resulted  in  an unaccountable  independent  agency  creating  sub-
stantial  barriers  to  entry  for a  significant portion  of the  American  econ-
omy. The FCC's application of E911  and CALEA policies  to the internet
has already sparked  lawsuits.6  Although there  are  as yet no judicial  opin-
ions on  these matters,  a line  from an article  by Professor Thomas  Merrill
encourages  me  to  proceed:  "Legal  scholars  who  take  their  cues  from
courts will always  end up playing  'catch-up,'  attempting to integrate judi-
cial  innovations with previously established  understandings  and (perhaps)
with  social  science  literature.  But they  will  rarely  serve  as  catalysts  for
6.  Ch6rie  R.  Kiser & Ernest  C. Cooper,  Application of CALEA  to  Cable Opera-
tors:  Current Issues  and Status  of FCC Rulemaking,  MONDAQ  (Dec.  15,  2005),
http://www.mondaq.com/article.asp?articleid=37246&lastestnews=l  (discussing  cases
challenging  CALEA Order consolidated  in Am. Council  on Educ.  v.  FCC, No.  05-1404
(D.C. Cir. filed Oct. 24, 2005)); Nuvio Corp. v. FCC, No. 05-1248 (D.C.  Cir. filed Nov.
8,  2005)  (challenging E91 1 Order) (on file with author).BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
change.",7 This  Article tells the  story of this new  form of regulatory  cap-
ture,  and  is  aimed  at  galvanizing  congressional  action  to  constrain  the
Commission's  currently  apparently  unlimited  discretion  to  regulate  the
internet.
The early rulemakings  I discuss in this Article rely on assumptions:  we
are in a new age, and therefore social policies from the old age need to be
brought  forward  into  this  new  age.  We  are  referred  back, ceaselessly,  to
the  need to assuage  fears  about emergency  services  and law enforcement
access-to  bring  in  the  ambulance  and  the  squad  car-without  much
analysis. The FCC says only that it wants to provide a "level  playing field"
for the digital age by treating everyone alike in implementing these "social
policies"  online. It  is requiring  that these policies be  carried out in a cen-
tralized,  unitary,  command-and-control  fashion  that  is well-suited  to the
world of telephones. But the  internet  should have  taught us, by now, that
there are alternative ways to reach our social policy goals. The argument is
not that the  new actors  discussed  in this  Article  should  be  exempt  from
emergency  and law enforcement  concerns. Although  there is a case  to be
made for that argument,  it is politically untenable, and I do not advance  it
here. Instead, I suggest that by insisting that these actors pursue these  ends
by  the  same  means  as  traditional  telephone  providers,  we  have  both
missed crucial  opportunities  and imposed heavy  costs on new market en-
trants. In  addition to  outlining the  case studies of regulatory  capture pro-
vided  by these  proceedings,  this  Article  examines  the  alternative  routes
that Congress might want to follow in the future.
To  describe  the capture  case studies and suggest alternative  routes re-
quires  some groundwork.  Part II lays out the social  concerns that underlie
the E911  and  CALEA rulemakings,  describes  the history of both of these
efforts and  the  dynamic  cooperation  between  third-party  vendors  of out-
sourced  services,  law  enforcement/public  safety  officials,  and  staff, and
details the enormous implementation  difficulties that have  been caused by
the FCC's rush to impose these social policies on online businesses.
These two rulemakings  are at different  stages. In the E911  context, the
third-party outsourced service providers and incumbent telephone  compa-
nies have successfully  managed to convince  the FCC to  create  a  standard
that serves their business  interests and puts their competitors  out of busi-
ness. In  the CALEA  context,  law  enforcement  has  managed  to convince
the  FCC  to  create  a  legally  tenuous  threat  of non-compliance  liability
without saying what compliance actually entails.
7.  Thomas  Merrill,  Capture Theory and the Courts: 1967-1983, 72  CHI.-KENT  L.
REv.  1039,  1067 (1997).
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Part  III sketches  the  market  context  for  the  E911  and  CALEA rule-
makings  by introducing the dramatis  personae involved in both proceed-
ings. In brief, incumbent telephone companies  are being undermined daily
by the success  of new online  services,  vendors of compliance  services  to
traditional  telephone  companies  are  looking  for  new  market  niches  to
serve,  and law enforcement  and emergency services  authorities  are  long-
ing for the  relative simplicity of the  days of telephony. Part IV compares
the  case  studies  of regulatory  capture  provided by these  rulemakings  to
prior capture narratives and suggests that we have moved into a new era of
regulatory  capture  in  the  digital  era.  Part V  outlines  alternative  ways  in
which the  social policies  embodied in the E911  and  CALEA rulemakings
might be implemented, and what role Congress should take at this pivotal
moment in the short history of the internet.
II.  THE MARKET CONTEXT
When  Congress  passed  the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1996,8  few
people had heard of "broadband,"  and telephone  companies  were  selling
telephone  services.  Today, the telephone companies are angling to provide
television  services  and,  according  to  the  FCC,  38  million  Americans-
about 60% of active internet users in the U.S.-have broadband access.9
In  this  new  world,  the  nation's  Baby  Bell  telephone  companies-
Verizon,  SBC,  BellSouth, and  Qwest, the companies  remaining  from the
seven  original Baby  Bells that were  created  in  1984  with  the  breakup  of
AT&T-have  been  struggling,  cutting  jobs,  and  losing  market  value.
Telecommunications  companies  are losing local wireline (traditional) tele-
8.  47 U.S.C.  § 609 (2000).
9.  See Press  Release,  FCC,  Federal  Communications  Commission  Releases  Data
on  High-Speed  Services  for Internet Access,  July  7,  2005,  available at http://www.fcc.
gov/Bureaus/CommonCarrier/Reports/FCC-State  Link/IAD/hspdO7O5.pdf  (last  visited
Mar  1, 2006).  Internet  access  speeds  are  measured  in  kilobits  per  second  (kbps)  and
megabits  per second  (Mbps). The FCC's claims  about U.S.  broadband access  have been
sharply  disputed because the  FCC considers  anything over 200  kbps to be "broadband."
Id.; see also S. Derek  Turner, Broadband  Reality Check:  The FCC Ignores America's
Digital Divide,  FREE  PRESS,  Aug.  2005,  http://www.freepress.net/docs/broadband-
report.pdf. This speed is too low to  receive low-quality video,  much less originate high-
quality video. Turner, supra, at  2.  In comparison, dial-up  speed is around 56 kbps. Dial-
up  Access,  WIKIPEDIA:  THE  FREE  ENCYCLOPEDIA,  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Dial-up
(last visited Mar.  16,  2006).  The International Telecommunication  Union  (ITU) reported
that  in 2005  the top five nations  for broadband network  market penetration  were Korea,
Hong  Kong,  the Netherlands,  Denmark,  and  Canada.  Turner, supra, at 4  (citing  ITU,
April  13,  2005,  http://www.itu.int/osg/spu/newslog/ITUs+New+Broadband+Statistics+
For+l+January+2005.aspx).  The  ITU  ranked the  United  States  sixteenth  in  broadband
penetration. Id.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
phone  customers to  VoIP  and  wireless  services  at  a rate  of about 5% of
their basic phone subscribers  each year."°  According to a  September 2005
report,  6%  of U.S.  households  now  have  only wireless  phones.1 "  Since
2000, the number of wireline subscribers has fallen by  13.5 million, to 178
million in 2005.2  SBC and Verizon  lost  1.3  million and 3 million  access
lines, respectively, between June  30, 2004 and June 30, 2005.13
These  Baby Bell difficulties  relate to the growth of VoIP usage  in the
U.S.  Although the idea of offering  voice services  online  is not new,14 the
availability  of broadband  access  and special  VoIP  equipment  has  made
these services  truly attractive to consumers.  The uptick in VoIP usage be-
gan in  2002,  when  50-employee  Vonage  Holdings  Corp.  offered  a  much
cheaper  internet-based  voice  service  that  worked through  telephone-like
handsets  connected  to  adapters  that  could packetize  voice. 15 Consumers
no longer needed to talk into their PCs.
Vonage  can  offer  voice  services  more  cheaply  than  traditional  tele-
phone companies because  Vonage  customers  do not have to pay the taxes
and access fees associated with traditional phone service. 6 Vonage, adver-
tising  itself as  "The  Broadband  Phone  Company"'17  and  using  ads  that
poke  fun  at  people  who  pay  too  much  for  phone  service,  has  grown
quickly  since  2002, and now has  1500  employees  and more than 800,000
subscribers. 8  And free or nearly free voice offerings  from Skype, Yahoo!,
10.  See Jon  Arnold,  The IP Heat Is On,  TELECOMMS.  AMs.,  Feb.  14,  2005,  at 8,
available  at 2005 WLNR 4973909; Leslie Cauley, BellSouth Likes To  Go It Alone, USA
TODAY,  Nov.  1,  2005,  available at  http://www.usatoday.com/tech/news/techpolicy/-
business/2005-10-31-bellsouth-mergers_x.htm.
11.  See  THE  INSIGHT  RESEARCH  CORP.,  FIXED  MOBILE  CONVERGENCE:  SINGLE
PHONE  SOLUTIONS  FOR  WIRELESS,  WIRELINE,  AND  VoIP  CONVERGENCE:  2005-2010
(2005), http://www.insight-corp.com/reports/fixmobcon.asp.
12.  Elizabeth Wasserman,  The New Telecom  Wars: Looking to Update a Landmark
Law, CQ WEEKLY,  Nov.  14, 2005, at 3049.
13.  Mike Farrell, Dialing Without Dollars:  Price  Pressures  Could Wring Profit Out
of Cable's Booming Telephone Business, MULTICHANNEL  NEWS,  Oct.  3,  2005,  http://
www.multichannel.com/article/CA6262221  .html?display-Search+Results&text=-dialing+
without+dollars.
14.  Net2Phone  has been  selling  voice  services  since  1996.  See About Net2Phone,
http://web.net2phone.com/about  (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
15.  See Shawn Young,  Talk is Too Cheap: VoIP Profits Grow Scarce, GLOBE  AND
MAIL  (TORONTO),  Aug.  26,  2005,  http://www.theglobeandmail.com/servlet/Article
News/TPStory/LAC/20050826/WSJVOIP26.
16.  See Tom Johnson, Calling the Shots and Holding the Line, STAR LEDGER,  Aug.
16, 2005,  at B25, available  at 2005 WLNR 12895661.
17.  See Vonage, http://www.vonage.com  (last visited Mar 16,  2006).
18.  See Young, supra note 15.
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MSN,  and Google complicate  things further for  the Baby Bells.' 9 eBay's
recent purchase  of Skype  increases the probability that  Skype, with its 49
million users worldwide, will be a powerful  player in North America even
though  it currently has  only about  260,000  paying users.2° VolP  services
in  general  are  growing  quickly.  There  are  now  between  2 and  3 million
VolP subscribers in the U.S., and there  are projected to be between  12 and
40 million by 2011.21
All of this activity has forced  some striking price reductions  in online
voice  services.  Vonage  cut  its prices  by nearly  30%  in 2004.  Comcast's
decision  to  enter  the  online  voice  market  is  representative  of a  trend
among  cable  companies  to  enter  this  market  at  very  low  prices.22  The
Baby  Bells  are  hoping to  survive  this price-cutting,  as they  survived the
long-distance price wars in the 1990s. 23 And the Baby Bells are beginning
to  launch  their  own VoIP plans. For  example,  AT&T initiated  its  online
voice service, called CallVantage, in April 2004, and charged a flat rate of
$40/month  for  all  types  of  calls. 24  In  response,  Vonage  lowered  its
monthly  rates.25  Verizon  is  now  offering  VoiceWing  to  customers  for
$35/month,  and  Vonage,  AT&T,  and Verizon  have  all  introduced  even
26 lower-cost plans.  Voice service online is becoming essentially free.
With one of their key business  areas slipping away, the Baby Bells are
looking for an operating plan that will allow them to survive. They are bet-
ting that,  even  if voice  becomes  essentially  free,  consumers  will  pay for
bundled packages  that include on-demand movies and other video services
plus  voice  and  data.27  The  Baby  Bells  believe-possibly  rightly-that
consumers  would prefer  to receive  only  one  bill  for  all the  communica-
tions  services  they  use,  and  that  online  video  services  controlled  by the
access provider  will be  attractive  to their subscribers.  In effect, the  Baby
Bells  are  planning  to  combine  all  of their  offerings  on  a  single  network
19.  See  Ben  Charney,  Big Players Enter  VoIP  Game, EWEEK,  Sept.  20,  2005,
http://www.eweek.com/article2/0,1895,1861275,00.asp.
20.  Cf Farrell, supra note  13.
21.  Joyzelle Davis,  VoIP Battle Heats Up, ROCKY  MOUNTAIN  NEWS, Nov. 7,  2005,
at  IB; Farrell, supra  note  13; Cauley, supra note  10.





27.  See, e.g., Michael  Khalilian & Farshid Mohammadi,  Carriers Win Big with Tri-
ple-Play IP  Services, PHONE+,  June  2004, available at http://www.phoneplusmag.com/
articles/461soap.html;  David  LaGesse,  The  Battle Over Bundles, U.S. NEWS,  Mar.  20,
2006, available at http://www.usnews.com/usnews/biztech/articles/060320/20phone.htm.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
instead  of having  separate  networks  for  telephone,  cell  phone,  internet,
and television services,  so that users can get to their e-mail from their tele-
vision sets  or any other network  device,  and  see caller ID information  on
any device  whenever the  phone rings.2 8  Throughout  most of 2005,  there-
fore,  the Baby Bells bombarded  the nation with advertisements  for pack-
ages that included landline and wireless voice products, VoIP, internet ac-
cess,  and  video  services.  They  also  began  pushing  for  legislation  that
would allow them to offer "premium" packages  of services.29
In order to be confident that consumers will be willing to pay for these
packages,  the Baby Bells have  worked hard to  ensure  that their  networks
will not be  subject to  common  carriage  or non-discrimination  obligations
that  might  force  these  network  managers  to  carry  competing  voice  or
video  services 30  such as  Skype  or Google  Video.  Immediately  following
the  Supreme  Court's Brand X decision  in  2005,31  which made  clear  that
cable  networks  had no  common carriage  obligations,  the Baby Bells  de-
manded that DSL services  be  similarly released  from any requirement to
connect  to  all  ISPs  or carry  all services.  In  August  2005,  they  achieved
this goal with the issuance of the FCC's Wireline DSL order. 32
Many  non-Bell  VoIP  and  video/audio  application  providers  want  to
reach  Bell  subscribers  and there  is a  tussle now  over  whether  the  Baby
Bells  can either insist that these  other application  providers  pay them for
the privilege of being accessed by end-users, or subtly discriminate against
non-Bell  applications  by  degrading  the quality  of service experienced  by
users when using these  other applications.  The Baby Bells have been ex-
traordinarily  active  politically  in  trying  to  make  sure  that  they  have  the
power to  control  their  last-mile  networks,  the  funds  for  the  building  of
which may have  been provided by their subscribers  in the first place. Ac-
28.  See  John  C.  Roper,  FCC Puts Off Merger Votes,  HOUSTON  CHRON.,  Oct.  29,
2005, available  at 2005 WLNR 17494376.
29.  See Anne Broache & Declan  McCullagh, Playing  Favorites on the Net?, CNET
NEWS.COM,  Dec.  21,  2005,  http://news.com.com/Playing+favorites+on+the+Net/2100-
1028_3-6003281.html  ("A bill expected early next year in the U.S. House of Representa-
tives,  coupled with  recent comments  made by executives  from BellSouth and the newly
merged AT&T and SBC Communications,  has raised the prospect of a two-tiered interet
in which some services-especially  video-would be favored over others.").
30.  See 47 U.S.C. § 151 (2000)  (defining common carrier requirements).
31.  Nat'l Cable  & Telecomms.  Ass'n v. Brand  X Internet  Servs.,  125  S. Ct. 2688
(2005).
32.  In re Appropriate  Framework  for Broadband  Access to  the Internet over  Wire-
line Facilities, CC No. 02-33,  5 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Sept.  23,  2005)  [hereinafter
DSL Order] (classifying  wireline broadband  internet access service (DSL) as an informa-
tion  service  under  the  Communications  Act),  available at  http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/
edocs-public/attachmatch/FCC-05-150A  1  .pdf.
[Vol. 21:8732006]  THE AMBULANCE,  THE SQUAD  CAR, & THE INTERNET  881
cording  to the Center  for Responsive  Politics,  the Baby Bells  have  given
more than $44 million since  1999 to federal candidates and parties (almost
60%  to currently-powerful  and traditionally deregulatory  Republicans).3
In addition to  consolidating  consumers'  bills, the Baby Bells  are  con-
solidating themselves. By the end of 2005, SBC, having purchased AT&T,
dominated the western U.S. as the largest telecommunications company  in
the  country  with  about  $110  billion  in  annual  revenue. 34  And  Verizon,
having purchased MCI, dominated the eastern portion of the country as the
second largest telecom entity with about $90 billion in annual revenue.35
The  Baby Bells'  argument that they should have  greater  control  over
their networks has  found support  in concerns  about  a related U.S.  policy
issue: broadband penetration. Whether because  of the lack of competition
for broadband provision, because of the peculiar physical characteristics  of
the wide-open U.S. landscape,  or because of bad policy, the U.S.  is falling
behind in  ensuring that its citizens have high-speed  access  to the internet.
Studies by the  Organization  for Economic  Cooperation and Development
and the International  Telecommunication  Union have  found that the U.S.
is either  12th (OECD) or  16th  (ITU) in the world in terms of the  percent-
age  of people  having  broadband  access  to  the  internet.36  In  addition,
broadband speeds in other countries are often four to five times faster than
they are in the U.S. 37  The Baby Bells argue that without control over who
has  access  to  their networks,  they will have  no incentives to maintain or
improve  those networks and thus improve America's  standing in  the race
to connect citizens  to the high-speed internet-and the Baby Bells and the
cable  companies  together  control  the  market  for  broadband  access  in
America.3"  So  the  Baby  Bells  suggest  implicitly  and  explicitly  that  the
quid pro quo for improving  the American broadband  story should be con-
trol over their networks and the ability to block competing services unless
33.  Untangling Telecom, NEW JERSEY REC., Aug. 7, 2005,  at B01.
34.  Cauley, supra note 10.
35.  Id.
36.  Wasserman, supra note  12; see also Turner, supra note 9, at 3.
37.  Wasserman,  supra note  12  ("Internet  services  in  South Korea,  Japan  and Italy
can transfer data at eight to ten megabits  per second...  In the United States, cable users
can  download information  from the Internet at about  3  to 6  megabits  per second;  DSL
users...  about  1.5 megabits per second."); see also Turner supra note 9, at 5-6.
38.  At the moment, broadband access is provided by just two kinds of actors in the
U.S. and ninety-five percent of U.S. zip codes broadband subscribers  are served by cable
and telephone companies.  Cable has more subscribers  than the Baby Bells do, with  21.4
million subscribers  to  the Baby Bells'  13.8  million. FCC, WIRELINE  COMPETITION  BU-
REAU,  HIGH-SPEED  SERVICES  FOR INTERNET  ACCESS:  STATUS  AS OF DECEMBER 31,  2004
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they  are  compensated  for  carrying  them.39  In  November  2005,  SBC
Chairman  Edward Whitacre made clear that SBC expected  such control:
[Q]  How  concerned  are  you  about  Internet  upstarts  like
Google[],  MSN, Vonage, and others?
[A]  How  do  you  think  they're  going  to  get  to  customers?
Through  a  broadband  pipe.  Cable  companies  have  them.  We
have them. Now what they would like to do  is use my pipes free,
but I ain't going to  let them  do that because  we  have spent this
capital  and  we  have  to  have  a return  on it.  So there's  going to
have to be some mechanism for these people who use these pipes
to pay for the portion they're using. Why should they be allowed
to use my pipes?  The Internet can't be free in that sense, because
we  and the cable  companies  have made  an investment and for a
Google or Yahoo! [] or Vonage or anybody to expect to use these
pipes [for] free is nuts!
4 0
Indeed, the larger goal of the Baby Bells is to do away with the  tradi-
tional  telephone  network,  with  all  of its  common  carrier obligations  and
history of tariffing, altogether. Most traditional telephone lines in the U.S.
will be replaced over the next five to ten years with DSL or fiber optic ca-
ble.41 The digital Internet Protocol42  (IP)  based systems of DSL and fiber
are  30%  to  60%  cheaper  to  run  than  the  old  traditional  telephone  net-
work.43  So  the  traditional  telephone  companies  are  looking  for ways  to
protect their markets against the depredations of their competitors  as they
move their businesses entirely onto the internet.
39.  Verso  is  already providing  Skype blocking  software  to network  providers.  See
Ted Shelton,  Verso Appliance Lets Enterprises Block Skype,  INFORMATIONWEEK,  Sept.
21,  2005,  http://www.informationweek.com/shared/printableArticle.jhtml?articlelD = 171
000619.
40.  Patricia O'Connell, At SBC, It's All About  "Scale and Scope", BUSINESSWEEK
ONLINE,  Nov.  7,  2005,  http://www.businessweek.com/@@n34h*IUQu7KtOwgA/
magazine/content/05_45/b3958092.htm;  see also Arshad Mohammed, SBC Head Ignites
Access Debate, WASH.  POST, Nov.  4,  2005,  at  DO1  (stating reactions  to Whitacre  state-
ments,  including  "Internet  companies  said Whitacre  was  stating  what  they have  long
feared-that SBC and others may manage their networks to choke off access to Web sites
or to  target  competing  firms  such  as  Vonage  Holdings  Corp.  and  Skype  Technologies
SA, which provide Internet-based  phone services.").
41.  Dave  Burstein,  DSL  (or Fiber) on  Every Line,  DSL  PRIME,  Nov.  25,  2005,
http://www.dslprime.com/News  Articles/newsarticles.htm.
42.  Internet  Protocol  (IP)  is  "[tihe  protocol  used  to  route  a  data  packet  from  its
source  to  its  destination  via the  Internet."  Red  Hat  Documentation,  Red  Hat  Glossary,
http://www.redhat.com/docs/glossary  (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
43.  Dave  Burstein,  7%  of Japanese Can't Get DSL, DSL  PRIME,  Nov.  25,  2005,
http://www.dslprime.com/NewsArticles/newsarticles.htm.
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One key market-protection  move  is  to pile destructive  regulations  on
new  competitors. 4  Several  of the Baby  Bells  have  announced  that they
want to see that all VoIP providers  meet the same  "social  policy"  regula-
tory requirements that phone  companies  have had-including  offering  re-
liable emergency  911  service,  submitting  to the same  federal  wiretapping
assistance guidelines to which traditional telephone companies are subject,
contributing  to  the universal  service fund,  and paying  access  fees to con-
nect  to  the  traditional  phone  network. 41  I  believe  the  Baby  Bells  them-
selves  are content to comply with these regulations  because they have  as-
sumed  in  their planning  processes that they  will be  subject to these  con-
tinuing costs. But new entrants may not have planned  for this kind of per-
mission-based future,  and are likely to be put out of business by the regu-
latory  machinations  of the  incumbents.  Indeed, VoIP providers  had  been
working on voluntarily providing better, more informational, Internet Pro-
tocol-based E911  services,  but the Commission chose  instead to adopt  a
plan that appeared to be aimed at raising their barriers to entry.
At  the  same  time,  a  new  class  of regulatory  capture  players  has
emerged  in the E911  and CALEA contexts:  providers of outsourced com-
44.  Regulation  is often used as a strategic  barrier to entry.  "An innocent entry bar-
rier is unintentionally  erected as a side effect of innocent profit maximization.  In contrast,
a strategic  entry barrier  is purposely  erected  to  reduce  the possibility  of entry."  Steven
Salop, Strategic Entry Deterrence, 69 AM. ECON.  REv. 335,  335  (1979)  (emphasis  omit-
ted); see James  B. Speta, Deregulating  Telecommunications in Internet Time,  61  WASH.
&  LEE  L.  REV.  1063,  1140  (2004)  (examining  the  1996  Telecommunications  Act and
suggesting that "[r]egulation  that burdens new entrants should be more suspect than regu-
lation that burdens incumbents").
45.  Wasserman,  supra note  12.  BellSouth CEO  Duane  Ackerman stated "Congress
must ensure that all the base-line social obligations  placed on the communications busi-
ness  are  equitably  apportioned  and  supported  by  all  competitors  ...  regardless  of the
technology  they choose  to  serve  the public."  BellSouth CEO Ackerman Offers Recom-
mendations for  Next  Telecom  Act,  TECH  L.J.,  Dec.  14,  2005,  http://www.techlaw
joumal.com/alert/2004/12/20.asp;  Regulatory Aspects of  Voice  over Internet Protocol
(VoIP): Hearing  Before the Subcomm. on Commercial and  Admin. Law of the H.  Comm.
on the Judiciary, 108th Cong.  77 (2004)  (statement  of John  Langhauser, Vice  President,
Law,  and  Chief  Counsel,  Consumer  Services  Group,  AT&T)  ("We  agree  with  those
who've  said that providers of VoIP  must meet  important social  policies."). Verizon  has
stated that "[S]ome  regulation of VoIP  services is appropriate  to effect important federal
policy  objectives.  As  Chairman  Powell  has  recognized,  'rules  designed  to  ensure  law
enforcement  access,  universal  service,  disability  access and  emergency  911  service  can
and  should  be  preserved  in  the  new  architecture.'  Verizon  supports  these  objectives."
Comments  of Verizon  Telephone  Cos.,  In re IP-Enabled  Servs.,  WC No.  04-36, In re
Petition  of SBC Communications  Inc.  for Forbearance  Under 47 U.S.C.  § 160 from  Ap-
plication  of  Title  I  Common  Carrier  Regulation,  WC  No.  04-29,  at  47-48  (Fed.
Commc'ns  Comm'n  May  28,  2004),  available at  http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native  or  pdf=pdf&iddocument=6516199830.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
pliance  services  to  the  Baby Bells.  Intrado,  a company  that counts  as its
customers  all of the Baby Bells and most of the nation's wireless carriers,
has over the past 25  years created  a database of 206 million subscriber re-
cords,  and now handles  more than 80% of the existing emergency  call in-
frastructure  in the United States.46 Intrado's  footprint and pre-existing  re-
lationships  with  all  of the  companies  that  control  the  specialized  hard-
ware-called "selective  routers"-that must be used  for access  to the na-
tion's  911  system  have made  it possible  for Intrado  to provide  a  nation-
wide  compliance  product  to VoIP  companies.47  Intrado  is the  company
that,  under  contracts  with  the  Baby  Bells,  runs  most  of the  selective
routers  that  are  the  gateways  to  the  E911  system.48  In  effect,  Intrado  is
now in a position to deliver  all  of the  major VoIP providers'  E911  calls
itself. 49  Verizon,5°  SBC  (now  AT&T),51  Vonage,52  and  Qwest53  all  use
Intrado for their VoIP E9 11  service. Intrado  is the ultimate  middleman in
46.  Here's  How  Vonage-Verizon  E-911  Will  Work,  Posting  of Russell  Shaw  to
ZDNet:  IP,  Telephony,  VoIP,  Broadband  (May  4,  2005,  02:26  PM),  http://blogs.
zdnet.com/ip-telephony/?p=397;  Robyn  Weisman,  AT&T-Intrado  E911  Deal Sign  of
Things  To  Come  in  VoIP  World,  EWEEK,  Aug.  2,  2005,  http://www.eweek.com/
article2/0,1895,1935168,00.asp;  TRDO: Security  Play with Recurring  Revenue and New
Product  Growth;  MARKET  PERFORM,  Stifel, Nicolaus  Co.,  Aug.  2003,  http://www.
stifel.com/stifelresearchdocs/TRDO%20090903%20FC.pdf  (reporting  an  81%  Intrado
market  share  in wireless and wireline  911  provisioning  and that Intrado  services  almost
all of the Baby Bells).
47.  Intrado's customers  include  all of the Baby Bells  (BellSouth, Qwest, SBC (now
AT&T),  and Verizon)  and  most  of the  wireless  carriers  in  the  U.S.  Corporate  Profile.
Intrado,  http://www.intrado.com/main/company/history/intradocorporateprofile  (last  vis-
ited Dec.  10, 2005).
48.  See Letter of Mary  Boyd, Intrado,  WC No. 04-36,  at Attach.  1, 4-5  (Apr.  25,
2005) (on file with author).
49.  Johanne  Torres,  Intrado Interconnects Local  Exchange Carriers, TMCNET,
Nov.  17,  2005,  http://news.tmcnet.com/news/2005/nov/1206361.htm;  Robert  Poe,  In-
trado Lays  the  Groundwork for Nationwide VoIP E911,  VOIP  MAG.,  Nov.  18,  2005,
http://www.voip-magazine.com/content/view/600/;  Charlotte  Wolter,  Outsourced e911:
Help  is  on  the  Way,  XCHANGE,  Aug.  1, 2005,  http://www.xchangemag.com/articles/
581backofficel .html.
50.  See generally Verizon Compliance Report, In re IP-Enabled Servs.,  WC No. 04-
36,  E911  Requirements  for  IP-Enabled  Service  Providers,  WC  No.  05-196  (Fed.
Commc'ns  Comm'n  Nov.  28,  2005),  available at  http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
retrieve.cgi?native-or pdf=pdf&id-document=6518184175.
51.  Weisman, supra note 46.
52.  Shaw, supra note 46.
53.  Extending the Privilege of 911 Service to  VolP Callers, VoIP Newsletter (Mer-
cator  Capital,  Reston,  Va.),  Jan.  2005,  at  3,  http://www.mercatorcapital.com/news
letters/January2005newsletter.pdf  (listing  Qwest,  along  with  Vonage,  AT&T,  and Veri-
zon, as Intrado customer  for E91 1 VoIP services).
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this setting; anyone who wants to connect  to E91 1 in this country needs to
talk to Intrado first.
Another company, Level  3, serves as a key middleman  for connection
to the crucial  selective routers. Level  3 provides myriad infrastructure  and
telecommunications  services  to  many  telephone  and cable  companies  in
both the  United States  and Europe. 4  It  is  certified as  a  "telecommunica-
tions carrier" in all 50 states-in effect, it has the status of a competitor to
the Baby Bells-and claims  that it has  the network  infrastructure  to pro-
vide wholesale VoIP  (and thus E91 1) services  in areas  covering approxi-
mately 69% of all U.S. households. 5  The Baby Bells are required to per-
mit Level 3 to interconnect with their E9 11  systems.
In  the  CALEA  context,  the  key  provider  of outsourced  compliance
services  is VeriSign,  which presented itself to the FCC as able to provide
outsourced "cost-effective  CALEA support solutions"  for all providers  of
broadband  access and VoIP.16 VeriSign suggested to the Commission that
a  "service  bureau"  approach  to  CALEA  compliance  would dramatically
lower costs  and simplify the  task of law  enforcement  authorities,  whose
only interface  would  be  with VeriSign  rather  than with  all  communica-
tions service  providers. 7 VeriSign, which has  announced publicly that its
54.  See Level  3 Communications,  The  Level  3 Story, http://www.leve13.com/576.
html (last visited Mar.  1, 2006)  (noting that the ten largest internet  service providers and
the ten largest telecommunications  carriers  in the United States  use Level 3).  Level  3  is
certified to connect to the selective routers  around the country. See E-9 11: Enhanced  911
for VolP, Level 3, http://www.level3.com/userimages/dotcom/pdf/Level3_E-91  1_Fact_
Sheet.pdf (last visited Mar. 1, 2006) (stating that Level 3 offers VoIP providers the ability
to provide  full E911  service  for approximately  60%  of U.S.  households,  and it plans to
support 70% to 80%  later in 2005).
55.  Press Release,  Level 3, Level  3  Selected by United Online to Enable VolP Ser-
vices (Dec. 15,  2005), available  at http://www.level3.com/press/6623.html.
56.  Comments  of VeriSign,  Inc., In re U.S.  Dep't of Justice,  FBI,  and DOJ  Joint
Petition  for Rulemaking  to Resolve  Outstanding  Issues Concerning  the  Implementation
of CALEA,  RM-10865,  at  13  (Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm'n  Apr.  12,  2004),  available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native  or .pdf=pdf&iddocument=651608
7646.
57.  See Ex Parte Presentation of VeriSign, Inc., In re Joint Petition for Rulemaking
to  Resolve  Various  Outstanding  Issues  Concerning  Implementation  of CALEA,  RM-
10865  (Apr.  15,  2004)  (attaching  slides  suggesting,  among  other  things, that a  service
bureau approach to CALEA would facilitate subpoena process because online users could
be  easily  identified),  available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-
or  pdfpdf&id-document=6516088289.  "Since  compliance  with  surveillance requests is
a significant  cost for  carriers,  telecommunications  companies  have  acted  as  a check  on
government power, lobbying against excessive proposals. Now, private entities that profit
from surveillance  will have an incentive  to lobby for more government surveillance pow-BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
goal is to have all suppliers of communications  services as its customers, 58
asked  that  the  Commission's  Notice  of Proposed  Rulemaking  (NPRM)
give  "special consideration"  to service  bureau architectures  in implement-
ing  CALEA.59 The resulting  CALEA  NPRM did exactly that:  it outlined
VeriSign's proposal that the use of a "trusted third party" be recognized as
fulfilling  CALEA  compliance  obligations,  and  included  an  appendix
sketching out VeriSign's proposed flow of data between entities.6"
In addition to the incumbents pushing for telephony rules to be applied
to the online world, and the outsourcing vendors pushing for standardized
business opportunities, law enforcement and emergency services providers
were anxious to receive familiar forms of data from new online companies
and for CALEA and E911  rules to apply to VoIP and other online applica-
tions.
The CALEA rulemaking process discussed in this Article began with a
petition  filed  on  behalf of the  Federal  Bureau  of Investigation,  the  De-
partment  of Justice,  and the Drug Enforcement Administration  asking  for
clarification of the  scope  of CALEA.6'  The  Joint Petition  asked  the  FCC
to  declare  that  CALEA  requires  providers  of broadband  access  services
and VolP services to design their facilities  so as to make law enforcement
wiretapping easier."  And  the FCC,  so far,  has cooperated:  In a  notice of
proposed  rulemaking issued in August  2004, the FCC  suggested that "fa-
cilities-based  providers of any  type of broadband Internet  access  service"
63 and "'managed'  VoIP services"  were subject to CALEA.  More recently,
ers."  CALEA:  The  Perils  of Wiretapping  the  Internet,  Electronic  Frontier  Foundation,
http://www.eff.org/Privacy/Surveillance/CALEA  (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
58.  See  Khali  Henderson,  CALEA  Compliance Goes  Undercover, PHONE+  (Jan.
2003),  available at http://www.phoneplusmag.com/articles/31  1FEAT4.html  ("The  com-
pany [VeriSign]  has the goal  of supporting all suppliers,  creating  vendor neutral support
for operators.").  VeriSign, like Intrado, plans to migrate  its pre-existing  telecommunica-
tions carrier services to the online world. See VeriSign Comments, supra note 56, at  14-
15.
59.  Ex  Parte  Presentation  of  VeriSign,  Inc.,  RM-10865,  at  3  (Fed.  Commc'ns
Comm'n July 6, 2004), available  at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native
_or  pdf=pdf&iddocument=6516283062.
60.  Notice  of Proposed  Rulemaking  and  Declaratory  Ruling,  In  re CALEA  and
Broadband Access Servs.,  ET No. 04-295,  69-74 & app. C. (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n
Aug. 4,  2004)  [hereinafter  CALEA NPRM],  available at http://www.askcalea.net/docs/
20040809.fcc.04-187.pdf.
61.  Joint Petition  for Expedited  Rulemaking,  In re U.S.  Dep't of Justice, FBI,  and
DOJ  Joint Petition  for Rulemaking  to  Resolve  Outstanding  Issues  Concerning the  Im-
plementation  of CALEA,  ET  No.  04-295  (Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm'n  Mar.  10,  2004),
available  at http://askcalea.net/docs/200403l0.calea.jper.pdf.
62.  Id. at 3,  8,  15-17.
63.  CALEA NPRM, supra note 60.
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the  Commission  has issued an  order declaring  that broadband  access  and
"interconnected"  VoIP services are covered by CALEA.64
Ever since the  1994 enactment of CALEA,  law enforcement, industry,
and  the FCC  have  been  battling  over  what compliance  with  that  statute
requires  of telecommunications  carriers."  It  is  very likely  that  law  en-
forcement  authorities  would like to replicate  the call-identifying  informa-
tion that they have  fought to obtain in the telephony world, and are  inter-
ested  in  shifting  the  costs  of sifting  out that  information  to  application
providers and their customers.66
In the  E911  context, the role of the emergency services  community  is
less obvious than the role of law  enforcement  in the CALEA proceeding.
But public safety  officials  from New York told the FCC that all VoIP ap-
plications  should  be  immediately  subject  to  E911  requirements.67  Other
64.  CALEA Order, supra note 2,  7.
65.  Industry  groups came  up  with  the  first  standard,  which  was  known  as the  J-
standard. Press Release,  Telecommunications  Industry Association,  TIA and ATIS Pub-
lish Lawfully  Authorized  Electronic  Surveillance  Industry  Standard  (Dec.  5,  1997)  (on
file with  author).  The  FBI took  strong  exception  to the  J-standard,  and filed  comments
stating that  the standard  would have  to  be revised.  See Comments  of FBI, In re Imple-
mentation  of CALEA,  CC  No.  97-213,  at  36-38  (Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm'n  Dec.  12,
1997); Reply Comments  of the FBI, In re Implementation of CALEA, CC No. 97-213,  at
4-7  (Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm'n  Feb.  11,  1998),  available at http://www.askcalea.net/
docs/980211 .pdf. The FBI then issued a  list of additional requirements  it wanted  to see
incorporated  in the J-standard. See Joint Petition for Expedited  Rulemaking,  CC No. 97-
213,  at 35  (Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm'n  Mar.  27,  1998)  [hereinafter  FBI  Joint  Petition],
available  at  http://www.askcalea.net/docs/980327.pdf  (addressing  Establishment  of
Technical  Requirements  and  Standards  for Telecommunications  Carrier  Assistance  Ca-
pabilities under the CALEA). The FBI Joint Petition asked for access  to the communica-
tions of all parties in a conference  call supported by the subscriber's service or facilities;
access  to  all  subject-initiated  dialing  and  signaling  activity;  information  indicating
whether a party is connected to a multi-party  call at any given time ("party  hold,"  "party
join," and "party drop"  messages);  notification of messages  for in-band and out-of-band
signaling;  timely delivery of call-identifying  information;  automated reporting of surveil-
lance  status;  delivery  of all  call-identifying  information  over  call  data  channels;  and a
limited number of standardized  delivery interfaces. Id. at 20. These  suggestions substan-
tially  raised the costs  of compliance  and led to  litigation.  See U.S.  Telecomm.  Ass'n v.
FCC, 227 F.3d 450, 461-62 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
66.  The CALEA  NPRM  sought  further comment  on how  to define  call-identifying
information  in  packet  technologies,  and how  much  information  is  "'reasonably  avail-
able'  to broadband access and VolP providers. CALEA NPRM, supra note 60, at  2.
67.  See  Comments  of Eliot Spitzer,  In re IP-Enabled  Servs.,  WC  No. 04-36,  at  5
(Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n  May  28,  2004)  ("VoIP providers'  products  must allow  their
customers  to  access  both  traditional  911  and  E911  systems."),  available  at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native  orpdf=pdf&iddocument-651619
8823; Comments of King County E911 Program, In re IP-Enabled  Servs., WC No. 04-36,
at 2 (Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n May 27, 2004) ("The public expectation  is that any deviceBERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
public  officials  from both  the  King  County, Washington  E911  Program
and the City of New York have told the FCC that E911  calls should pass
only  through  traditional  selective  router hardware.  These  officials  were.
very concerned that VoIP providers would route 911  calls to "administra-
tive numbers"--numbers  answered, if at all, by whatever  clerk happened
to be  on duty-inside  call center buildings rather than through  the selec-
tive router to  emergency  operators.68  Many emergency  services providers
commented  that  they  were  concerned  about  losing funding  for  911  ser-
vices when phone subscribers  switched to VoIP services.69
The combination of incumbent anxiety over future markets, third-party
outsourced  vendor  interest  in  supplying  compliance  services,  law  en-
forcement's  desire for familiar forms of data, and public officials'  anxiety
over funding  for emergency  services  (as  well  as over retaining  orthodox
approaches to emergency service provision) produced an irresistible incen-
tive for the  FCC  to  adopt  E911  and  CALEA  rules  affecting  online  ser-
vices. The following Part describes  these rules and outlines the controver-
sies surrounding their implementation.
II.  FCC INTERNET SOCIAL POLICIES
In March 2004, the FCC initiated a broad rulemaking proceeding  sug-
gesting that "social  policies"  from the world of telephony might be appro-
priate for the  internet.7° The FCC has begun its work in this area by focus-
ing on two issues:  availability of emergency  911  service  and assistance  to
law  enforcement.  This  Part  describes,  first,  the  differences  between  te-
that can  make  voice  phone  calls  can  call  911  ...  [and]  that  full  E911  service  will be
available on  all telephone  devices,  including  selective routing  to the appropriate  PSAP,
and  the  provision  of their  call-back  number  and  location  information."),  available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native  or pdf=pdf&id  document=651618
8890.
68.  Comments of King  County E911  Program, supra note 67,  at 2;  Letter of Gino
Menchini,  Comm'r, N.Y. Dep't of Info.  Tech. and Telecomm.,  In re IP-Enabled  Servs.,
WC No. 04-36, at  I (Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n  Apr.  18,  2005), available at http://  gull-
foss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=-6517587651;  Let-
ter of Gregory Ballentine, President, APCO Int'l, In re IP-Enabled Servs., WC No. 04-36,
at  1 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Apr.  15,  2005)  (stating that while routing 911  calls  to ad-
ministrative  numbers  is "perhaps  acceptable  for  some  PSAPs,  such  an approach  could
endanger  the  public  and  disrupt  already  over-burdened  PSAP  operations"  at  others),
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-docu
ment=6517519564.
69.  E911  Order, supra note 1, at 10,273-74 (citing comments).
70.  IP  NPRM,  supra note  3  (statement  of Comm'r  Kathleen  Q.  Abernathy);  see
Crawford, Shortness of Vision, supra note 3, at  714-19  (describing  IP  NPRM  in global
context of internet regulation).
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lephony  and  the  internet  and, second,  how the  Commission  proposes  to
implement these social policies with respect to online services.71
A.  Telephony  v. Internet
The  fundamentals  of telephony  have  not changed  since  its  introduc-
tion. Early on, a pair of wires made up a circuit from the user to the opera-
tor  and  the  operator  would then  complete  the  circuit  between  two  users
based on a caller's request. Later, the operator was replaced by automatic
switching  systems  and  the  analog  circuits  were  replaced  by digital  chan-
nels. But the  overall operation  and  concept of the telephone  network (the
PSTN, or "public switched telephone network") remains the same. When a
user requests  it,  the  system  opens  a digital  circuit  between  users  for the
duration of their call. This circuit carries the bits of information they want
to send and,  whether or not any user is saying  anything,  the  circuit stays
open until the call ends. Use of circuit switching therefore relies on intelli-
gence-routing  and processing decisions being made-residing at the cen-
ter of the  network. Indeed, a fundamental  goal of telephony switches  is to
maintain  control  over circuits.72 Every  time  a new  service  (such  as call
waiting)  is introduced,  a tremendous amount of re-engineering  of the net-
work is required. For this reason, the scope  of telephony services has not
changed  very much over the  last fifty years. The idea of "someone  in au-
thority"  standing  between  the  user and  the network,  so  prevalent  in  the
early days of telephony, still exists.
This "someone  in  authority"  notion  is  deeply  connected to  the  pres-
ence of police and emergency assistance  for telephone users. Indeed, from
the very beginning of the history of telephony in the U.S., a principal pur-
71.  Two  other related  initiatives,  having  to  do  with funding  universal  service  and
providing  access to the disabled, are still under consideration  and are not yet ripe enough
to discuss. Chairman Martin has announced that imposing universal service funding obli-
gations  on  internet  services  is  one  of his  top  priorities  for  2006.  Anne Broache,  FCC
Chief  Backs Net Phone Taxes, CNET NEWS.COM,  Dec.  14,  2005,  http://news.com.com/
FCC+chief+backs+Net+phone+taxes/2100-7352_3-5995488.html.  A  third  internet-
focused  FCC  initiative  constraining  the functioning of devices  capable  of retransmitting
marked digital files online-the "broadcast flag" rule-was struck down by the D.C. Cir-
cuit in mid-2005.  See Am. Lib. Ass'n v. FCC, 406 F.3d 689,  708 (D.C.  Cir. 2005);  see
generally Susan  P. Crawford,  The Biology of the Broadcast  Flag,  25 HASTINGS  COMM. &
ENT. L.J. 603  (2003)  (describing broadcast flag proceeding  and jurisdictional weaknesses
of FCC's claims of authority to regulate design of devices, which includes personal com-
puters, capable of processing TV signals).
72.  See generally SUSAN  LANDAU,  SUN MICROSYSTEMS,  NATIONAL  SECURITY  ON
THE  LINE  18  (2005)  (discussing  differences  between  circuit-switched  and  packet-
switched  networks)  (citing  ANDRE  GIRARD,  ROUTING  AND  DIMENSIONING  IN  CIRCUIT-
SWITCHED  NETWORKS  431 (1999)).BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
pose  for  telephone  service  has  been  to  make  emergency  help  available
from a central source.  Telephones are there to watch  over us in our sleep.
For example,  a major  emphasis of early  Bell advertising  was the  useful-
ness of the telephone  in times of emergency. An advertisement  from  1905
reads:  "The  modem  woman  finds  emergencies  robbed of their  terror by
the  telephone.  She  knows  she can  summon her physician,  or if need be,
call the  police  or  fire  department  in  less  time than  it  ordinarily  takes to
ring  for  a  servant., 73 A  1910 Bell-funded  telephone  tract put the  matter
this way:
But it is in a dangerous  crisis, when safety seems to hang upon a
second, that  the  telephone  is  at its  best. It  is the  instrument  of
emergencies,  a sort of ubiquitous  watchman.  When  the  girl op-
erator in the exchange hears a  cry for help - "Quick!  The hospi-
tal!"  "The  fire department!!"  "The  police!"  she seldom waits to
hear  the  number.  She  knows  it.  She  is  trained  to  save  half-
seconds. And it is  at  such moments,  if ever, that the users  of a
telephone  can appreciate  its insurance value. No doubt, if a King
Richard III were worsted on a modem battlefield, his instinctive
cry would be, "My Kingdom for a telephone!"...  When a small
child is lost, or a convict has escaped from prison, or the forest is
on fire,  or  some  menace  from the weather  is  at  hand, the  tele-
phone bells clang out the news, just as the nerves jangle the bells
of pain when the body is in danger. In one tragic case, the opera-
tor in Folsom, New Mexico,  refused to quit her post until she had
warned her people  of a flood that had broken  loose  in the  hills
above the village. Because  of her courage,  nearly all were saved,
though she herself was drowned at the switchboard.  Her name-
Mrs. S. J. Rooke-deserves  to be remembered.74
An advertisement from the 1920s reads:
[M]y  heart  stood  still  ...  I  heard  stealthy  voices  ...  someone
tinkering with a lock..,  a muffled footstep  ...  saw a shadow flit
by my window...  I reached over to the stand by the bedside and
seized-no, not a revolver-a telephone.75
An advertisement  from the  1930s  shows a picture of a little blond girl,
arms  innocently flung out  in sleep.  It reads:  "Sleep  Soundly, Little Lady.
Mother  and  Daddy  are  near  and  the  telephone  is  always  close  by.  It
73.  CLAUDE S. FISCHER,  AMERICA  CALLING: A  SOCIAL HISTORY OF THE TELEPHONE
To 1940 140 (1994).
74.  HERBERT N. CASSON,  HISTORY  OF THE TELEPHONE  211-13  (1911),  available  at
http://casson.thefreelibrary.com/History-of-the-Telephone/1-6.
75.  FISCHER, supra note 73,  at 68.
[Vol. 21:8732006]  THE AMBULANCE,  THE SQUAD  CAR, & THE INTERNET  891
doesn't go to sleep. All  through the night it stands guard over you and mil-
lions of other little  girls  and  boys.,7 6  An  advertisement  from  the  1940s
says  that  telephone  service  is  a bargain because  it  is "[a]dvantageous  to
you because  it saves time,  steps, and trouble. Stands guard over the secu-
rity of your home."77
Telephones are vigilant, centrally-controlled,  located in an identifiable
terrestrial  place,  and set up with  services  that the telephone  company be-
lieves-or  the  government  believes-are  good  ideas.  By  contrast,  the
internet has  none of these  characteristics.  There  is no  one  "in  authority"
between the user and the network, no  central control, no necessary terres-
trial  connection to  particular  internet uses, no  advertising  for the  internet
touting  its connection to emergency services,  and anyone can begin  a new
service that is available around the world without asking permission  from
anyone  else.  An  individual  can  make  a VoIP  call  from  a  hotel room  in
London  using  a  New  York  area  code,  and  be  for  all  purposes-except
physical purposes-in New York.
The  internet  is  not  a telephony  network  in  part because  it is "packet
switched"  rather  than  "circuit  switched,"  and  in  part  because  internet
packets have no guarantees of service.  The Internet Protocol can be under-
stood  as a  language  that  allows  the  division of all  communications  into
small packets that are then individually routed,  one hop at a time, to their
destination-without any router knowing more than where the next hop is.
Because  internet traffic has been packetized, there  is no need  for it to oc-
cupy a circuit for the full duration of an exchange. Instead, one can use the
circuit just for  the brief interval needed  to transmit  the  packet. And be-
cause  each packet has a unique source  and destination address  embedded
in its header,  simultaneous  conversations  can  coexist on the same  circuit
without interfering  with one  another, and without anyone having to be  in
charge of the routing of these conversations."
The telephone network was built for a single purpose:  voice telephony.
By contrast, the Internet Protocol provides a simple, common interface  for
all kinds of networked  applications to run over all kinds  of physical net-
works.79  Thus, fiber-optic  infrastructure  or wireless connections  provide  a
76.  Advertisement on file with author.
77.  Id.
78.  See  generally  How  Internet  Infrastructure  Works,  http://computer.howstuff
works.com/intemet-infrastructure.htm  (last visited Mar. 1, 2006).
79.  See Lawrence  B.  Solum & Minn Chung,  The Layers Principle:  Internet  Archi-
tecture and the Law, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 815, 822 (2004) (noting that layers are key
architectural  element of the internet and drive normative conclusions about internet regu-
lation).BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
way for any networked application to be transmitted, and the Internet Pro-
tocol  provides  a  predictable,  well-defined  interface  for  these  transport
mechanisms to work with applications.8'
The Internet Protocol provides the means to allow the end-to-end  prin-
ciple  first  articulated  in  an  important  paper  by  Jerome  Saltzer,  David
Reed, and David Clark in 1984 to be  implemented.8  The end-to-end  prin-
ciple  suggests  that the network itself should not filter or change  the  com-
munications  information  contained  in  the  IP  packet's  payload.  Rather,
such manipulation  should occur only at the edges,  at the level of end-user
applications. 8 2  This end-to-end  principle,  like the Internet Protocol,  keeps
bits flowing freely across the lower levels of the protocol stack, to be proc-
essed  only when they  get  much  closer to  the  end-user-the  edge  of the
network.
Where a central telephone provider must provide enhanced functional-
ities at a physical  termination point, IP network design is highly decentral-
ized, allowing substantial  innovation to occur at the edges of the network.
Internet  routers have not, to  date, been designed to maintain control or ac-
countability  over circuits, or even to remember anything about the packets
that pass  through them. Instead, internet  routers  are  designed only to for-
ward packets  one more step toward their destinations,  and have  no neces-
sary  connection  to  geography.  Because  of its  protocols  and  layers,  the
intemet allows any application to be used on any network and in any geo-
graphical  location.
The flexible  and  free  protocols  of the  internet  have made  innovation
easy.  Having to ask permission to introduce a new service,  at any layer, is
enormously  destructive  to the internet  model that  has brought  such  great
benefits to the U.S. economy.
By contrast,  the  telephone  network  is  completely  geographically  de-
pendent  and has been designed to carry  a single application.  In telephone
networks,  that application  (phone  service)  and the physical  connection  to
80.  See id. The layers concept has recently become a suggested model for regulatory
intervention.  In early 2004,  MCI issued a paper suggesting  that cable and telephone pro-
viders be required to make their networks  available to others on  a wholesale basis, citing
(and relying on)  the layers principle.  See generally Richard  S.  Whitt, A Horizontal Leap
Forward.  Formulating  a New Communications Public Policy Framework Based on the
Network Layers Model, 56 FED. COMM.  L.J. 587 (2004).
81.  See Jerome  H.  Saltzer et al., End-to-End Arguments in System  Design, 2 ACM
TRANSACTIONS  ON  COMPUTER  SYSTEMS  277  (1984),  available at http://web.mit.edu/
Saltzer/www/publications/endtoend/endtoend.pdf  (illustrating the end-to-end principle).
82.  See  David  S.  Isenberg,  The Dawn of the Stupid Network, NETWORKER,  Mar.
1998,  at 24, available  at http://www.isen.com/papers/Dawnstupid.html.
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the network  itself are inextricably  intertwined. This geographic  fixity  has
made 911 service and wiretapping possible on telephone networks.
B.  E911
There  are  many potential  technologies,  including  location-aware  ser-
vices, that could benefit society enormously but may never come  into be-
ing because  of the  E911  Order. First, there  are  substantial  technical  stan-
dard-setting  activities  underway  that  may  be  truncated  because  of the
FCC's  approach.83  Second,  starting  in  2003,  the  National  Emergency
Number Association (NENA),  which coordinates Public Safety Answering
Point (PSAP) call centers used for 911 services  described in the following
section, began  working with online VoIP companies  to develop  more  in-
novative  solutions for E91 1 services.84 A Voice on the Net (VON)/NENA
911  working group was  established in 2004 to implement the  NENA  ef-
forts. And several VoIP providers began deploying interim  911 services-
something  that  took  wireless  carriers  sixteen  years  to  do.85  The
VON/NENA  efforts resulted in plans to roll out an IP-based E911  service
offering  which would deliver  location  information  and callback numbers
to PSAPs automatically  in real time via the internet (rather  than connect-
ing  through  the  traditional  telephone  system).  As  of February  2005,  the
plan was for these services to include enhanced digital capabilities:
By  upgrading  to  Internet  Protocol  (IP)  based  equipment,  9-1-1
calls could be accompanied by much more information, such as a
callers'  medical  records,  medical  status,  language  preference,  or
maps of commercial  buildings. With today's system, there is no
way for end users to automatically  inform emergency technicians
that someone has Alzheimer's,  or for a PSAP to receive photo or
83.  The  Internet Engineering  Task Force (IETF)  is working on modifications to the
Dynamic Host Control Protocol to allow  a device  to be assigned  location information by
a network  when  the device  first connects  to  that network.  See generally J.  Polk  et al.,
Dynamic Host Configuration  Protocol Option  for Coordinate-based  Location Configura-
tion Information (IETF, RFC 3825, July 2004), http://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3825.txt.  There
are proposals  for  voluntarily-provided  emergency  services  based  on  instant  messaging
and other IP-based  services. See generally H. Schulzrinne,  Emergency Services URIfor
the Session Initiation Protocol (IETF, draft-ietf-sipping-sos-00,  Feb. 2004), http://www.
ietf.org/proceedings/04aug/I-D/draft-ietf-sipping-sos-0O.txt.
84.  Voice on the Net Coalition, Answering the Call for 9-1-1  Emergency  Services in
an Internet World (Jan.  12,  2005), at  1, http://www.von.org/usrfiles/91  1%20VON%20
White%20Paper%201-12-05%20final.pdf  (discussing  the  December  2003  National
Emergency  Number  Association  agreement  with  8 X  8,  AT&T  Consumer  Services,
Broadsoft,  Dialpad, ITXC (now TeleGlobe), Level 3, PointOne, Pulver.com, Vonage,  and
Webley).
85.  Id.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
video images. In the future, VolP 9-1-1  calls may be able to sup-
port  not  only  voice  but  a  variety  of  data  and  video  fea-
tures/functions.86
Several companies  put aside work on more robust emergency response
efforts to devote their resources  to complying with the FCC's approach in
the  E911  Order.87  And because  the  FCC  E911  Order  was  implemented
before  the public safety  community  finalized what had become known  as
the  NENA  "12"  standard,88  major  providers  (including  Intrado)  imple-
mented versions of E9 11  services that comply with the E9 11  Order but are
noncompliant  with the 12 standard-thus  creating a continuing patchwork
of E911 services.89
Because the E911  Order requires all VoIP 911  calls to go through  the
selective router, it will not allow a 911  call to go through an Internet  Pro-
tocol router to any call center. Therefore, the Order prevents any IP-based
emergency  network, together  with  the host  of advances  such  a  network
can deliver,  from coming  into being.  The FCC's  June  2005  E911  Order
cut  off further  development  of these  IP-based  E911  services  and  sent
companies  scrambling  to  figure  out  how  to  connect  with a  legacy,  cen-
trally-switched,  telephony-based  911  system.  Commentators  had  sug-
gested  that VoIP  should  not be  burdened with  connecting  to  the  legacy
emergency  system.  For  example,  they  noted  that  "[t]oday's  emergency
access  network reflects  the hierarchical  nature  of the  incumbent local ex-
86.  Id. Former FCC Chairman Michael  Powell applauded these efforts:
The 9-1-1  system is vital in our country, but it has limited functionality.
In most systems,  it primarily identifies the location from which the call
was  made.  But an Internet  voice  system  can  do  more.  It can  make  it
easier  to pinpoint the  specific location of the caller in a large building.
It might also hail your doctor, and send a Text or Instant Message alert
to your spouse.
Id.
87.  The Department  of Commerce  had encouraged the development  of a post-9/11
reverse  911  emergency  broadcast  system, and the  city of Hemdon,  Virginia had devel-
oped an Amber Alert system over Cisco VolP phones.  Rather than continuing with work
on breakthrough  advances  like these, companies put aside these efforts to focus on com-
pliance.  E-mail  from Jonathan  Askin,  General  Counsel, pulver.com  to  author (Feb.  12,
2006,  12:24:00) (on file with author).
88.  See  generally Interim  VoIP Architecture for Enhanced 9-1-1  Services  (12),
NENA  (Dec. 6, 2005), http://www.nena.org/9-1-1TechStandards/StandardsPDF/NENA
_08-001_V1j12-06-05.pdf.
89.  E-mail  from Jonathan  Askin, General  Counsel,  pulver.com  to  author  (Feb.  12,
2006,  12:24:00) (on file with author).
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change network,"9  and pointed the Commission to consider the  enhanced
capabilities  that  IP-based  emergency  services  communications  could in-
clude.  But  the  Commission  ignored  all of this  and plunged  forward  (or
backward) to tie emergency  services to the existing legacy infrastructure.9 1
These requirements may drive many new VoIP entrants out of business.
1.  Background
In April 2003, a Colorado mother watched her infant son die while she
was switched from one 911 dispatcher to another.92 She blamed Comcast,
her digital phone provider, for failing to record her address accurately.93  In
early  2005,  a  Houston  teenager's  parents  were  shot  during  a robbery.94
The  teenager  used  a  Vonage  VoIP phone  to call  911  and  allegedly  had
trouble reaching  a 911  dispatcher. 95 Similarly, in March 2005  a mother in
Deltona, Florida  used  her Vonage  phone  to dial  911  when  her daughter
stopped breathing,  but was unable  to get  through.96 Her  daughter subse-
quently  died.  The  Attorneys  General  of three  states-Texas,  Michigan,
and  Connecticut-all  separately  sued  Vonage,  claiming  that  users  had
been deceived  as to Vonage's 911 capabilities. 9 7
Vonage called  itself "The  Broadband  Phone  Company," but it appar-
ently was not providing adequate 911  connectivity. At an open FCC meet-
90.  Comments of Level 3 Communications, In re IP-Enabled Servs.,  WC No. 04-36,
Petition  for Forbearance,  No.  03-266,  at  37  (filed May  28,  2004),  available at http://
gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or_pdf=pdf&iddocument=6516199232.
91.  See, e.g.,  DALE  N. HATFIELD,  A REPORT  ON  TECHNICAL AND  OPERATIONAL  IS-
SUES  IMPACTING  THE  PROVISION  OF  WIRELESS  ENHANCED  911  SERVICES  41  (2002),
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native  or_pdf-pdf&id-docu
ment-6513296239.  An  IP-enabled  emergency  service  system would  enable  "a  caller  to
send  a picture  of a vehicle  involved  in  a hit-and-run  accident  along with  a voice mes-
sage."  Id. IP-enabled emergency  services would also allow deaf users to contact others.
92.  Chris  Vanderveen,  Mom  Blames Phone Company Mix-Up for Death of Son,
9NEWS.COM,  Sept. 30,  2004, http://9news.com/acm-news.aspx?OSGNAME=KUSA&IK
OBJECTID=4c3beadf-Oabe-421  a-0057-38432f27e620&TEMPLATEID=0c76dce6-ac  if-
02d8-0047-c589c01ca7bf.
93.  Id.
94.  Ben Charny,  Deadly Delay on  Vonage 911?, CNET  NEWS.COM,  May  9,  2005,
http://news.com.com/Deadly+delay+on+Vonage+911/2100-1037-3-5700493.html.
95.  Id.
96.  See id.
97.  Eric Hellweg,  VoIP's Call  for Help, TECH. REV.,  Mar. 25,  2005,  at  1, available
at http://www.technologyreview.com/articles/05/03/wo/wo  hellwegO32505.asp  (address-
ing VoIP  issues in Texas); Ted Stevenson, State To  Target Vonage 911 Services, INTER-
NETNEWS.COM,  May  2,  2005,  http://www.intemetnews.com/infra/article.php/3501991
(addressing  VolP  issues  in Michigan);  Preston  Gralla,  Connecticut Sues  Vonage  Over
Emergency 911, NETWORKINGPIPELINE.COM,  May 5,  2005,  at  1, available  at http://www.
networkingpipeline.com/voicedata/162600024  (addressing VoIP issues in Connecticut).BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
ing  on  May  19,  2005,  people  involved  in  these  Vonage  incidents-
including  Cheryl  Waller  of Florida,  the  mother  of the  baby  girl  who
died-testified to the effect that their expectation had been that they would
be able  to reach 911 operators just as with an "ordinary"  phone.  Waller's
story in particular was extraordinarily troubling:
In  a  hushed  hearing  room  at  the  FCC  headquarters  last  May,
Cheryl  Waller choked  back tears  as she  recounted  the death  of
her three-month-old daughter. At 6:35 p.m. on Mar.  24, the baby
stopped breathing.  The  frantic  mother  dialed  911  several  times
but got only a voice recording. Finally, a neighbor reached  a 911
operator-but by the time medics arrived, it was too late. The in-
fant was pronounced  dead at 6:51 p.m.
Waller  ...  urged  the  Federal  Communications  Commission  to
pass Chairman Kevin J. Martin's proposal to require Internet car-
riers  to tighten  up their  emergency  services  within  120  days-
"seven  days  longer than  my  daughter  lived,"  said  Waller,  dis-
solving into tears. 98
It seemed  so  easy:  why not require  the  "The Broadband Phone  Com-
pany"  and  other  VoIP providers  to  make  911  service  available  to  their
subscribers,  particularly  when  people  could  die  if such  service  was  not
available?  On the  same  day  that Waller appeared  before  them,  the  FCC
Commissioners  voted 4-0 to adopt the E91 1 Order.99
Given the  differences  between  the way that traditional  telephone  net-
works work  and the way  the  internet works,  the E911  Order  was  a  very
dramatic  piece  of administrative  activity.  Briefly, 1 0 0  landline (traditional,
non-wireless  telephone) 911  works in this country because  we have  estab-
lished  a  network  of  six  thousand  Public  Safety  Answering  Points
(PSAPs),10'  whose  staffs  field  911  calls.  Specialized  routing  within  the
telephone  network,  using  centrally-programmed  switches,  ensures  that a
911  call goes to the right  PSAP. 1°2 But, in  the beginning,  basic  landline
911 calls did not arrive accompanied by location information or a callback
98.  Catherine Yang, Storm Warnings for Kevin Martin; The New FCC Chairman is
About To Confront Issues that Divide  Business, Bus. WK.,  Oct. 31,  2005,  at 59.
99.  See Press Release,  FCC,  Commission Requires  Interconnected  VolP  Providers
To  Provide  Enhanced  911  Service:  Order  Ensures  VolP  Customers  Have  Access  to
Emergency  Services  (May  19,  2005), available  at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/
attachmatch/DOC-258818A1  .pdf.
100.  See HATFIELD,  supra note 91,  for the description of 911  impossibilities that fol-
lows.
101.  Id. at 3-5; E911  order, supra note  1, at  10,251  n.14.
102.  HATFIELD, supra note 91,  at 3-5.
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number.1 0 3 This meant that the PSAP operator had no way to call the com-
plaining person back or send an ambulance  to the right destination unless
the caller was  able to describe  her whereabouts  and provide  a number-
something many people in an emergency are unable to do. 104
Using signals that automatically made analog queries to a billing data-
base, PSAPs and local telephone companies were  able to obtain the calling
number.1°5 (This  is  what  software  developers  would  call  a  "kludge,"  or
inelegant  work-around  allowing  a desired  result.)  A  separate  kludge was
set up to  allow PSAP equipment to automatically query an Automatic Lo-
cation Identification  (ALI)  database  over  a  separate  data circuit,  separate
from the  call  itself, providing  the  ALI  with  the  in-calling  phone  num-
ber. 1 06 The ALl then returned location information to the PSAP.
In  time,  local  telephone  companies  were  able  to  program  selective
routers-hardware-to  query these databases and provide both a callback
number and location information to a PSAP at the  same time that the  911
call  was  coming  in. 1°7  Thus  enhanced  911-or E911,  911  that  includes
location information and a call-back number-came  into being thirty years
ago, based not on digital signaling but on centralized router programming
by phone companies.  This was possible for telephone  companies that had
knowledge  of the  subscriber's  location  for  billing  purposes;  indeed,  this
1970s  E911  system was  dependent  on using numbers  that closely tied to
both subscriber location and existing physical network switches.
Wireless  carriers do not have selective routers of their own. They need
the  permission  and active  cooperation  of the  carriers  who  control  these
selective  routers  to connect  to them. Without these  connections  the wire-
less  industry  cannot provide  accurate  information to existing  PSAPs.  For
this reason,  the FCC  and  the wireless  industry  have  been  working  since
1993  on wireless E911 arrangements,  with countless extension and waiver
requests being filed by the wireless  companies.' °8  The details of these ne-
gotiations  are beyond the  scope of this Article.  But the bottom line  is that
given the kludges and legacy systems in place  for landline PSAPs, as well
as  the  absence  of incentives  for  landline  telephone  companies  to  allow
wireless  companies  to  interconnect  with  their  selective  routers,  it  has
103.  Id.
104.  Id.
105.  Id.at 3-4.
106.  Id.  at 4.
107.  Id. at 4-5.
108.  See Kelly  Carroll,  One Fine E911 Mess, TELEPHONYONLINE,  Aug.  20,  2001,
http://telephonyonline.com/mag/telecom  one_fme_mess/index.html  (noting  delays  and
extension requests).BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
proven  extremely  difficult  to  implement  E9 11  services  for wireless  sub-
scribers.  Because  911  continues to  be based  on  a  1970s  legacy  system, it
has taken more than ten years for nomadic  cell phones to have reliable 911
access. 1 9 Cell  phone  operators  use  tower  location  and  triangulation  to
make location information available for 911 purposes-information  that is
not available to mobile VoIP providers.
Despite the history of slow and difficult implementation  of 911 on the
wireless  side, FCC Chairman  Kevin J. Martin must have  felt he had to act
quickly to address  the searing press  coverage  of deaths  caused,  arguably,
by  inadequate  VoIP  911  service.  On May  19,  2005,  after  Cheryl  Waller
gave  her testimony  about  the death  of her daughter  and  the  Commission
adopted the  E911  Order,  Chairman Martin said:  "Today's  action  seeks to
remedy  a very serious problem-one  quite literally of life or death for the
millions of customers that subscribe to VoIP service as a substitute for tra-
ditional phone service."
11 0
In  the  E911  Order,  the  Commission  mandated  that  "interconnected
VoIP" providers be able to route all 911  calls, accompanied by a call-back
number  and  the  caller's  location,  through  the  traditional  telephone  911
network  to  appropriate  local  emergency  authorities  by  November  28,
2005.111  The Commission defined "interconnected  VoIP" as those services
that  (1) allowed  for  "real-time,  two-way" 112  voice  communications,  (2)
required  a  broadband  connection,  (3)  required  end-user  equipment  to
process  and receive  Internet  Protocol  packets,  and  (4)  allowed  users  to
both receive  calls  from  traditional telephone  networks and make  calls  to
telephone numbers.11 3 Thus, a free online voice service that made it possi-
ble for users to "call"  traditional telephone numbers and receive calls  from
the network  must find ways to get location  and callback  information to  a
local  emergency  center  through a centrally-located  and customized  piece
109.  According  to  the CEO of Nuvio,  a  VolP provider,  "The  cellular  industry  has
been grappling  with  these  [E911  implementation  issues]  for  a dozen  years."  Jon  Van,
Internet  Phone Service Provider  Files Suit, Seeks Clarity  from FCC,  CHI.  TRIB.,  Aug. 16,
2005.
110.  E911  Order, supra note  1, at  10,328  (statement  of Kevin  Martin,  FCC  Chair-
man).
111.  See id. at  10,328  (requiring  implementation  of E911  requirements  within  120
days).
112.  Id. at  10,254 n.58.
113.  Id. at  10,257-58;  Catherine  Yang, Storm  Warnings for Kevin Martin: The New
FCC Chairman is About To  Confront Issues that Divide Business, Bus. WK.,  Oct.  31,
2005,  at 41.
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of hardware-the  selective  router--controlled,  for  the  most part,  by  In-
trado. 1 14
Interconnected  VolP providers  were also directed to find  ways to  ob-
tain updated  information  as to the physical  locations of their  subscribers.
They  were  told that they had to  instruct their customers  immediately  and
obtain affirmative  acknowledgements  from  subscribers  that  they had re-
ceived  these  instructions  as  to  the  extent  of 911  service  provided  to
them.115  Providers  of these  interconnected VoIP  services  were  ordered to
find ways to make 911 services available to their subscribers, and told that
connecting to the  existing 911  legacy  structure  was  a  condition of being
permitted  to provide  services  at all.116  The Commission  noted that third-
party  providers  of outsourced  services  (including,  prominently,  Intrado)
were  available to assist interconnected VoIP providers with connections to
the traditional telephone 911 system because these providers had been cer-
tified  as  telecommunications  carriers.117  The  Commission  also  said  it
would not shield interconnected  VolP providers  from liability under state
laws  for  mistakes  occurring  in connection  with provision  of emergency
services. 118 Telephony  providers,  both wired  and wireless,  do have  such
liability protections by statute. 119
2.  Implementation Difficulties
Making  E911  services  available to consumers within four months was
impossible  to do for most VoIP companies. 2 ° The existing 911  infrastruc-
114.  As the Commission  notes, 911  systems "usually  are based on  a 25-year-old  ar-
chitecture and implemented with legacy  components  that place significant limitations  on
the  functions  that can  be  performed  over the  network."  E911  Order,  supra note  1,  at
10,252.
115.  Id.  at 10,334.
116.  Id.  at  10,272 ("Thus, interconnected VoIP providers must, as  a condition of pro-
viding that service to a consumer, provide that consumer with E911 service as outlined in
[this  Order].")
117.  See id. at 10,256-57.  The Baby Bells are required to provide access  to 911  data-
bases and interconnection to 911  facilities to all telecommunications  carriers, pursuant to
the Telecommunications Act, 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(a), 25 1(c), 271(c)(2)(B)(vii) (2000).
118.  E911 Order, supra  note  1, at  54.
119.  See, e.g., Wireless Communications and Public Safety Act of 1999, Pub.  L. No.
106-81,  § 4(a),  113  Stat.  1286,  1288  (1999)  (providing  wireless  carriers,  and their offi-
cers,  directors,  employees,  vendors  and  agents  the  same  immunity  or protection  from
liability  as local exchange  companies  enjoy in the same jurisdiction). Both liability pro-
tection  and mandated  access  to  selective routers  are  being  addressed by  draft bills now
pending in Congress. See CoMMs. DAILY, 2005 WLNR  17729142  (Nov. 3, 2005).
120.  See Charlotte  Wolter, FCC's Deadline To Make  VoIP Services E-911 Capable
Will Be Difficult To Meet, WARREN'S WASH.  INTERNET  DAILY, June  9,  2005;  CharlotteBERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
ture in the U.S.  is extremely antiquated,  to the point where even  wireless
companies  have  had great difficulty  implementing  911.  The  E9 11  Order
gives  interconnected  VoIP  providers  no  new  rights  that  will  help  them
comply, and does not obligate  local telephone companies to allow them to
connect  to the  essential  selective routers  owned by these  telephone  com-
panies. 2'  Thus,  VoP  service  providers  have  no right  to access  selective
routers,  and have  to  wait for the Baby  Bells to  slowly give them permis-
sion  to  connect.  The  E911  Order  did  not  set  rates  or  otherwise  control
what the essential  facility provider-the  incumbent local  telephone  com-
pany-could do to hold up a  VoIP provider  seeking access to the  special
emergency  communications  equipment  whose  use  the  E911  Order  man-
dated. 1 22
The  complexities  of nomadic  VoIP  services-usable  from  any  net
connection anywhere  in the world, using any area  code, over any form  of
transport-make  connection  to  the  legacy  E911  system  difficult.  Thus,
online voice providers will need to persuade  the Baby Bells to  give them
access to the necessary facilities  through intermediaries  at a sensible cost,
and load up routers  and databases with the right information, without any
protection  from liability if they make mistakes.  Compliance  may be suffi-
Wolter,  Vonage CEO Citron: No  One Can Meet FCC 911 Deadline,  NEW  TELEPHONY,
June 14,  2005, http://www.newtelephony.com/news/56h1485125.html.
121.  See FCC Adopts  Order Expanding E911  Regulation To  Include Some  VOIP
Service Providers,  TECH L. J., May  19, 2005, http://www.techlawjoumal.com/alert/2005/
05/20.asp.
122.  Vonage,  in  particular, bitterly  complained to  the FCC  that  although  BellSouth
and SBC  were giving  the appearance  of cooperating in granting access  to their selective
routers  to  Vonage,  they were  in  fact making  such  connection  difficult. See, e.g.,  Letter
from  Jeffrey  Citron,  Vonage  Chief Executive  Officer,  to  Bill  Smith,  BellSouth  Chief
Tech.  Officer, In re IP-Enabled  Servs.,  WC No.  04-36,  at  2  (Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n
May 9,  2005)  ("I write  to seek your  clarification  that BellSouth will make available  all
elements necessary  to allow Vonage  and BellSouth to implement  a solution that will al-
low for the extending  the benefits  of E911  to nomadic  VoIP consumers."),  available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&iddocument-651760
1367;  Letter  from  William  B.  Wilhelm,  Jr.,  Counsel,  Vonage,  to  Marlene  H.  Dortch,
Sec'y,  FCC,  In re IP-Enabled  Servs.,  WC  No.  04-36,  at  2  (May  10,  2005)  (attaching
April 27, 2005 letter from SBC and stating that "[C]ontrary  to the public pronouncements
of several RBOCs, many of the proposed solutions are  limited to delivery of 911 to fixed
location  end  users  with  geographically  valid  telephone  numbers."),  available  at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=-651760
1482;  Letter  from  William  B.  Wilhelm,  Jr.,  Counsel,  Vonage,  to  Marlene  H.  Dortch,
Sec'y, FCC, In re IP-Enabled  Servs., WC No. 04-36, at  1-2  (May  13,  2005) ("SBC's re-
cently announced  VolP 'solution'  is inadequate and does not fully support nomadic VolP
providers....  Vonage often has  difficulty provisioning selective router  trunking because
of limitations  in carrier interconnection  agreements."),  available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.
gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native  orpdf-pdf&iddocument=-6517605052.
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ciently expensive  to make it no longer worthwhile  for some VoIP provid-
ers to stay in business. 1 2 3
In  the  E911  Order,  the  FCC  firmly  told  providers  of interconnected
VoIP services that if they did not comply with the Order by November 28,
2005,  they would  be  forced  to  stop  offering  services  to customers. 124  In
October 2005, Nuvio (a VoIP company) moved for a stay of the E911  Or-
der's requirements. 125 Then, in November  2005, prompted by Nuvio's and
other industry  complaints, the  FCC backed down.'26 VoIP providers  were
told that if they did not comply with the E911  Order as  of November  28,
2005,  the Commission would "expect that such providers will discontinue
marketing VoIP service, and accepting new customers  for their service"  in
areas  where  E911  services  were  not  available. 12 7  The  Commission
"strongly  encourage[d]"  VoIP  providers  to  adopt  the  E911  compliance
plans that had been filed by AT&T  and Verizon when they merged with
SBC and MCI,  respectively. The AT&T  and Verizon plans  had been  ex-
acted  by the  Commission  as  a condition of the  mergers,  including  com-
mitments  not  to  accept  new  customers  in areas  where E911  service  was
not available. 12  The clear  implication to be  drawn  from  this  "strong  en-
123.  Indeed, pulver.com  has "chosen  not to offer a PSTN-connected VoIP  service in
the U.S.  because  of the  FCC's backward-looking,  anti-innovative  rules  on  E-911  and
CALEA."  E-mail from Jonathan  Askin, General Counsel, pulver.com to author (Dec. 20,
2005,  16:02:43)  (on file with author).
124.  See 47 C.F.R. § 9.5(b) (2006).
125.  See Motion  for Partial Stay, In re IP-enabled Servs. and E911  Requirements for
IP-Enabled  Service Providers,  WC Nos.  04-36, 05-196,  at 5-9  (Oct. 24, 2005), available
at  http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativeoorpdf-pdf&id-document-651
8174062.
126.  Press  Release,  VON  Coalition, VoIP Providers  Announce  Significant  Progress
on E911  (Nov.  11,  2005), at 3, available  at http://www.von.org/usr.files/911%20--%20
Survey%202005%20fmal.pdf  (reporting  that  nearly half of independent VoIP  providers
surveyed  said they  would  have  to  cut  off customers  because  they  could  not  meet the
Commission's November 28th deadline).
127.  Public  Notice,  Enforcement  Bureau  Outlines  Requirements  of November  28,
2005  Interconnected Voice Over Internet Protocol 911  Compliance Letters,  WC Nos. 04-
36, 05-196, at 4 (Nov. 7,  2005), available  at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attach
match/DA-05-2945A1 .pdf.
128.  Public Notice,  Enforcement Bureau Provides  Guidance to  Interconnected  Voice
Over Internet Protocol Service Providers Concerning the July 29,  2005 Subscriber Notifi-
cation Deadlines, WC Nos. 04-36, 05-196, at 2 (Nov.  7,  2005),  available  at http://hraun
foss.fcc.gov/edocs.public/attachmatch/DA-05-2085AI.pdf.  The  Verizon  and  AT&T
plans included a wildly kludge-y way of updating consumer location information:
By November 28, Verizon expects to have a capability to detect when a
customer's  VoiceWing  telephone  adapter  is  disconnected  from  the
network.  If we  detect  that  the  customer's  adapter  has  been  discon-
nected,  we will  suspend the customer's  service,  with the  exception  ofBERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
couragement"  was that VoIP  providers  who  did not  file  equivalent  com-
pliance plans by November  28, 2005 would be viewed as being candidates
for enforcement  actions. Wireline  and wireless providers have  never been
required to obtain  acknowledgements  from their subscribers of the limita-
tions of their 911  services, to disconnect subscribers because of these limi-
tations, or to limit their marketing efforts-even though it has taken wire-
less providers more than a decade to get E911 services working.
Most VoIP providers  missed the  November  28  deadline 1 29 and  some,
including Vonage,  continued to market services  to customers  even though
E91 1 service was not available. 130
The nature  of VoIP  services  makes  it difficult  for VoIP  providers  to
comply.  Let us  say you  are  sitting  in London  using a  U.S.  online  voice
911  calls and calls to customer service. At the same time, we will  send
the customer an e-mail  and post a message  to the customer's  Personal
Account  Manager  asking  the customer  to  confirm  his  or her existing
Registered Location, or register a new location.
While  in  suspend  status,  if the customer  attempts  to  make  any calls,
other than 911  calls  or calls to customer service, before he or she con-
firms or registers  a new  location,  Verizon  will  intercept  the  call  and
play an announcement  that will inform the customer of the service sus-
pension  and transfer the customer to  a customer  service representative
for assistance.  If the  customer  confirms  to  the  service  representative
that  the  customer's  Registered  Location  has  not changed,  full  service
will be restored by Verizon. If the customer indicates that he or she has
moved  from the existing Registered  Location, service  will remain sus-
pended unless and until the customer registers a new address in an area
where Verizon  can provide  911  service.  If the customer fails to choose
either  option  (for  example  by  hanging  up),  service  will  remain  sus-
pended ...  As a result, the customer will  be required  to register  a new
address when the service is used nomadically.
Ex Parte letter of Verizon, WC Nos. 04-36, 05-196, at 2-3  (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Oct.
21,  2005),  available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf=pdf
&iddocument=-6518171541  (citations omitted).
129.  Geoff Duncan,  VOIP Providers Largely Miss E911  Deadline, DESIGNTECH-
NICA.COM,  Nov. 30, 2005, http://news.designtechnica.com/article8935.html.
130.  Roy  Mark,  Vonage  Markets  On  Despite  FCC  E911  Order,  INTERNET-
NEWS.coM,  Nov.  29,  2005,  http://www.intemetnews.com/bus-news/print.php/356721  1.
Vonage  sought  a waiver  of the  FCC  rule,  stating  that  it had been  able  to extend  E911
service to only 26%  of its subscribers. Id. More  than a dozen other VolP companies  also
sought waivers.  It is difficult for VolIP  providers to limit who sees  their online advertise-
ments.  Additionally,  this  marketing  requirement  seems  to plunge  the FCC  deeply  into
advertising  regulation-territory  thought to be  within the purview of the Federal  Trade
Commission. See, e.g.,  ONLINE  PROFILING:  BENEFITS  AND  CONCERNS,  105th Cong.  297
(2000)  (statement of Jodie Bernstein,  Dir. of the Bureau of Consumer Prot.,  FTC). If the
FTC does get involved, it might require bold letter warnings:  "You are not buying a tele-
phone service. If you want telephone services, go somewhere else."
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service with a  Rhode Island  number, and you are  speaking to a  friend in
Singapore.  Let us assume  you get into  some kind of trouble.  How  is the
online  voice  application  supposed  to  know  who  to tell,  and what  to  tell
them to do? The answer, for the moment, is that the online voice applica-
tion is supposed to make arrangements through local phone companies and
with  all  selective  routers,  which  are  in  turn  connected  to their  relevant
PSAPs,  to provide  databases  of location  information  and callback  num-
bers.  This  location  information  is then  supposed to be  provided  and  up-
dated by  the  subscriber,  even if the subscriber  is  going  ninety miles per
hour down a Montana freeway.'  31
And what exactly is  a "VoIP  provider"?  The  internet is indifferent  to
the  nature  of the  applications  that  it  carries.  In turn,  to each  application
one bit looks just like  another. 1 32  So, for example,  instant messaging (IM)
platforms that include many straight data tools-text, maps, collective pic-
ture  drawing,  file  sharing-can  also  easily  include  voice  applications
which are also straight data tools. 1 33 The instant messaging user can talk to
131.  The FCC appears to be planning to require  any VoIP-capable  device (including
PCs) to be able by June 2006 to automatically  declare its location. In the E9 11  Order, the
Commission  asks  whether  it  should  "require  all  terminal  adapters  or  other  equipment
used in the provision of interconnected VolP service sold as of June 1, 2006 to be capable
of providing  location  information automatically,  whether embedded  in  other equipment
or  sold to  customers  as  a separate  device?"  E911  Order, supra note  1, at  10,277.  This
suggestion  that  eventually  all  VoIP-capable  applications  and  devices  (including  PCs)
should be automatically  reporting  their precise  locations  should raise  substantial privacy
concerns and worries about technical mandates. See infra Part V.
132.  As  used  in this  Article,  the term "bits"  refers  to machine-readable  representa-
tions  of information. "Bit"  is shorthand  for "binary digit,"  the smallest  unit of informa-
tion on  a machine.  Bit,  WIKIPEDIA:  THE  FREE  ENCYCLOPEDIA,  http://en.wikipedia.org/
wiki/Bit (last visited Mar.  10, 2006). A single bit can exemplify only one of two values: 0
or 1. Id.
133.  See Elena Malykhina,  AOL, Microsoft's MSN, and Yahoo are Adding VoIP Ca-
pabilities  to Their Popular  IM Software, Giving More Credence to the Burgeoning Tech-
nology, INFORMATIONWEEK,  May  16,  2005,  available at http://www.informationweek.
com/story/showArticle.jhtml?articlelD=  163101889.
Spending by U.S. companies  and public-sector  organizations  on voice-
over-IP systems will grow to $903 million this year, up from $686 mil-
lion in 2004,  according  to research  firm Gartner. Investment  in hybrid
systems,  which  handle  VoIP  and  conventional  calls,  will  grow  from
$1.5  billion to $2 billion. By 2007, Gartner predicts, 97% of new phone
systems installed in North America will be VoIP or hybrids.
These  statistics  aren't lost  on  the major interet companies.  America
Online, Microsoft's MSN division, and Yahoo are all entering the VoIP
market, armed with services and capabilities that they've added to their
popular instant-messaging software.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
others  to her heart's content.  Are IM providers  "VoIP  providers"?  At the
moment, the  answer from  the FCC  is  "not necessarily,"  because  most of
these applications  do not make  it possible  to both  send data to particular
phone numbers  and receive data "at"  a particular  phone number (and thus
are not interconnected  VoIP providers). ' 34 But in time more of these appli-
cations may have this capability, or the FCC may broaden the  scope of its
rule to include them. 135  The FCC  is already signaling that its definition  of
"interconnected  VoIP"  will broaden  to include VoIP  applications  that are
"capable  of' connection to traditional telephone networks. 1 36
More  fundamentally,  there  is  no  magic  distinction  between  "voice"
data and any other kind of data. Voice, when digitized, looks and acts just
like any other data stream. From an internet point of view, the E911  man-
date has no principled limits and could apply to any application that is ca-
pable  of connection  to  any public  network.  Although  making  nomadic
VoIP  services,  much  less  any  other  data  application,  connect  to  legacy
E9 11  hardware seems strange from an internet perspective,  it fits perfectly
with the mindset of people who have grown up in the telephone world.
A darker, less public-service-oriented  part of the telephony mindset  is
bent on squashing competitive services. Alexander Bell's own success was
made  possible by a  strong patent and investors  who were  willing to fund
what must have seemed like an endless flow of litigation.' 37 In the absence
of an unassailable patent, today's telephony providers have had to find an-
other approach to the enormous online voice marketplace.  There is at least
the  possibility  that  the  E911  order  is  an  unprincipled  or political  move,
Id. Yahoo! Messenger  is already providing  voice  services to millions of people. See Ya-
hoo Messenger, http://messenger.yahoo.com  (last visited Mar. 10, 2006).
134.  See  E91 1. Order,  supra note  1 (stating  FCC's  definition  of "interconnected
VoIP").
135.  The  FCC  is  planning  to  promptly  reconsider  the  scope  of the application  of
E9 11  requirements. See id. at 10,277. Most observers agree that there is no principled line
to  be  drawn  between  one  kind of VoIP  and  other  services  that  also  offer  voice  affor-
dances,  and that  it will  be very  difficult  to  limit  expansions  of this  mandate.  See, e.g.,
Educause,  School  and Library  Networks  Threatened  by  Proposed  CALEA Expansion,
http://educause.edu/ir/library/pdf/EPO0415.pdf  (explaining  that  the  FCC's  analysis
makes all information services, including  instant messaging and e-mail, vulnerable to the
future  imposition  of CALEA  obligations).  This  means  that  Skype,  an  extraordinarily
popular online voice  service  that has been downloaded  by more than  100 million people
will likely  soon be subject  to E911  obligations. See generally James  E. Gaskin,  What Is
Skype,  O'REILLY  NETWORK,  Aug.  4,  2005,  http://www.oreillynet.com/pub/a/network/
2005/08/04/whatisSkype.httnl.
136.  CALEA Order, supra  note 2,  39.
137.  See Mike Gorman:  Bell's Path to the Telephone, http://www3.iath.virginia.edu/
albell/homepage.html  (last visited Apr.  15,  2006).
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designed to protect the incumbents'  ability to control the market for online
voice services. The next section delineates the background for this view.
3.  The Capture  Story
At  a November  2005  telecommunications  conference  in Washington,
D.C., Stagg Newman,  a  Senior Telecommunications  Practice  Expert with
McKinsey  &  Co.,  a  management  consulting  firm,  and  a  former  Chief
Technologist  at the  FCC,  said that  he  had heard  that  a  single  company
wrote the E91 1 rule.'38  He refused to elaborate on his remarks.
Even without Mr. Newman's  last word on the subject, one can see the
influence' of third party  compliance providers  in cooperation  with incum-
bent telephony companies  in the E911  rule. Third party vendors met early
and often with staff and Commissioners,  and filed numerous comments. 3 9
Intrado,  the vendor that runs  80%  of the selective  router  and E911  infra-
structure in this country, met with staff to give presentations  or filed com-
ments sixteen times  between April  2004  and December 2005.140  Both In-
trado and Level  3 patiently explained to staff how the E911  system func-
tioned and how the FCC  should frame  its Order. 141 The FCC's June 2005
138.  Stagg  Newman,  Statement  at  pulver.com  Peripheral  Visionaries'  IP-Based
Communications Policy Summit (Nov.  10, 2005)  (notes on file with author).
139.  See generally Letter  from  Susanne  A.  Guyer,  Senior  Vice  President  of Fed.
Regulatory Affairs, Verizon,  to Marlene H. Dortch,  Sec'y, FCC, WC Nos. 04-36, 05-196
(Oct.  21,  2005),  available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-
pdf=pdf&iddocument=6518171541.
140.  Listing  of  Intrado  Comments  to  FCC,  http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/
comsrch-v2.cgi  (in  Field  4,  type  "intrado,"  then  in  Field  3,  select  "co,"  then  retrieve
document list).
141.  According  to Jonathan  Askin  of pulver.com,  the  FCC had  considerable  help  in
the technical parts of the Order from  the firms  that supply the  systems used for E911  by
telephone  companies.  E-mail from Jonathan  Askin,  General Counsel, pulver.com,  to the
author  (Dec.  22,  2005,  11:07:00)  (on  file  with author).  Even  without  this  secondhand
report,  the ex parte  filings  made by Intrado  and Level  3,  which  included many  Power-
Point presentations  and indications of telephonic  and other  contacts,  tell a skeletal  story
of influence. Many of these filings  are written too summarily  to be helpful, however. For
example,  days before the E911  Order was adopted, Intrado representatives  spoke to FCC
staff. Here is the full report of that call in the ex parte filing made by Intrado:
On May  3,  2005,  Stephen  Meer, Chief Technology  Officer of Intrado
Inc. ("Intrado"),  spoke  telephonically  with Julie  Veach, Christi  Shew-
man  and  Nicholas  Alexander  of the  Wireline Competition  Bureau  to
discuss  9-1-1  service  provisioning  for  Voice  Over  Internet  Protocol,
specifically relating  to New  York City.  Additional  items  discussed  in-
cluded  ownership of telephone number  blocks and 9-1-1  data manage-
ment scenarios.
Letter from Mary Boyd, Vice President of Gov't & External  Affairs, Intrado, to Marlene
H.  Dortch,  Sec'y,  FCC, In  re IP-Enabled  Servs.,  WC No. 04-36,  at  1 (May 5,  2005),BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
E911  Order cites  Intrado's  filings more than twenty times,  and mentions
that VoIP providers can use Intrado's  services  to connect to the dedicated
hardware  that  serves  as  the  gateway  to the  telephone  companies'  emer-
gency services  system. 142 Intrado's stock price jumped substantially during
the summer of 2005.14  With the Baby Bells and the largest non-Bell VoIP
provider as its customers, and with its almost complete control over access
to the required gateway to the E9 11  system, Intrado had every incentive to
help the FCC shape the E911  rules.
Level  3, unlike  Intrado,  argued  actively  in  the  E911  proceeding  that
the Commission  should take a flexible approach to E911  compliance  stan-
dards for VoIP providers.  For example, Level 3 noted that "VoIP's flexi-
bility and the  growth in broadband  access  will lead to  ever-increasing  use
of nomadic  or  mobile  VoIP  with  added  features  and  functionalities  not
available  on  traditional  phones  ....  ,144  Although  the  Commission  de-
clined  to take this flexible  route,  it was no  doubt comforted by Level 3's
ability to  make  compliance  by  VoIP providers  easier,  as  it  stated  in the
Order that interconnected VoIP providers could comply with the Commis-
sion's mandate in most of the households  in the country by buying Level
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf=pdf&iddocu
ment-6517596672.  A July  2005  call,  held after  the E911  Order  was  finalized, was  re-
ported as follows:
In  this meeting,  Intrado  relayed  its  commitment  to  working  with  all
parties to assist in meeting  the Commission's rules regarding VolP and
E9 11.  Intrado also  discussed issues related to  implementation  with  the
Commission and highlighted the cooperative  efforts involved in the de-
ployment of VoIP E911  services  in New York City.
Letter  from Mary  Boyd, Vice President of Gov't & External Affairs, Intrado, to Marlene
H.  Dortch,  Sec'y,  FCC,  WC  Nos.  04-36,  05-196,  at  1 (Jul.  21,  2005),  available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf-=pdf&id-dcument=651801
2587
142.  E91 1 Order, supra  note  1,  at  10,267-68.
143.  Intrado's  stock was flat at  $12  per share  from  1998, when  it went public, until
June 2005.  See Intrado, Inc.,  HoOVERS,  http://www.hoovers.com/free/co/fin/stockquote.
xhtml?COID=56660&ticker=TRDO  (last visited Dec.  21,  2005). In June 2005-after  the
E911  Order  was announced,  but before the Order was released-its  stock price  went up
to  $15;  as of December  21,  2005,  Intrado's stock price was $22.69. See id. (tracking In-
trado stock price  changes); Gene  Marcial,  The Lines Ring Off the Hook at Intrado, Bus.
WK.,  Aug.  1, 2005, available  at http://www.businessweek.com/magazine/content/05_31/
b3945127_mz027.htm.
144.  Reply  Comments of Level  3, In re IP-Enabled  Servs. & E911  Requirements for
IP-Enabled  Serv.  Providers,  WC Nos.  04-36,  05-196,  at  3 (Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm'n
Sept.  12,  2005),  available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or
pdf=pdf&id-document=6518157216.
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3's wholesale E91 1 services.'45 Level 3 pushed the Commission to require
E9 11  services of VoIP providers, at least for those services that competed
with traditional telephone  services and for which consumers had an expec-
tation of such access.1
46
The  incumbent  telephone  companies  underscored  the  availability  of
these third-party 911  solutions in their own presentations,147 while empha-
sizing their own abilities to provide  E91 1 services to  their VoIP subscrib-
ers.  ' 4 8 Meanwhile, both third-party  service  providers and public safety of-
ficials  noted that VoIP  operators were not paying  for emergency call  cen-
ters via user fees, but that third-party solution providers were making such
contributions. 49 All of this must have satisfied the Commission that com-
pliance with the E91 1 mandate made sense for VolP providers,  given that
145.  E91 1 Order, supra note  1, at  10,267-68  (citing Level  3's fact  sheet, E-91 1:  En-
hanced  911  for VoIP,  supra note  54).  Level  3  met with  the  Commission  or filed  com-
ments  more  than  forty times  in the  E911  proceeding,  and  the Commission  referred  to
Level  3  fifteen  times  in  the  E911  Order.  See  Listing  of Level  3  Comments  to  FCC,
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/comsrch  v2.cgi (in Field 4, type "level  3", then in Field
3,  select "co,"  then retrieve document list).
146.  Comments  of Level  3,  In re IP-Enabled  Servs.  &  E911  Requirements  for IP-
Enabled  Serv.  Providers,  WC  Nos.  04-36,  05-196,  at  3,  25  (Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n
Sept.  12,  2005),  available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or
pdf=pdf&iddocument=6518157216.
147.  See, e.g.,  BELLSOUTH,  E-9-1-1/VoIP  INTEGRATION,  WC Nos.  04-36, 05-196, at
4  (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n  May  12,  2005)  ("BellSouth will  provide  database  services
via Intrado which includes edits, posting, and return  of errors for resolution  by the VolP
provider."),  available at  http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf=
pdf&iddocument=6517603049;  Verizon, Current VoIP  911,  WC Nos. 04-36, 05-196,  at
4  (Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n  May  16,  2005)  (showing  "Intrado  Gateway" to  E911  sys-
tem),  available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or  .pdf=pdf&id_
document=6517602285.
148.  See supra note  148;  Ex  Parte  Comments  of  SBC  Commc'ns,  Inc.,  In  re IP-
Enabled  Servs.  &  E911  Requirements  for  IP-Enabled  Serv. Providers,  WC Nos.  04-36,
05-196, at  18 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n  Aug.  15,  2005)  ("Even before  the  Commission
adopted the  VoIP 911  Order, SBC and other  ILECs were already  offering  a  variety of
911  services  directly  to  VoIP  providers."),  available at  http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/
prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native  or .pdf=pdf&iddocument=-6518142908.
149.  Letter  from  Bruce  A.  White,  Vice  President  &  General  Counsel,  Telecomm.
Sys., to Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, WC No. 04-36, at 23 (Apr. 22, 2005), available
at  http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id__document=651
7582385;  Letter  from  Gregory  S.  Ballantine,  President,  APCO  Int'l, to  Kevin  Martin,
Chairman,  FCC, WC No.  05-196,  at  1 (Nov.  30,  2005)  (noting that  only  those  service
providers  paying  state  level  emergency  fees  should  be permitted  to  have  access  to the
numbers  needed  for  nomadic VoIP  users  to trigger  emergency  responses),  available at
http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-r-pdf-pdf&id-document=-651818
4848. TCS also noted in a later presentation that public safety officers reap almost $1 per
subscriber line in revenues, and are worried about that funding decreasing. Id.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
so many third parties stood ready to assist them to reduce the complexities
inherent  in  connecting  one-by-one  with all of the emergency  call centers
in the country.
Before permitting the  2005 mergers  of SBC/AT&T  and MCI/Verizon
to  close, the FCC apparently required  that AT&T,  MCI,  and Verizon  file
nomadic  VoIP  E911  compliance  plans.15 °  Each  of these  plans  stated  that
the entity would no longer market VoIP products  to customers in areas in
which  E911  services  were  not  available.'51  At least two  of these  plans,
AT&T  and  Verizon,  announced  compliance  solutions  that relied  entirely
on Intrado-provided  services.  The  FCC  then  applauded  these  plans  and
strongly urged other VoIP providers to follow their model. 152  The implicit
bottom line: any non-Bell, non-Vonage  independent  VoIP provider would
need  to sign up  with Intrado's  services  (whatever  their cost),  or another
third-party's  services, and stop marketing to customers who would not be
able  to receive  E911  services.153  The  combination  of the  presence  of In-
150.  See  Letter  from  Robert  W.  Quinn,  Jr.,  Vice  President  of Fed.  Gov't  Affairs,
AT&T, to Marlene  H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, WC Nos.  04-36, 05-196 (Oct. 7,  2005), avail-
able at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native  ormpdf-pdf&iddocument=
6518167082;  Letter  from Richard  S.  Whitt,  Vice President  of Fed.  Regulatory  Affairs,
MCI, to  Marlene H. Dortch, Sec'y, FCC, WC Nos. 04-36, 05-196 (Oct.  21,  2005), avail-
able at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native  ormpdf-=pdf&iddocument= -
6518171530;  Letter  from Susanne  A.  Guyer,  Senior  Vice  President of Fed.  Regulatory
Affairs,  Verizon,  to  Marlene  H. Dortch,  Sec'y, FCC, WC  Nos.  04-36, 05-196  (Oct.  21,
2005), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id
_document=-6518171541.
151.  The plans  also uniformly stated that existing VoIP customers  in areas  not served
by  911  would  be  "grandfathered,"  and  that  per-grandfathered-subscriber  contributions
would  be  made  to  local  emergency  services  organizations-ranging  up  to  $1.00  per
grandfathered  subscriber per day. See Letter from Robert W. Quinn,  Jr., Vice President of
Fed. Gov't Affairs,  AT&T, to Marlene  H.  Dortch, Sec'y, FCC,  WC Nos. 04-36,  05-196
(Oct.  7,  2005), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativeorpdf
=pdf&iddocument=-6518167082;  Letter  from Richard  S. Whitt, Vice President  of Fed.
Regulatory  Affairs,  MCI,  to  Marlene  H.  Dortch,  Sec'y,  FCC, WC  Nos.  04-36,  05-196
(Oct.  21,  2005),  available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or
pdf=pdf&id-document=-6518171530;  Letter from  Susanne A. Guyer,  Senior Vice  Presi-
dent of Fed. Regulatory  Affairs, Verizon,  to Marlene  H. Dortch, Sec'y,  FCC, WC Nos.
04-36,  05-196 (Oct.  21,  2005), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.
cgi?native.orjpdf=pdf&iddocument=-6518171541.
152.  See  Public  Notice,  Enforcement  Bureau  Provides  Guidance  to  Interconnected
Voice Over Interet Protocol Service Providers  Concerning the July 29, 2005  Subscriber
Notification  Deadlines, supra note  128,  at  1-2  n.5  (discussing  the compliance  plan that
AT&T  is  implementing  to  address  July  29, 2005  Subscriber  Notification  Deadlines  for
VolPs).
153.  The  Commission's adjuration  that VoIP firms  stop marketing to  customers  (or
accepting  new  customers)  in  all  areas  where  they are  not  transmitting  911  calls  to  the
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trado and Level  3, with their long customer  lists and control  over the se-
lective routers, together with the desire of the Baby Bells to avoid compe-
tition  from  upstart  independent  VoIP  providers,  provided  an  irresistible
impetus for the resulting FCC rule.
A further  capture  wrinkle  makes  the  story  even  plainer:  In  a  public
session held at  CompTel  on December  14,  2005,  FCC  Chairman Martin
told  an  audience  of local  telephone  companies  (non-Bell  companies  at-
tempting to compete with the Baby Bells) that the E911 Order had created
enormous  market  opportunities  for them. 1 5 4 Why?  Because,  like Intrado,
these local telephone companies  can qualify as "telecommunications  carri-
ers."  VoIP providers,  by  contrast, are  "information  services."  Only "tele-
communications  carriers"  can  be  certified  to connect  directly  to  the  in-
cumbents'  selective routers-the hardware  that accesses the special legacy
emergency  system that VoIP providers  are required to use according  to the
E911  Rule.  Indeed,  the  incumbent  Bell  companies  must by  law  provide
interconnection to these companies. Martin suggested that this was a posi-
tive development for these companies:
"That  [selling  retail  access  to  VoIP  providers  to  selective
routers] is probably a business  opportunity for many of the  carri-
ers that are  out there,"  Martin said.  .. "I have continued to be-
lieve that the competitive  carriers  are going to play an important
role and  many of our rules and regulations should  be viewed  as
actually an opportunity for people."'55
This  is a breathtaking  statement. It strongly  suggests that the  FCC not
only  supported  obligating  VoIP providers  to  go  through the  legacy  sys-
tem-a  solution  that  was bad  enough  in itself-but  was also  suggesting
that VoIP  providers  work  through middlemen.'56  And, to boot,  the  FCC
appropriate  PSAP  in  full compliance  with the  Commission's  rules  is a very telephony-
minded approach  that raises fascinating questions. See Enforcement Bureau Outlines Re-
quirements, supra  note  127, at 4. Although telephone companies know who their custom-
ers are (because they run physical,  centrally-controlled  networks), online VolP providers
cannot limit who sees  their online  advertisements.  VoIP providers  could perhaps comply
with this FCC marketing ban by placing disclaimers  on their online advertisements ("this
service may not be available in all areas"), but that suggestion raises yet another question:
is the FCC becoming  an  advertisement regulator?  Isn't that advertising  the terrain  of the
Federal Trade Commission? In effect, the FCC is mandating that VoIP providers post ads
stating, "Buy our service. It may kill you."
154.  Drew Clark, FCC Chief Tells VoIP Firms More Regulation is an Option, NAT'L
J.'s TECH. DAILY, Dec.  14, 2005.
155.  Id.
156.  Recall  that the FCC  did not require in the E911 Order that the Baby Bells open
up their  selective routers  to VoIP  companies.  E911  Order,  supra note  1, at  10,269  (ex-BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
supported the middleman-market  as an "opportunity"  for its familiar regu-
lated entities, telephone companies.
If the Commission was captured  along these lines, it was not necessar-
ily  acting  corruptly.  The widely-reported  Vonage-related  deaths  in  2005
may  have  made  the  FCC's  telephony-minded  staff  feel  a  need  to  act
quickly.  Those  who  are  steeped  in telephony  strongly  believe  that  any
communications  service  offered  to  the  public  must  provide  access  to
emergency  officials  and that technological  developments  must not be  al-
lowed to avoid this regulatory requirement.  That dramatic May 2005 FCC
meeting,  marking  the  adoption  of the  E911  mandate,  made  this  point
clear. 15 7
Given  all the  actors  involved  and the telephony  mindset of staff, the
stars were aligned  in such a way that the Commission was emboldened to
adopt what it itself termed an "aggressive"  strategy. ' 58 Arguably, the Com-
pressing no mandate for interconnection, but stating "[w]e  expect and strongly encourage
all parties  involved to work together to develop and deploy VoIP  E911  solutions").  Dur-
ing this same session, Chairman Martin rejected the notion that legislation was needed to
require the Baby Bells to open  connections to their  selective  routers to  VolP providers.
Congress has been considering  such legislation. See S. 1063,  109th  Cong. (2005).  Chair-
man Martin also implicitly rejected a plan, advanced by VolP providers, for the appoint-
ment  of an  independent  administrator  to  address  the  emergency  number  compatibility
with nomadic VoIP providers.  Clark, supra note  154. No such administrator was needed
because  Level  3 and  other  middlemen  would  provide  interconnection  services  to  the
VoIP providers. Id.
157.  During that meeting,  one local emergency services  employee said, passionately:
We  should  never allow an  embedded  base of technology  subscribers
and users to grow out of control before wrestling the technological and
policy challenges to the  ground. Any technology,  any service  offering,
any  entrepreneurial  venture  that  would  seek  to  gain  acceptance  from
the public  should always have 911  and access to emergency services as
its first item on the checklist before products and services are delivered
to the consumer.
FCC  Open  Meeting,  May  19,  2005  (statement  of  John  Melcher,  Executive  Director,
Greater Harris  County 9-1-1  Emergency Network).  It  is hard to  imagine  that  all  online
services  (including  newspapers and banks)  should come provisioned  with E911  service,
but  the  telephony  mindset  might  lead  in  this  direction.  In  introducing  Mr.  Melcher,
Chairman Martin referred  to the "invasion"  of VolP services. Id.
158.  E911  Order,  supra note  1, at  10,266-67  ("While  120  days  is  an  aggressively
short amount of time  in  which to  comply  with these requirements,  the threat  to public
safety if we delay further  is too  great and demands near immediate  action.")  In a recent
paper,  J. Scott Marcus  expressed  his amazement  at the  overbearing  nature  of the  E911
VoIP edict, saying:
What  is striking  in the case  of the emergency  services order..,  is the
degree  to  which it imposes harsh, lopsided,  even Draconian  regulation
on  new market entrants....  Given the VoIP industry's active  engage-
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mission's  E911  order was  impossible to implement  by  independent VoIP
providers  and  deeply  favored  the  incumbent  Baby Bells. The  Order also
represented  a missed opportunity. The  FCC had nipped in the bud the de-
velopment  of more  flexible IP-based  emergency  response systems,  which
might have been extremely helpful to consumers.
C.  CALEA
As with the E911  story, the CALEA  controversy  and the FCC's adop-
tion of the  CALEA Order  in August  2005  represents  a wealth  of missed
opportunities,  permission-culture  regulatory  heavy-handedness,  and  will-
ful misreadings of statutory requirements. If law enforcement wants access
to  data,  it  can  clearly  get  it  without  insisting  that  it be  in  pre-digested
form. 59 Forcing data into  forms that fit the era of telephony  require forc-
ing  applications  to  collect  recognizable  data-which  in  turn  will require
those  applications  to  be  designed,  in advance,  to meet  the  needs  of law
enforcement.
1.  Background
The  1994  CALEA statute "requires  telecommunications  common car-
riers to  ensure  that  new technologies  and  services  do not hinder  law  en-
forcement access to the communications  of a subscriber who is the subject
of a  court order  authorizing  electronic  surveillance..  .,,160  To  this  end,
CALEA  mandates  the  carriers  to be able  to  "expeditiously  isolat[e]  and
enabl[e]  the government, pursuant to a court order or other lawful authori-
zation,  to  access  call-identifying  information  that is  reasonably  available
to  the  carrier  ...  .,,6"  CALEA  also  requires  that  carriers  deliver  inter-
cepted  communications  and  call-identifying  information  to  the  govern-
ment with the emergency  services  community, and their significant  in-
vestment  in customer  education  on this point,  it  is difficult  to  under-
stand the rationale.
J. Scott Marcus, Is the U.S. Dancing  to a Different Drummer?, 60 COMM. & STRATEGIES
39 (4th Quarter  2005) (discussing  differences between U.S.  and European  telecommuni-
cations  regulatory  approaches),  available at http://www.idate.fr/fic/revuetelech/132/
CS60%20MARCUS.pdf.
159.  The traditionally  cooperative  nature of the relationship  between telcos and law
enforcement is well-known, and has recently become the  subject of broad public scrutiny.
See Scott  Shane, Attention in N.S.A. Debate Turns to Telecom Industry, N.Y. TIMES,  Feb.
10,  2006, at All ("Some [telecommunications]  companies are  said by current and former
government  officials  to  have  provided  the  eavesdropping  agency  access  to  streams  of
telephone and Internet traffic entering and leaving the United States.").
160.  H.R.  REP.  No.  103-827,  at  16  (1994),  reprinted in  1994  U.S.C.C.A.N.  3489,
3496.
161.  Communications  Assistance  for Law Enforcement  Act (CALEA),  Pub.  L.  No.
103-414,  § 103,  108 Stat.  4279,  4281 (1994).BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
ment  "in  a  format  such  that they  may be  transmitted  ...  by  the  govern-
ment to a location other than the premises of the carrier." 62
CALEA  was  a  heavily-negotiated  statute  that sought  to  make  digital
telephony  service  architecture  tappable  by  law  enforcement.  The act  au-
thorized  the federal government  to pay $500 million  in  industry costs  in-
curred before  1995  to bring telephony  facilities  into compliance  with  law
enforcement's  interception  requirements. 1 63 But  Congress  wrote  CALEA
so as not to apply to "information  services,"  defined to be services "gener-
ating,  acquiring, storing, transforming, processing, retrieving, utilizing,  or
making available  information via telecommunications,"  including services
"that permit[]  a customer  to  retrieve  stored  information  from,  or  file  in-
formation for storage  in, information storage facilities." ' 164 In other words,
CALEA  did not apply  to  the  internet  or online  applications.  It  bears  re-
peating:  The  internet  and  online  applications  were  specifically  excluded
from CALEA's coverage. 16 5
The  CALEA  Order  released  in  August  2005  interprets  CALEA  to
cover any services provided by non-telephone companies  that are in some
way (however  minor)  replacements  for  telephone  services.166  As  I have
explained  elsewhere,'67  this  interpretation  is  at  best  tenuous.  Although
CALEA  defines covered  "telecommunications carriers"  to include entities
(1) engaged  in providing switching  or transmission services  (2)  to the  ex-
tent that  the Commission  finds  such  services  to be  "a  replacement  for  a
substantial  portion  of the  local  telephone  exchange  service,"  the  statute
also exempts "information  services"  from the definition  of "telecommuni-
cation carrier."' ' 6 8  And broadband providers and VoIP applications (as well
162.  Id.
163.  Id. § 102(6)(A),  108  Stat. at 4279.
164.  Id. § 110,  108 Stat. at 4288.
165.  See,  e.g.,  H.R.  REP.  No.  103-827,  at 23  ("[T]he  capability  requirements  only
apply to  those services  or facilities that  enable  the subscriber to make,  receive  or direct
calls [and] [t]hey do not apply to information services, such as electronic mail services, or
on-line services, such  as Compuserve,  Prodigy, America-On-line or Mead  Data, or Inter-
net service providers.").
166.  CALEA Order, supra note 2,  10. FCC Commissioner Copps acknowledged the
shortcoming of the Commission's attitude concerning  "substantial  replacement,"  saying:
"To me, it strains  credibility to suggest that Congress intended  'a replacement  for a sub-
stantial portion of the local  telephone exchange'  to mean  the replacement of any portion
of any  individual  subscriber's  functionality."  Id.  35  (separate  statement of Michael  J.
Copps, Comm'r).
167.  See generally Crawford, Shortness of Vision, supra note  3.
168.  47 U.S.C.  § 1001(8) (2000) (defining "telecommunications carrier").
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as any  other internet application)  are  "information  services"--indeed,  the
FCC has said so on many occasions.
1 69
The  statute  intended  to  provide  law  enforcement  faced  with  digital
phone  systems  with the  tappability  it had  been used  to  with analog  and
mechanical  phone systems.  Although  so far there  is no evidence  that law
enforcement  is having  difficulty  implementing  warrants  for  information
from broadband providers  or VoIP applications, 7° law enforcement  asked
the FCC to "clarify"  its reading of CALEA to include these companies.'
Law enforcement  takes the view that because these new technologies  and
services  are  relied  on  by  the  American  public, CALEA  should apply  to
them' 72--even though the CALEA statute itself appears to specifically ex-
clude them.
In response to law enforcement's requests, the FCC issued its CALEA
Order  in  the  fall  of  2005.173  The  CALEA  Order  stated  generally  that
169.  E.g., DSL Order, supra note 32 (classifying  wireline  broadband internet access
service (DSL) as an information service under the Communications  Act).
170.  BellSouth  cited  an  April  2004  audit report  of the  Department  of Justice  that
stated: "[T]he  FBI was unable  to provide  the [Auditor]  with data  showing the extent to
which state and local law enforcement has been unable to conduct electronic  surveillance
as a result of these  delays [in implementing CALEA solutions]." Comments  of BellSouth
Corp., In re CALEA & Broadband Access & Servs.,  ET No. 04-295,  at 2-3 n.2  (Nov. 8,
2004)  (on file  with  author)  (citing  U.S.  DEP'T  OF  JUSTICE,  OFFICE  OF  THE  INSPECTOR
GEN.,  AUDIT  REP.  04-19, IMPLEMENTATION  OF  THE  COMMUNICATIONS  ASSISTANCE  FOR
LAW ENFORCEMENT  ACT BY THE FED. BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION  6 (2004)).
171.  Law enforcement  initially asked for a declaratory  ruling rather than a rulemak-
ing with  respect to  the CALEA  scope  issues. FCC  declaratory  rulings  are  supposed  to
terminate  a controversy or remove  uncertainty regarding the application of existing laws.
47  C.F.R. §  1.2 (2000). Law  enforcement may have gone this route in order to avoid the
notice-and-comment  rulemaking that would be required  by the Administrative Procedure
Act  for  the  promulgation  of new  rules  or  changes  to  existing  rules.  15  U.S.C.  § 553
(2000). The Commission proceeded, however, to issue a Notice of Proposed Rulemaking
concerning  CALEA's  scope.  CALEA  Order,  supra note  2,  5  ("The  Commission  de-
clined to  issue  a declaratory  ruling,  finding  instead  that it  was necessary  to  compile  a
more  complete  record  on  the  factual  and  legal  issues  surrounding  the  applicability  of
CALEA to broadband  Internet access  services  and VoIP services,  and thus issued  a No-
tice of Proposed Rulemaking.")
172.  See  AskCALEA,  Frequently  Asked  Questions,  http://www.askcalea.netfaqs.
html (last visited Feb.  28, 2006).
173.  CALEA Order, supra  note 2.  As I have  explained elsewhere, the FCC's issuance
of the CALEA NPRM  and subsequent  CALEA Order was very likely a quid pro quo for
the DOJ's willingness to take the 9th Circuit's Brand  X  decision  to the Supreme Court on
the Commission's behalf. Crawford,  Shortness of Vision, supra note  3.  The DOJ is the
FCC's lawyer  for petitions  for certiorari,  and  likely refused  to  take Brand  X  to  the Su-
preme  Court without  a  clear  understanding  with the  FCC as  to  how "information  ser-
vices"  would be treated  under CALEA.  Section 4020)  of the  Communications  Act  andBERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
CALEA  applies to all facilities-based broadband  internet access providers
(including  wireless,  DSL,  and  cable)  and  providers  of "interconnected
VoIP"  services. The Order included within its scope  all VolP applications
that are capable of connecting to the traditional telephone network,  even if
they do not actually connect. 174 In addition, the Commission (prompted by
law enforcement)  appears  to be taking the position that all private  broad-
band networks that are capable of connecting to the public internet are also
covered by the FCC's interpretation of CALEA. 1 7 5 The FCC announced in
the CALEA Order that it would issue a second order (on an unstated time-
table), addressing the standards for CALEA compliance. 176
section 2350(a) of the Judicial Review  Act give the Commission the right to file petitions
for writ of certiorari.  But, "[u]nder  current practice, the Commission coordinates its peti-
tions  with  the  Solicitor  General."  Marshall  J.  Breger  & Gary  J.  Edles, Established By
Practice: The  Theory and Operation of Independent Federal Agencies, 52  ADMIN.  L.
REv.  1111,  1252  (2000).  Litigation  authority  matters.  When  the DOJ  wields  litigation
authority,  the President  can  ensure  that "government"  speaks  with  a  single  voice.  See
generally Neal  Devins, Political Will and the  Unitary Executive:  What Makes an Inde-
pendent Agency Independent?, 15  CARDOZO L.  REv.  273,  274  (1993);  Neal  Devins  &
Michael  Herz, The Battle That Never Was: Congress, the White House, and Agency Liti-
gation Authority, 61  LAW  & CONTEMP.  PROBS.  205,  205  (1998)  ("For DOJ and  agency
lawyers,  [the  question  of litigation  authority]  is of monumental  importance  [but]  [f]or
members of Congress and their staff..  . this question is almost always a non-starter.")
174.  CALEA Order, supra note  2,  39 ("To be clear, a service offering is "intercon-
nected VoIP" if it offers the  capability for users to receive calls from and terminate  calls
to the PSTN; the offering is covered by CALEA for all VoIP communications, even those
that do not involve the PSTN."). The CALEA Order generally adopted the  E911  Order's
definition of "interconnected  VoIP"  and indicated  that the definition of "interconnected
VoIP" might itself evolve over time. Id.  39 n. 108.
175.  CALEA  does  not  apply  to  "equipment,  facilities,  or  services  that support  the
transport  or  switching  of  communications  for  private  networks."  47  U.S.C.
§ 1002(b)(2)(B) (2000).  But footnote  100 of the CALEA Order appears  to eviscerate this
private network exception,  by stating that any networks that are capable of connecting to
the intemet, and any "facilities"  involved in these networks, are  covered by CALEA. See
CALEA Order, supra note 2,  36 n.  100. This broadening of CALEA  in footnote  100 of
the CALEA Order, using notions taken directly from the DOJ's Reply  Comments  in this
proceeding,  and has  caused  universities  and other  private  network providers  to  sue the
FCC. See Reply  Comments  of the U.S.  Dep't of Justice,  In re CALEA and Broadband
Access Services,  ET No. 04-295,  at  18 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Dec.  21,  2004), avail-
able at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&iddocument=
6516885861;  see also infra note  201.  Arguments  against footnote  100  are entirely  sepa-
rate from  the  "information  services"  attack  on  the  CALEA Order.  It  is not  clear what
precisely is meant by "facilities  that support the connection of the private network" to the
internet, a notion that was suggested  in the  DOJ's reply comments. See infra text accom-
panying note 220.
176.  CALEA Order, supra  note 2,  3.
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FCC Commissioner Abernathy noted the weakness of the FCC's legal
claim at the time the CALEA NRPM was issued, saying:
The NPRM we are issuing proposes a plausible  interpretation of
the  "substantial  replacement"  provision  in  CALEA  that  would
extend  the  assistance-capability  requirements  to  broadband  ac-
cess  services  and  IP  telephony.  But  such  an  extension  clearly
would  be  fraught  with legal  risk.  The  Commission thus would
benefit  greatly from  further congressional guidance  in  this
area.  177
She again expressed her concern when the Order was released, saying:
Because  litigation  is  as  inevitable  as  death  and taxes,  and  be-
cause some might not read the statute  to permit the  extension of
CALEA to  the  broadband  Internet  access  and VoIP  services  at
issue  here,  I have  stated  my concern that  an  approach  like  the
one we adopt today is not without legal risk. 1 78
Congress has yet to  address this point. The FCC will likely extend the
scope  of its  CALEA  requirements  even  beyond  "interconnected  VoIP"
(defined in the E911  proceeding  to  mean applications  that are  capable  of
both  receiving  calls  from  and  making  calls  to  the  traditional  telephone
network) to other online applications  with fewer direct connections to tra-
ditional phone numbers. 1 79
2.  Implementation Difficulties
The  Order  sets  a  definite  date  for broadband  facilities  providers  and
"interconnected  VoIP"  providers  to  comply  with  CALEA:  Eighteen
months following November  15,  2005  (or in May  2007), after which cov-
ered  entities  will  be  subject  to  $10,000  fines  for  each  day  of  non-
compliance.'  The trouble is, however, that the FCC has set no standards
for  what  CALEA  "compliance"  means  for  newly-covered  entities.  By
making  compliance  begin  before  defining  what  companies  must  do  to
177.  Notice of Proposed Rulemaking  and Declaratory  Filing, In re Commc'ns Assis-
tance  for Law Enforcement Act and Broadband  Access and Servs.,  19 F.C.C.R.  15,676,
15,772 (Aug. 4, 2004) (statement of Kathleen Q. Abernathy,  Comm'r) (emphasis added),
available  at http://hraunfoss.fcc.gov/edocs-public/attachmatch/DOC-250547A2.doc.
178.  CALEA Order, supra note 2 (statement of Kathleen Q. Abernathy,  Comm'r).
179.  E911  Order, supra note  1, at  10,277  ("Are there  any other services  upon which
the  Commission  should impose  E91 1 obligations?");  CALEA Order, supra note  2,  39
n.  108 ("To the extent that the Commission modifies  its definition of interconnected VoIP
in the future, the CALEA obligations  we establish today for interconnected VoIP provid-
ers will reflect such modifications.")
180.  CALEA Order, supra note 2,  3.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
comply,  the  Commission  has  put  technology  providers  in  an  extremely
difficult position; they may end up  investing in compliance  measures  that
are  later found to  be unnecessary,  or building in  elements  that later  must
be retrofitted to conform to a compliance scheme.
As an initial matter, it was unclear exactly what entities the Order cov-
ered,  given  its  murkiness  on  the  subject  of  "private  networks"''  and
CALEA's  apparent  complete  exclusion  of "information  services."  Also,
there  are many outstanding  questions under the general heading of "com-
pliance."  What  is "call-identifying  information"  for broadband providers?
Although  Section  1001(2)  of CALEA  defines  "call-identifying  informa-
tion"  as "dialing  or signaling  information that identifies the origin, direc-
tion, destination,  or  termination  of each  communication  generated  or re-
ceived by a subscriber by means of any equipment, facility, or service of a
telecommunications  carrier," ' 112 that definition  does not necessarily  fit the
online  world.'83  Under  current  surveillance  statutes,  the  content  of com-
munications  may not be  made available to government entities absent ap-
propriate  warrants.  But because  all online  packets contain  both "header"
information  (about routing)  and "payload" or content information, it is not
clear how  online services can comply with CALEA's mandate.  CALEA's
requirements  that  the  privacy  of subscribers  be  protected  and  that  call-
identifying  information  may not include  "any  information  that  may dis-
close  the  physical  location  of the  subscriber" '84  further  complicate  this
question for online applications. 85
181.  See infra note 204.
182.  47 U.S.C. § 100 1(2) (2000).
183.  In the CALEA Order, the Commission  said that this and other questions  would
be  answered  in a forthcoming  Order, including  "the ability of broadband  Internet  access
providers and VolP providers to provide all of the capabilities that are required by section
103 of CALEA" and "what those  capability  requirements mean  in a broadband  environ-
ment."  CALEA Order, supra note 2,  46. Section 1002  broadly requires covered entities
to  ensure that  their equipment,  facilities,  and  services  enable  interception,  isolate  call-
identifying  information  "that  is reasonably available  to the  carrier,"  allow this informa-
tion to be delivered  to  law enforcement  in an approved  format, and protect subscribers'
privacy and the confidentiality of the interception. 47 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2)  (2000).
184.  47  U.S.C.  § 1002(a)(2)(B)  (2000).  Specifically,  section  1002(a)(4)  states  that
common  carriers  should  not disclose  "call-identifying  information"  that is  "not author-
ized to be intercepted."  The Commission has said that "privacy concerns could be impli-
cated if carriers were to give to [law enforcement  agencies] packets  containing both call-
identifying  and call  content information  when only the former was authorized."  CALEA,
Third Report and Order,  14 F.C.C.R. 16,794,  48 (1999).
185.  See Crawford, Shortness of Vision, supra note 3, at 723 (noting that IP addresses
may in fact reveal the physical location of users.)
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What new  designs will be required of VoIP applications?  What infor-
mation  is "reasonably  available"  to these  entities?" 8 6  Congress  sought to
standardize  the  forms of data delivered  to law enforcement,  but the  Com-
mission has  not identified  acceptable  forms  of data.  The  FCC expressly
tabled  for later  Orders  the  meaning  of compliance  and potential  exemp-
tions from coverage.187
The  implementation  of CALEA in  the telephone world has been (and
continues  to be)  extremely  difficult.  Law enforcement  rejected  an  initial
industry-created  standard for telephony compliance (the J-standard),  and it
then proposed an elaborate  "punchlist" of desired compliance elements.188
This "punchlist"  led to  extensive litigation and  further FCC action lasting
more than  a decade.189  Now,  in the  online  context,  law  enforcement  has
requested that compliance  standards be  set by industry, with law enforce-
ment and the FCC to later deem those standards deficient or not. 190
This  method  of  proceeding  (decide  generally  who  is  covered  by
CALEA, using  dubious  legal  reasoning,  without deciding what  standards
of compliance  apply  to those  entities)  creates  enormous  risks for entities
newly  covered  by CALEA. If they  are  found  in  the  future  to  have  built
products  considered  "deficient"  by law enforcement,  they run  the risk of
having  their services  taken off the market  and  incurring  enormous  fines.
Indeed,  law  enforcement  emphasized  to  the  FCC  that  service  providers
should build their systems  in the  first place to be CALEA-compliant,  be-
cause  it would  be  expensive  to have to retrofit  them later.' 9 1  All prudent
businesses will want to have  law enforcement approve  their services,  sug-
gested the DOJ:
Service providers would be well advised to seek guidance  early,
preferably  well before  deployment  of a  service,  if they  believe
that their service  is not covered by CALEA ....  DOJ would cer-
186.  The  CALEA does  not  define  or  interpret  the term  "reasonably  available."  See
generally CALEA Order, supra  note 2.
187.  Id.  3.
188.  For the history of this battle,  see generally CALEA,  Third Report and Order,  14
F.C.C.R. 16,794,  16,795-802  (Aug. 26,  1999).
189.  Seeid.  2-11.
190.  Reply Comments of U.S. Dep't of Justice, In re CALEA and Broadband Access
and Servs.,  at 39-43,  ET  No. 04-295  (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n  Nov.  8, 2004)  (arguing
that DOJ  prefers  to  use  the  deficiency  petition  process  to  resolve  standards  disputes),
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf-pdf&iddocu
ment=6516793569.
191.  Id.  at 44-45.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
tainly consider  a  service provider's  failure  to request  such guid-
ance in any enforcement  action. 192
This is a threat: come negotiate with us first, or you will run the risk of
being subject to penalties later. The warning flies in the face of the legisla-
tive history  of CALEA, for  Congress  said when  the  statute  was adopted
that  "if  a  service of [sic]  technology  cannot reasonably  be  brought  into
compliance  with  the interception  requirements,  then  the  service  or tech-
nology can be deployed,"  and rejected "original versions of the legislation,
which  would have barred  introduction  of services  or  features  that  could
not be tapped." ' 193
But  service  providers  reading  the CALEA  Order  had to  take law  en-
forcement's  pre-approval  approach  seriously  because it was apparent that
law enforcement  was  feeling  powerful.  This  was extremely  awkward  for
technology providers,  because  they were  unsure  what the standards  were
to which  they were  going  to  need to build,  and, in some  cases,  whether
they  were  covered  by  the  statute's  mandates  in  the  first  place.  The
CALEA  Order  arguably created  a  cloud over innovation  and product  de-
velopment,  particularly  for  smaller  technology  providers  who  might  be
unable to bear  the costs  of potentially  unlimited compliance  requests  by
law enforcement. 194
For  example,  pulver.com  makes  a  free  service  called  Free  World
Dialup  available  to  the  public.  Free  World  Dialup  (FWD)  uses peer-to-
peer  connections  between people  communicating,  but  is capable  of con-
necting to the traditional telephone network. 1 95  Because it is a free service,
no  compliance  costs  are  bearable.  But pulver is unsure whether  CALEA
applies to Free  World Dialup, and has therefore  decided  to  cease  to pro-
vide FWD in the U.S.196  Similarly,  Skype is a peer-to-peer application that
192.  Id.  at 11.
193.  H.R. REP. No. 103-827, at 23  (1994).
194.  For example,  a  small  business  making mesh  network  access  available to  rural
areas  (by providing  equipment  that allows  each  computer  to  seek out  other  nodes that
may or may not be connected to the internet) might be forced under the CALEA Order to
comply with unpredictable  "punchlist" demands  by law  enforcement,  and would  likely
respond by going out of business. CALEA compliance  would likely be nearly  impossible
for open source  projects that  always publish their  code publicly. See Comments  of 8x8,
Inc.  et  al.,  In  re CALEA,  ET  No.  04-295,  and Broadband  Access and  Services,  RM-
10865,  at  1-5  (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n  Jan.  31,  2005)  (petitioning  for reconsideration
and  clarification  of the  CALEA  applicability  Order),  available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.
gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native  or_pdf=pdf&iddocument=6518192043.
195.  See FWD, http://www.freeworlddialup.com  (last visited Apr.  15,  2006).
196.  Greg Piper, Groups Ask Appeals Court to Overturn FCC  CALEA  Order,  COMM.
DAILY,  Oct.  26,  2005;  E-mail  from  Jonathan  Askin,  General  Counsel,  pulver.com,  to
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has been downloaded by more than  150 million people.197  Subscribers can
purchase  from  Skype  the ability  to  connect to traditional  telephone  num-
bers  and to receive  calls from traditional  telephone  subscribers.  It is un-
clear whether Skype is covered by CALEA.'98
Although  the  first  CALEA  order  issued  by  the  FCC  covers  only
scope-the question of which entities  are considered by the FCC to be ob-
ligated to comply with CALEA-law  enforcement, in the coming months,
will  likely  dictate  to the  FCC its  strong  view  of the mandatory  require-
ments  to  be  applied  to  the  internet  and  VoIP  applications.' 99  And,  of
course, VeriSign stands ready to provide the data formats preferred by law
enforcement.  Indeed, law enforcement has cited VeriSign's  service pitches
in arguing  that CALEA  compliance will not be  expensive  and, therefore,
that the costs for such compliance may be borne by the businesses covered
by the CALEA statute.2 ° 0
Soon  after the FCC published the  CALEA  Order,  five  sets of parties
sought  to have  it stayed or reversed  by  the  D.C.  Circuit.2 0'  For example,
Susan  P. Crawford,  Assistant Prof. of Law, Benjamin  N. Cardozo  School of Law  (Dec.
20,  2005  3:53:00  pm)  (on file  with  author) (noting that pulver.com  has "chosen  not to
offer a PSTN-connected  VoIP service in the US because of the FCC's backward-looking,
anti-innovative rules on E-911 and CALEA").
197.  In  late  2005,  eBay  purchased  Skype  for  $2.6 billion.  Richard  Waters  & Paul
Taylor, Ebay, Skype  Deal Challenges Rivals, FT.CoM,  Sept.  12,  2005,  http://news.ft.
com/cms/s/45b40bd0-2326-  11 da-86cc-00000e25 11 c8.html.
198.  Ryan  Singel,  Furor Grows  Over Internet Bugging, WIRED  NEWS  (Oct.  20,
2005), http://www.wirednews.com/news/technology/0,69277-0.html  (noting that CALEA
Order "appears to pull in" Skype; Skype did not return a call seeking comment).
199.  The FCC announced in the CALEA Order that it would issue a second order (on
an unstated timetable) addressing  the standards for CALEA compliance.  CALEA Order,
supra note  2,  3. The  generally-accepted  wisdom of FCC-watchers  was  that  the FCC
would not refuse any requests law enforcement  made  for particular elements  of compli-
ance.
200.  Joint Reply Comments  of U.S.  Dep't of Justice,  FBI,  & DEA,  In re Joint Peti-
tion for Rulemaking to Resolve Various Outstanding Issues  Concerning the Implementa-
tion  of CALEA,  RM-10865,  at  47  n.  114  (Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm'n  Apr.  27,  2004)
("[Concerning]  CALEA compliance  costs..,  one solution vendor (Verisign) stated  in its
comments that. ..  solutions are available at reasonable prices...  Verisign's ex parte pres-
entation  dated April  15,  2004 shows, the CALEA capital  costs for VOIP  and IP-enabled
services..,  range  from  $100,000  to  405,000  per  year."),  available  at  http://
gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&id-document=-6516182053.
201.  All  of these cases  were  filed in  the D.C.  Circuit  with  the  FCC  and the United
States  as  respondents:  No.  05-1404,  American  Council  on  Education;  No.  05-1408,
American  Library Association, Association of Research Libraries, Center for Democracy
& Technology,  COMPTEL, Electronic  Frontier Foundation, Electronic  Privacy Informa-
tion Center, Pulver.com,  Sun  Microsystems; No. 05-1438,  American Civil Liberties Un-
ion;  No. 05-1451,  Pacific Northwest GigaPOP,  Corporation  for Education Network  Ini-BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
the American  Council on Education (ACE), a trade association for institu-
tions of higher education  in the U.S.,  filed a  lawsuit on Oct. 24, 2005,  al-
leging that the  Order would cause a  $7  billion upgrading  expense to  col-
leges  and  universities  who  provide  broadband  access  to  others. 2 °2  ACE
argued that the "incredible  cost of compliance"  made the Order an ineffi-
cient  approach  to  assisting  law  enforcement.2 3  ACE  also  noted  that
CALEA cannot be read to apply to providers of facilities that connect pri-
vate  networks  to  public  networks,  because  Congress  made  clear  in  the
statute that CALEA requirements do not apply to "equipment,  facilities,  or
services that support the transport or switching of communications for pri-
vate networks."2 4  The  Center for Democracy and Technology  (CDT), to-
gether  with  a  large  group  of other  civil  society  groups  and  companies,
sought relief from the  Order on the grounds that it exceeded  the Commis-
sion's statutory authority and was arbitrary and capricious  in establishing a
hard deadline for compliance  without saying what compliance entailed.2 5
The  CDT  lawsuit  also  emphasized  the  substantial  risks  to  innovation2 0 6
posed by forcing  service providers to seek approval from law enforcement
before launching  any potentially  CALEA-covered  application  or network
facility.207
tiatives  in California, Internet2,  and National  LamdaRail; No. 05-1453,  American Asso-
ciation of Community  Colleges et al. See Brief for Petitioners, Am. Council on Educ. v.
FCC, No. 05-1404  (D.C.  Cir.  Jan. 26, 2006),  available at http://www.cdt.org/digitele/
20060126ace-opening-brief.pdf.  The cases were  consolidated for  expedited briefing  and
argument in mid-December 2005.
202.  Press  Release,  American  Council  on  Education, ACE  Files  Suit  Against  FCC
Over New Wiretapping  Regulations  (Oct. 24,  2005),  http://www.acenet.edu  (search  for
"Ace  files  suit against  FCC";  then link  to press release);  Declan McCullagh,  FBI Net-
wiretapping  Rules Face Challenges, CNET NEWS.COM,  Oct. 25,  2005, http://news.com.
com/FBI+Net-wiretapping+rules+face+challenges/2100-1028_3-5911676.html.
203.  Ace Files Suit, supra note 202.
204.  Brief for Petitioners, supra  note 201,  at 4.
205.  This  group  also includes  the American  Library Association, the Association  of
Research  Libraries,  COMPTEL,  the  Electronic  Frontier Foundation,  the Electronic  Pri-
vacy Information Center, Pulver.com, and Sun Microsystems. Id. at cover page.
206.  In addition to the risks to innovation, Susan Landau of Sun Microsystems argues
in a recent paper that  applying CALEA to VoIP poses substantial national  security risks.
Susan  Landau,  National  Security  On  the Line,  at 27-35  (Dec.  30,  2005)  (unpublished
manuscript, on  file with author) ("[I]n the current communications  environment, with an
unsecured  Internet  upon which  critical  infrastructure  depends heavily, building  surveil-
lance  technology  directly  into Internet  protocols has very negative  national-security  im-
plications.").
207.  CDT and its co-petitioners  filed their opening brief on  Jan. 26,  2006.  Brief for
Petitioners, supra  note 201, at  71. Oral argument has not yet been scheduled.
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3.  The Capture  Story
CALEA  is similar to E9 11  in that in both proceedings  some of the  in-
cumbent Baby Bells  are pushing for CALEA  compliance  that will burden
their competitors,  the VoIP providers. 28 And the key compliance  vendor,
VeriSign,  did its best to persuade  the Commission that  its service  bureau
model would minimize any impacts on innovation  that application provid-
ers might otherwise  experience. 09  In the end, the Commission's  CALEA
Order  did  recognize  that  "[i]ndustry  solutions"  for  compliance  with
CALEA "appear to be readily available. 21 0
VeriSign did more than simply hawk its  services, however (although it
did that with astonishing bravado).  It also toiled to persuade the Commis-
sion that  the  U.S.  lags  behind  other  countries  in its support  for law  en-
208.  Verizon  filed  comments  strongly  supporting  the  Commission's  reading  of
CALEA  to  include VoIP  providers.  See Comments  of Verizon, supra note  45,  at 5, 48-
50;  Reply Comments  of Verizon, In  re CALEA and  Broadband Access  Servs.,  ET  No.
04-295,  RM-10865,  at  10  (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n  Dec.  21,  2004), available  at http://
gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-orpdf=pdf&id-document=6516885832.
It also  supported  the Commission's determination  that law enforcement  needs mandated
extension of CALEA to all broadband providers. Comments of Verizon, supra  note 45, at
8 (arguing  that  CALEA should  be applied  to all  broadband access providers  because to
do  otherwise  would  enable  individuals  "to  avoid  electronic  surveillance  simply  by
switching  to VoIP  service").  SBC  also pushed  for CALEA  requirements  to be broadly
applied to ensure a level playing field. See Comments of SBC Commc'ns, In re CALEA,
ET No. 04-295,  at 7 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm. Nov. 8, 2004)  (stating that "the  Commis-
sion must ensure that the application of CALEA is competitively neutral  ...  [a]ll  service
providers,  regardless  of the platform  they use  to deliver  the services  (i.e.,  cable,  DSL,
wireless,  satellite,  powerline),  should  be  subject  to  the  same  CALEA  obligations"),
available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or-pdf=pdf&iddocu
ment-6516793572.
209.  VeriSign made clear to the Commission that it already had a compliance service
in the marketplace. See Ex Parte Presentation of VeriSign, supra  note 57, at 1 ("VeriSign
is a globally recognized leader in providing an array of large-scale,  ultra-high availability
infrastructure  support capabilities for..,  lawfully authorized electronic surveillance  (law-
ful interception)  capability requirements  to communication providers globally, other law-
ful access services (i.e.,  subpoena processing)."). Although  a list of VeriSign's customers
for NetDiscovery  is not public, Vonage and Cox Communications  have both adopted this
service.  Press  Release,  VeriSign,  VeriSign  NetDiscovery  Services  Selected  by Vonage
(Mar.  8, 2004),  http://www.verisign.com/verisign-inc/news-and-events/news-archive/us-
news-2005/page_028679.html;  Press Release, VeriSign, VeriSign NetDiscovery Services
Implemented by Cox Communications (Apr. 5. 2004), http://www.verisign.com/verisign-
inc/news-and-events/news-archive/us-news-2004/page_004015.html.  Vonage is far larger
than  the  other  VolP players.  See Internet Phone Service  Vonage Hits 155,000 Users,
FORBES.COM,  May  17,  2004,  http://www.forbes.com/technology/networks/newswire/
2004/05/17/rtr1373314.html.
210.  CALEA Order, supra note 2,  43.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
forcement's lawful  access to communications.2 ' For example,  in a presen-
tation by VeriSign  in  July  2004,  the  company  repeatedly  stated that  the
Commission's action  on CALEA for broadband and  VolP was needed  to
align  with  "worldwide  requirements"  and  "worldwide  related  activities
and  actions. 212  VeriSign  implied  that "Next  Generation  Network"  stan-
dard-setting activities  around the world justified that CALEA mandates be
put in place.
2 1 3
Even  after  the  Commission  issued  its  CALEA order  in  September
2005,  VeriSign  continued  to  agitate  for  better  treatment.  It  suggested
(while  reminding  the  Commission  of its  existing compliance  service  bu-
reau offering)  that all providers of VoIP  services  (not just those intercon-
necting  with the  traditional  telephone  network)  be  covered  by  the  man-
date.214  VeriSign urged the Commission to hurry up with the  implementa-
tion  of its  order,  saying that VeriSign had  been  relying on the  Commis-
sion's  imposition of CALEA  on  a  broad range  of applications  and  ser-
vices. 215  Verisign  also  stated that  any potential  incurred  costs to  entities
covered  by  the  CALEA  mandate  "can  be  readily  outsourced  with  a
CALEA  service  bureau  as part  of a compliance  agreement"-VeriSign's
211.  E.g., Reply Comments  of VeriSign, Inc., In re Joint Petition for Rulemaking to
Resolve  Various  Outstanding  Issues  Concerning  Implementation  of the  CALEA, RM-
10865,  at 4-5  (Fed.  Commc'ns  Comm'n  Apr. 27, 2004)  ("[T]he  capabilities  sought by
law enforcement have been available  for more than a decade, and deployed  on an ad-hoc
basis in the U.S. over that period.  In  some G8  countries, this has occurred  on a national
scale."), available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or.pdf=pdf&
id  document=-6516089605.
212.  Ex Parte Presentation of VeriSign, supra note 57, at 7.
213.  See id. at  10.  "Next Generation  Network"  is  an umbrella  term  for the kind  of
network that incumbent telephone  companies  and cable  companies would  like to substi-
tute for the public  internet. It is characterized  by services  that, much like those provided
by mobile  phone companies,  can be  easily tracked and  charged;  it is  a "walled  garden"
that is controlled by the service provider. According  to Wikipedia, "The  general idea be-
hind NGN is that all information  is transmitted via packets,  like the Internet; packets are
labeled according  to their type (data,  voice, etc) and handled differently for QoS  [quality
of service]  and  security  purposes  by traffic  management  equipment."  Next  Generation
Networking,  WIKIPEDIA:  THE  FREE  ENCYCLOPEDIA,  http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Next-
GenerationNetworking  (last visited Feb. 28,  2006)
214.  Comments  of VeriSign,  Inc., In re CALEA  and Broadband  Access  Servs.,  ET
No. 04-295, at 2 (Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n Nov.  14, 2005), available at http://gullfoss2.
fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?nativeor..pdf=pdf&iddocument=-6518180053.
215.  VeriSign,  Inc.  Opposition,  Request  for  Stay  Pending  Issuance  of Subsequent
Orders  and  for  Stay  Pending  Judicial  Review,  In  re CALEA  and  Broadband  Access
Servs., ET Nos. 04-295,  RM-10865, at 10 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Dec. 2,  2005).
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service-and that these costs would quickly end if the scope of the  Com-
mission's CALEA mandate was found to be improper by a court.216
But  the  overall  capture  profile  for CALEA  is  different  from  that  for
E91 1. Although  compliance  companies-most  notably  VeriSign-would
like to ensure that their services are  called  for by  the Order, and the FCC
takes  some  comfort  in  requiring  CALEA  compliance  of broadband  pro-
viders  and "interconnected  VoIP"  companies  because  of the existence  of
such third-party  services,21" the Commission has not yet stated what com-
pliance with  CALEA will entail. Third party providers of outsourced  ser-
vices are thus not  as firmly in the  driver's  seat in the CALEA  context  as
they are in the E9 11  realm: In CALEA there is no legacy infrastructure  (or
even a set of standards)  over which a third party already has control. Third
parties like VeriSign, accordingly,  could promise as a "trusted third party"
to  install  Carnivore-like  black  boxes218  to inhale  all data from broadband
providers  and  applications,  and then  parse  it  on  behalf of law  enforce-
ment,219  but the FCC's  initial  Order  did not state  whether  that would  be
enough  for  law  enforcement.  Indeed,  law  enforcement  comments  in  the
CALEA proceeding made clear that they wanted to maintain direct contact
with entities covered by the  statute in order to ensure  compliance  with all
of their demands.22°
216.  Id.
217.  CALEA  Order,  supra note  2,  43,  n.  126-27  (noting VeriSign's  claim  of the
"ready availability  [to providers of VoIP and broadband Internet access  services] of high-
performance,  reasonably priced  adjunct  devices  capable  of supporting  law  enforcement
needs,"  and citing Vonage's adoption of VeriSign's NetDiscovery  services  (internal  quo-
tations omitted)).
218.  See  generally  Carnivore  FAQ,  http://corz.org/public/docs/privacy/camivore-
faq.html (last visited Apr.  15,  2006).
219.  See VeriSign Comments, supra note 56, at 8 (noting use in service bureau model
of "isolated  adjunct  devices that  passively  duplicate  transmission  streams  and actively
filter  target  communications").  VeriSign  even  promised  to  adjust to  law  enforcement
demands  without  necessarily  needing  to  consult with the  covered  entity.  Id.  at  21  ("If
standards do not exist, or are deemed  deficient  by  law enforcement,  or are  evolving be-
cause of changed or additional law  enforcement  requirements,  the service bureau effects
necessary  interim solutions to the satisfaction of law enforcement and their collection  and
analysis  equipment vendors.").
220.  E.g.,  Reply  Comments  of U.S.  Dep't of Justice, In re CALEA  and Broadband
Access  Servs., ET No. 04-295,  at 28-29 (Fed. Commc'ns Comm'n Dec. 21,  2004) (noting
that entities  obligated  to comply  with  CALEA must remain  fully involved  in designing
CALEA  solutions;  Commission  should  be reluctant  to  shift  CALEA  responsibilities  to
trusted  third parties),  available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native
_or._pdf=pdf&iddocument=6516885861.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
The  real  story  of this  rulemaking  is  that  law  enforcement  drove  the
Commission to rely on an unsupportable  reading of CALEA. At least  one
of the Baby Bells even recognized this. As BellSouth commented:
[N]ational  security concerns  should not and cannot be used as a
veil  for the  Commission to  embark  upon  an  administrative  re-
write  of CALEA  when  the  statute  does  not  grant  such  author-
ity....  [M]any  of the  rules  and  requirements  proposed  in  the
[NPRM]  are plainly inconsistent with both the  language  and leg-
islative history  of the  statute .... To  the extent the needs of law
enforcement  have  changed  and communications  technology  has
evolved since CALEA was enacted, law  enforcement and the in-
dustry should work with Congress to amend the current law.22'
The Brand X deal2 22 and  the  heavy  hand  of law  enforcement  in  the
post-9/11  world pressured the  FCC into doing the best it could to give law
enforcement  the design authority it sought, while  shielding the  DOJ from
the  vicissitudes  of the  legislative  process.  In  effect,  the  Commission-
encouraged by  law  enforcement-reached  the  conclusion  that  it  would
apply CALEA to broadband  and VoIP and then backed into the legal rea-
soning it needed  in order  to  do this without Congressional  authorization.
But,  as  noted  by  Congress  at  the  time  of CALEA's  enactment,  CALEA
was  "not  intended  to  guarantee  'one-stop  shopping'  for  law  enforce-
ment,, 223 and it is very likely that the lawsuits  already  filed will slow the
broadening of CALEA that law enforcement seeks.
Again, as in the E91 1 setting, the Commission's  actions  in construing
CALEA  in  the manner that it did were  not necessarily  corrupt.  It  is very
likely that the Commission  was  told, as Americans  are told these  days in
many contexts, that the FCC's failure to extend CALEA would exacerbate
the United States'  vulnerabilities.  The absence of a colorable  legal justifi-
cation to issue the CALEA Order did not stop the FCC from acting. It un-
doubtedly  believed  it  was  helping  those  who  protect  United  States  citi-
zens.
224
221.  Comments of BellSouth Corp., In re CALEA and Broadband Access  Servs.,  ET
No.  04-295,  at 2 (Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n  Nov.  8, 2004), available at http://gullfoss2.
fcc. gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native-or.pdf=pdf&iddocument=-6516793535.
222.  See supra note  173.
223.  H.R. REP. No.  103-827, pt. 1, at 22 (1994).
224.  A  possible  parallel  looms  here:  the  (very  persuasive  and  powerful)  content
community  caused the FCC, in the broadcast flag context, to  take the position that it had
jurisdiction  to  mandate  that  all  devices  capable  of receiving  a digital  television  signal
have secure digital outputs  that prevented onward  transmission of a marked file over the
internet. In the  flag context, as in the CALEA  context, not having legal  authority  did not
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IV.  NEW FORMS OF CAPTURE
The delegation  by  Congress  of broad power over  communications  to
an  independent,  unaccountable  "expert"  agency  is,  in  this  age  of conver-
gence,  leading  to  a  situation  in  which  the  capture  of "new  technology"
rulemakings  by  "old  technology"  companies  and  interests  is  very  likely.
Out  of the glare  of public  scrutiny  that would likely  accompany  any  at-
tempt to legislate  in  the CALEA  and E911  context,  incumbents,  law en-
forcement,  and  vendors  of compliance  services  are  finding  it  relatively
easy to exact Commission rules that favor these parties and keep the world
of telephony policy in place. These parties would find it relatively difficult
to obtain  these  same  rules  from  Congress,  because  more  interest  groups
would  be  involved  and more  eyes  would be watching.  Because  "innova-
tion"  does  not have  a lobbyist,  and because  the providers  of online  ser-
vices are not as well-organized, well-funded,  or well-connected as the cap-
turers  are,  opposition  to  the  Commission's  initiatives  is  easily  ignored.
The mainstream  press is not paying attention to the enormous  power grab
that is proceeding at the Commission. And there is no way to remove from
office  the  Chairman and Commissioners  who have brought these most re-
cent  rules to  pass.  The  only way  to  address  the FCC's  actions  is to  sue,
and both of these rules  have prompted lawsuits.  The aim of this Part is to
summarize  the  pre-issuance  capture  story  these  case  studies  reveal,  in
hopes that Congress will be more careful in the future.  This Part proceeds
in  three subsections:  an  explanation of the delegation  history  for the  two
rulemakings,  an  exploration  of the  "expertise"  of the  FCC  in  these  two
areas, and the capture narrative.
A.  Delegation
These  two rulemakings  do not have the  same  delegation background.
In the  CALEA context, it is extremely unlikely that Congress intended for
broadband access and VoIP  services to be  covered by CALEA.225 Thus, it
is likely that the D.C. Circuit will find that no delegation has occurred, and
law enforcement  will need to return to the Hill in order to obtain the  au-
thority it seeks.
In the E911  world, by contrast, recent case law interprets  the Commis-
sion's "ancillary  authority" under the Telecommunications Act to give the
FCC  almost unlimited power over anything  concerning  a wire or  a radio
signal  in  the  U.S.-and  thus,  impliedly,  over  any  application  used
stop the FCC from acting. See Crawford,  The Biology of the Broadcast Flag,  supra note
71,  at 608-16.
225.  See discussion supra Section III.C.i.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
online.226 Given  the  importance  of the  internet to  the economic  future  of
this country,  Congress  should act to  discipline  the Commission's author-
ity;  at the  very  least, Congress  should be  explicit that  it  is giving power
over the internet to the FCC.
The  Commission  divides  all possible  radio and wire  communications
into two broad  categories:  (1) telecommunications  services,  regulated  un-
der  Title  II  of the Communications  Act, and  required to  charge  tariffed
fees, pay into the universal  service fund, and not discriminate against oth-
ers  who  want  to  connect  to  them;  and  (2)  information  services.227  The
FCC  has taken  the position  that  all  IP-enabled  services  of whatever  de-
scription (save  for the Internet Protocol itself, or "internet  governance") fit
into the information services category,22s and therefore  are regulated under
its  general  powers (including  its  "ancillary"  powers)  under  Title I. Com-
mentators have even referred to "Title  I"  and "Title  II" services.229
Title I  contains  a "necessary  and  proper"  rulemaking  provision, Sec-
tion  154(i), that  says that the Commission may "perform  any and all acts,
make  such rules  and regulations,  and issue  such  orders,  not inconsistent
with this chapter, as may be necessary in the execution of its functions."23
226.  See, e.g.,  United States v. Sw. Cable Co.,  392 U.S.  157 (1968).
227.  See In  re IP-Enabled  Services,  19  F.C.C.R.  4863,  4880-81  (Fed. Commc'ns
Comm'n Mar.  10, 2004).
228.  Id. at 4864 n.1.
229.  JONATHAN  E.  NUECHTERLEIN  &  PHILIP  J.  WEISER,  DIGITAL  CROSSROADS:
AMERICAN  TELECOMMUNICATIONS  POLICY  IN  THE  INTERNET  AGE  213  (2005).  In  the
E911  context, the FCC finessed the classification question, saying that it had not decided
whether interconnected  VoIP  services  were telecommunications  services  or information
services,  but that  it  analyzed  E911  primarily  under its  Title  I  ancillary jurisdiction  "to
encompass  both types of service."  E911  Order, supra note 1, at  10,256. It is astonishing
for the  Commission to  avoid deciding  (or declaring)  where  its authority  comes  from in
taking a particular regulatory  position.  However,  the FCC had  every  political  reason to
approach the VoIP E911  question in this way; the public outcry that would  have resulted
if the FCC had attempted  to create tariffing  structures  and interconnection  requirements
and special  charges  for VoIP services  made the choice  of Title  II classification inappro-
priate, but the FCC's ancillary  Title I jurisdiction over "interconnected  VoIP"  services is
unclear (as I discuss infra). And so the Commission spread its bets by choosing both clas-
sifications. The FCC may have wished to avoid any conflict with a  1998 FCC report (the
"Stevens  Report") that reviewed  VoIP services  in connection  with universal  service obli-
gations. See generally Report  to Congress, In re Federal-State  Joint Board on Universal
Serv.,  CC No. 96-45  (Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n  Apr.  10,  1998)  [hereinafter  Stevens  Re-
port], available at http://gullfoss2.fcc.gov/prod/ecfs/retrieve.cgi?native  or pdf=pdf&id_
document='2062770001.  The  Commission  tentatively  concluded  in  the  Stevens  Report
that some  "phone-to-phone" VOIP services  "lack[]  the characteristics that would render
them "information  services" within the meaning of the statute, and instead bear the char-
acteristics of "telecommunications  services."  Id. at 3.
230.  47 U.S.C. § 154(i) (2000).
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This  Section  allows  the  Commission  to  implement  regulations  that  are
necessary  to  carry  out  its explicit  responsibilities  under  the  Communica-
tions Act, and  courts have found that the FCC can exercise  "ancillary  au-
thority"  to  adopt  legislative  rules  using Section  154(i)  when  two  condi-
tions  are met: (1)  it otherwise  has subject matter jurisdiction over the ser-
vice  to be regulated 231  and  (2)  its  regulations  are  reasonably  ancillary to
the  Commission's  effective  performance  of its  statutorily  mandated  re-
sponsibilities. 232
From the Commission's perspective,  the  only question  it must answer
for the first part of this test is whether "interconnected  VoIP" services spe-
cifically,  or  IP-enabled  services  generally,  use  wires  or  radios.  Because
they do, the FCC asserts that "these services  come within the  scope of the
Commission's subject matter jurisdiction granted in section [152(a)] of the
Act., 2 3 3  Following  the  Commission's  logic,  Section  152(a)  gives  the
Commission  subject matter authority over all communications by wire and
radio anywhere in the world.234
231.  See Sw. Cable Co., 392 U.S.  at  172-75  (upholding  cable television  regulations
before  FCC  had  express  congressional  grant of regulatory  authority  over cable);  In re
Digital Broadcast  Content Protection, MB 02-230,  at 14  (Fed. Commc'ns  Comm'n Nov.
4, 2003), available  at http://www.eff.org/IP/Video/HDTV/20031104_fcc-order.pdf.
232.  See Sw. Cable Co., 392  U.S. at  178.  The  D.C. Circuit  has recently  been quite
skeptical  of the  Commission's Title  I authority. When  the FCC used its Title I jurisdic-
tion to justify video  description  for  television  programs,  the  D.C.  Circuit struck  down
those rules because they were outside  the Commission's  authority. Motion Picture Ass'n
of Am.,  Inc. v. FCC, 309 F.3d 796, 798-99  (D.C.  Cir. 2002). And in American Library
Ass'n  v. FCC, the D.C.  Circuit  ruled  that the  Commission  lacked  authority  to  impose
broadcast content  redistribution  rules on  equipment manufacturers  (the "broadcast flag"
rules) using its Title I ancillary jurisdiction because  the equipment was not subject to the
Commission's  subject matter jurisdiction. 406  F.3d 689, 692  (D.C. Cir. 2005). The FCC
argued  for  very  broad  ancillary  authority  in  the  broadcast  flag  case,  announcing  that
unless Congress has told the Commission it cannot regulate,  it has the power to adopt any
rules that "effectuate  the goals"  of the Communications  Act with respect to "instrumen-
talities,  facilities,  and apparatus  associated with the overall  circuit of messages  sent  and
received" via wire or radio. Am.  Library Ass 'n,  406  F.3d at 698 (citing Brief for respon-
dent); E911  Order, supra  note 1, at 10,264-65.
233.  E911  Order, supra  note  1, at 10,261-62.
234.  Section  152(a)  is about  the scope  of the  coverage  of the Act-it intentionally
excludes  people  in  the  Canal Zone,  for  example-and  says  nothing  about  rulemaking
authority. The section states:
The provisions of this  chapter shall  apply to all  interstate and foreign
communication by wire or radio and all interstate and foreign transmis-
sion of energy by  radio, which originates and/or is received within the
United States,  and  to all  persons  engaged  within the United  States in
such  communication  or such  transmission of energy  by  radio,  and to
the licensing and regulating of all radio stations as hereinafter provided;BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
As for the  second  step in  the ancillary jurisdiction  test,  the  Commis-
sion acknowledges  in  a footnote  that the Telecommunications  Act  states
that  "[i]t  is the policy  of the United  States-to  preserve  the vibrant  and
competitive  free market that presently  exists  for the internet and other in-
teractive  computer services, unfettered by Federal  or  State regulation., 2 35
At the same time, the Commission  asserts that it does not believe that this
"policy  statement  precludes  [it]  from  adopting  E911  rules  for  intercon-
nected  VoIP providers  here., 23 6 The  Commission rehearses  its "safety  of
life and property" arguments, notes that  it has imposed E911  rules on pro-
viders of new telephone  technologies,  argues that  Congress  has "ratified"
its exercises of authority in this area in the  1999 Wireless Act,  and asserts
that the Order  is reasonably  ancillary to the  Commission's  effective per-
formance of its statutorily mandated responsibilities.
In the NPRM accompanying  the E911  Order, the Commission reveals
its intention to do even more. As noted, the FCC appears  to be considering
whether to require  any  VoIP-capable  device  to  be  able by June  2006  to
automatically determine  its  location  to be provided in  a E91 1 call.237 The
FCC questions whether its focus on "interconnected  VoIP"  services is too
narrow.238  The  Commission  is  considering  adopting  consumer  privacy
protections applicable  to E911  service, implying  that the FCC will create
through  regulation  broad online  privacy  rules  that to  date  Congress  has
resisted legislating. 2 39 It is very likely that future  IP-enabled  services "so-
cial policies"  will be based on the same jurisdictional arguments.
The  chief problem with  the Commission's  claims  is that the jurisdic-
tional arguments  made in the E911  Order have very few principled limits.
Anything that has something  to do with a wire or a radio may be asserted
but it shall  not apply  to persons engaged in wire or radio communica-
tion or transmission in the Canal Zone,  or to wire or radio communica-
tion  or transmission  wholly within  the Canal  Zone.  The provisions  of
this chapter  shall apply with respect to cable  service, to all persons en-
gaged within the United States in providing such service, and to the  fa-
cilities  of cable operators  which  relate to  such service,  as provided  in
subchapter V-A.
47 U.S.C. § 152(a) (2000).
235.  47 U.S.C. § 230(b)(2) (2000).
236.  E911 Order, supra note  1, at  10,262 n. 95.
237.  See id.  57.  Arguably, Congress in  Section 230 of the Telecommunications  Act
said clearly that special  federal regulation of "internet services"  was inappropriate. It ap-
pears that the Commission has  convinced itself that the word "regulation"  in Section 230
refers only to Title II  common carrier-type  regulations having to do with tariffs and inter-
connection, and not to "social policies." See 47 U.S.C.  § 230.
238.  See E911 Order, supra note 1,  58.
239.  See id.  62.
[Vol. 21:8732006]  THE AMBULANCE,  THE SQUAD  CAR, & THE INTERNET  929
to be within the FCC's jurisdiction, and the FCC may expand the scope of
its policies  at any  time. Although  the Telecommunications  Act does  not
impose  any  explicit  regulatory  burdens  on  "information  services,"  the
FCC views itself to have complete discretion under its "ancillary jurisdic-
tion" to decide what requirements  it should mandate with respect to these
services.240
The  FCC's policy,  until relatively  recently,  was  that  online  services
should be unregulated. 241 As it turns out, however, all services that use the
Internet Protocol  are "unregulated"  only in the sense that they are not clas-
sified as Title II common carrier services (subjected to tariffing  and inter-
connection  obligations),  even  though  they  are  regulated  in  reality.  The
E9 11  Order is the clearest demonstration  to date that the FCC's telephony
mindset  drives it to believe that it has absolute  discretion under Title I to
impose  fundamentally  unchanged  telephony-based  mandates  on  IP-
enabled  services.242
The  Commission's  belief in its  "unregulation"  agenda for IP-enabled
services received  a  substantial  shot in the  arm as a result of the  Supreme
240.  The FCC's views about its Title  I jurisdiction have  become more aggressive  in
recent years. In 2001,  in its approval of the AOL-Time Warner merger,  the Commission
imposed  conditions  on AOL's  instant messaging  application  (conditions  that were  later
lifted),  but based  its authority  on  its power  over approving  spectrum  license  transfers
from  Time Warner's  cable  companies,  broadcast  companies,  and telephony  interests  to
the merged entity as well as  on its Title I jurisdiction. See Applications for Consent to the
Transfer of Control of Licenses and Section 214 Authorizations by Time Warner Inc. and
America  Online,  Inc.,  Transferors,  to  AOL Time Warner  Inc.,  Transferee,  16  F.C.C.R.
6547  (Jan. 22,  2001). This assertion  of Title  I jurisdiction  was not tested on appeal.  To-
day,  in  2005,  it is very  likely that the Commission would base  its authority  to regulate
instant messaging  solely on its ancillary jurisdiction under Title I.
241.  See  Jason  Oxman,  The  FCC and  the  Unregulation of the  Internet  (Fed.
Commc'ns  Comm'n  Office  of Plans  & Policy,  Working  Paper No.  31,  1999),  http://
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/OPP/working-papers/oppwp3  1.pdf, at 22.
242.  Philip Weiser has recommended that the FCC regulate  all internet services under
Title I using antitrust principles. See Philip  J. Weiser, Toward a Next Generation  Regula-
tory Strategy, 35  LoY. U. CHI. L.J. 41,  66  (2003)  ("outlin[ing]  how the  FCC can rely on
its Title I authority to employ a reactive,  antitrust-like model of regulation for the emerg-
ing broadband  market").  By  contrast, James  Speta  takes  the  view that  Title  I does  not
stretch as far as the Commission would like it to, and that the FCC's regulatory authority
should be limited. James  B.  Speta, FCC  Authority To Regulate the Internet: Creating It
and Limiting It, 35  Loy. U. CHI. L.J.  15,  22-24, 38-39  (2003).  The Commission  appears
to be listening to neither Weiser nor Speta, because  it is forging  ahead with non-antitrust
regulation under a broad reading of Title  I. It will take a substantial change in public  con-
cern  over the  fate of internet services  and a clearly different  congressional  direction  for
the Commission to change its approach.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
Court's recent Brand  X opinion.243 Justice  Thomas, writing for the Court,
ruled in  support of judicial  deference  to the Commission's  determination
that cable  modem  internet  access  service  is  an  "information  service." 244
This holding was  legally sound, but  in dicta  the  Court said that although
"information-service  providers  ...  are not subject to mandatory common-
carrier regulation under Title II... the Commission has jurisdiction to im-
pose  additional regulatory  obligations  under  its Title  I  ancillary jurisdic-
tion, ,24'  and  indicated  that  policy  in this  "technical  and  complex"  area
should be  set by the Commission  (and thus impliedly not by the courts or
Congress). 246
This  dicta in Brand  X can fairly be read to give the Commission  com-
plete  discretion  over what  rules  to mandate  with  respect  to  "information
services"  (including the internet),  even if those rules adopted (like  E91 1)
look just like rules applied to common carriers. In other words, classifica-
tion of services as "telecommunications,"  on the one hand, or "information
services,"  on the other, has become a matter of form over substance. Even
if something is called an "information  service," the Commission can man-
date requirements  of it that used to be required only of "communications
services."  The  opinion  also  signals  that  the  internet  is  too  difficult  and
complicated  for  any  branch  of government  other  than  the  FCC  to  deal
with.
247
Justice  Scalia's  stinging  dissent makes the judicial grant of power to
the Commission clear:
[W]hat the Commission hath given  [by classifying cable modem
service  as  an  information  service],  the  Commission  may  well
take  away-unless it doesn't. This is a wonderful  illustration of
how  an  experienced  agency  can  (with  some  assistance  from
credulous courts) turn statutory constraints into bureaucratic  dis-
248 cretions.
243.  See Nat'l  Cable  and  Telecomm.  Ass'n  v.  Brand  X  Intemet  Serv.,  125  S. Ct.
2688, 2712 (2005).
244.  Id. at 2690.
245.  Id. at 2696.
246.  See id. at 2705.
247.  See id. at 2712 ("The questions the Commission resolved in the order under re-
view involve  a 'subject matter  [that] is technical,  complex,  and dynamic.'  . . . Nothing in
the Communications Act or the Administrative  Procedure Act makes unlawful the Com-
mission's  use  of its expert policy judgment to  resolve these  difficult  questions.") (cita-
tions omitted).
248.  Id. at 2718 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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The E911  Order marks only the beginning of the Commission's regu-
lation  of the  internet  under  its  unprincipled  (and  potentially  unlimited)
reading  of its  ancillary jurisdiction.  In  this crucial  area,  silence  (or  even
ambiguous  statements)  by  Congress  should  not  afford  the  Commission
such enormous  powers.249 Congress  should act to cabin  and explicate  the
scope of the Commission's authority  to regulate  the internet. The difficult
and important question of how to govern the internet  should be answered
explicitly  rather  than  through  formalistic  re-characterization  of internet
services by an independent agency.25°
B.  Expertise
To  the  extent that  the FCC's  expertise  and political  neutrality  legiti-
mate congressional  delegation of power over IP-enabled services  (if such
delegation  occurred), 2 5 1 both the E911  and CALEA rulemakings  substan-
tially undermine this theory.
249.  For important questions, or questions with substantial  economic impact, the Su-
preme  Court  has  ruled that an agency's interpretation of an ambiguous  statute  deserves
no deference:
Deference under Chevron to an agency's construction of a statute that it
administers is premised on the theory that a statute's ambiguity consti-
tutes an  implicit delegation  from Congress  to  the agency  to fill  in the
statutory gaps. In extraordinary cases,  however, there may be reason to
hesitate before concluding that Congress has intended  such an implicit
delegation.
Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco  Corp.,  529 U.S.  120,  159 (2000)
(citations omitted). Regulation of the internet is the kind of "extraordinary  case" to which
the  Court  was  referring.  As  in  Brown  &  Williamson,  this  broad  swath  of regulatory
power  (i)  addresses  an  important  domain-regulation  of a  great "basic  industry"-for
which authority could not have  been delegated  accidentally;  and (ii)  concerns  a question
about  which  Congress  has  already  enacted  several  statutes.  Congress  should refuse  to
grant such broad jurisdiction to a single, easily captured agency.
250.  See  John T.  Nakahata, Broadband  Regulation at the Demise of the  1934 Act:
The Challenge of  Muddling Through, 12  COMMLAW  CONSPECTUS  169 (2004)  (question-
ing the Commission's authority  to create new regulatory  structures for "Title I"  services).
251.  Independent  agencies  were  supposed  to  be "a  body  of experts  who  shall  gain
experience  by length of service-a body which  shall be independent of executive author-
ity, except in its selection,  and free  to exercise its judgment."  Marshall  J. Brefer & Gary
J.  Edles, Established by  Practice: The  Theory and Operation of Independent Federal
Agencies,  52  ADMIN.  L. REv.  1111,  1113  (2000)  (citing  Humphrey's  Ex'r  v.  United
States,  295  U.S.  602,  625-26  (1935)  (internal  quotation  marks  and  citation  omitted)).
"[T]he  independent  commission  as  an  organizational  form  did  not emerge  full-blown
with  the passage of the Interstate  Commerce  Act. Rather, it evolved  over  the course of
several decades,  coming to maturity  late in the Progressive  Era."  MARC ALLEN  EISNER,
REGULATORY  POLITICS  IN TRANSITION  48  (1993).  The Progressives  saw great  value  in
independent  regulatory  commissions,  as  "an  important  conduit  through  which  market
correction was administered."  Brefer & Edles, supra, at 1131.  The idea of expert admin-BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
It is not just that the Commission needed the technical  assistance of In-
trado and VeriSign to write  these rules-agency resource  limitations often
dictate that the help of outside parties is called  for. And it is not just that
law enforcement forced the Commission into the CALEA rulemaking  as a
quid pro quo for the DOJ's help with the Brand X case,  or that both rule-
makings-despite  their  heavily  regulatory  character-fit  neatly  into  the
apparent thematic thread of the current White House by emphasizing secu-
rity  and law  enforcement.  It is more  that both  rulemaking  efforts  ignore
major  technical  differences  between  the  telephone  system  (centralized,
controllable)  and  the  internet  (decentralized,  any  service  can  be  added
without  permission),  and attempt  to  apply  telephony-based  rules  to the
internet with almost  no changes.  This  element of the  E911  and  CALEA
rules,  failing  to  consider  alternative  ways  of reaching  desirable  social
goals,  demonstrates  the Commission's  inexpert  approach  toward  a world
that has  changed  enormously.  Expertise was  not the basis of these  rules.
Indeed, it is easy to demonstrate  better ways of reaching  the FCC's social
policy goals.
252
Just as expertise was not the basis for these rules,  it would be impossi-
ble to say that they represent a "scientific"  response to a political question.
Instead, it is apparent that they are both deeply political responses to a se-
ries of political  requests.  Both rulemakings  have  at their heart  important
questions of social policy, which makes them difficult to attack. As a mat-
ter of both law  and technical  reality, however, they represent  some of the
most unlikely responses to these social questions.
For example,  in the E911  context, who would have imagined that new
VoIP  services  (capable  of transmitting  a  picture  of the house  where  the
injury has occurred, able to gather health data and doctor contact data and
convey it to emergency responders)  must use  a 30-year-old legacy system
that sharply  limits the  emergency  assistance  provided by the  services?  In
the  CALEA  context,  who  would  have  imagined  that  the  Commission
would read the statute's  exclusion  of "information  services"  to  allow  in-
clusion of those  services  under  the  CALEA  mandate?  And  who  would
istrators with technical  competence  became  very important during  this era. Progressives
believed  in "the  almost unlimited  potential  of science  and  administration."  Id. at  1131
(quoting  RICHARD  L. MCCORMICK,  THE PARTY  PERIOD AND  PUBLIC POLICY:  AMERICAN
POLITICS FROM THE AGE  OF  JACKSON  TO  THE PROGRESSIVE  ERA  201  (1988)).  The inde-
pendent agency  "was envisioned as an institution capable  of compensating  for the short-
comings  of the  'political'  institutions  of American  government."  EISNER,  supra, at 44.
"Many believed  that the  only way  to achieve  effective business regulation  was to estab-
lish  a trade  commission  completely  removed  from  the political  fray."  Brefer & Edles,
supra, at 1132-33.
252.  See infra Part V.
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have imagined that the online world, a great engine of economic  growth in
America,  would  have  been subject  to  pre-approval  by  law  enforcement?
This may  sound  (and possibly  is) conclusory, but  it is impossible  to pre-
tend that what the  FCC did with the  E911  and CALEA rules  was apoliti-
cal. These were hardly "scientific"  results.
Past chairs of the FCC understood very clearly that the FCC was a po-
litical  entity. And current Chairman Kevin Martin  is undoubtedly a politi-
cal actor. The chair of the FCC, who is appointed by the President and part
of his political party, is the most powerful  figure in the agency.  Chairman
Martin has close ties to the White House. 253  Prior to  his FCC position, he
served  on  the  Bush-Cheney  transition  team  and  as  general  council  for
Bush's 2000  Presidential  campaign. His  wife,  Cathie  Martin,  is  a former
adviser to Vice President Dick Cheney. She works in the White House as a
special  assistant to  the President  for economic  policy.2 54  The Martins  are
extremely  well-connected  to  the  White  House,  and Kevin  Martin  is very
likely to be interested  in ensuring  that his agency  is on the  same page  as
the Administration.
C.  Capture Theory
Absent  some action by Congress,  the FCC will continue  to argue that
it  has  broad  delegated  powers  to  regulate  internet  services.  With  this
unlimited delegation  and the FCC's broad preemption of any  state efforts
to make  rules  about  online services,255  capture  is relatively  easy:  there  is
only one entity to  capture,  and it is the  FCC. This next Section deals with
the capture narrative that has resulted.
1.  Comparison of  New Capture  to Old Capture
The regulations  at  issue  here  do  not  fit the  usual  capture  complaint,
which focuses  on the capture of agencies by the very groups they are sup-
posed to  regulate.  Although  it is true  that the Baby  Bells were  happy  to
visit  regulatory  burdens  on  their  VoIP  competitors,  these  case  studies
show that primarily third-party middlemen-entities  that are not regulated
by the FCC--captured the  FCC in  the E911  setting. And  in the  CALEA
253.  Genaro  C.  Armas,  Bush  Names Kevin  Martin New  FCC Chairman, USA  To-
DAY,  Mar.  16,  2005,  http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/2005-03-16-martin-
fccx.htm.
254.  Id.
255.  See In re Vonage  Holdings Corporation  for  Declaratory Ruling Concerning  an
Order  of the  Minnesota  Public  Utilities  Commission,  19  F.C.C.R.  22,404,  22,404-05
(Nov.  12,  2004) (showcasing  the FCC's authority  to "preempt an order of the Minnesota
Public  Utilities  Commission  (Minnesota  Commission)  [to  apply]  its  traditional  "tele-
phone company" regulations to Vonage's DigitalVoice  service").BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
context,  an  executive  agency,  the  Department  of Justice,  captured  the
Commission, an independent agency. 2 56 Neither of these stories is the tra-
ditional one.
From  the  first,  the  mere  existence  of  administrative  agencies  has
prompted questions as to their  constitutionality  and accountability. 2 57 But
until relatively  recently-the  middle  of the  last  century-few  questioned
that  agencies  were  interested  in  serving  the  public  good  above  all  else.
Beginning  in the  1960s, however, federal judges became  concerned  about
capture. 2 58  The worry was  that if agency  officials  were both given discre-
tion to act and were protected from political accountability,  they would be
subject to  enormous  pressures  by  the  entities  they regulated to help their
particular business models rather than the public interest.259 The term cus-
256.  44 U.S.C.  §  3502(5)  (2000)  (denominating  the FCC as  an independent  commit-
tee). The FCC has a bipartisan  group of Commissioners  who are  appointed by  the Presi-
dent  with  the  advice  and  consent  of  the  Senate  and  serve  for  five  years.  47  U.S.C.
§ 154(a)  (2000).  The maximum number of Commissioners  from  any party is  a number
equal to the least number that would constitute a majority, and the Chairman serves as the
Chief Executive  Officer of the  agency.  For an  extensive  discussion  of the  practices  of
independent agencies, see Breger & Edles, supra note 173.
257.  Mark  C.  Niles,  On the Hijacking of Agencies  (And Airplanes): The Federal
Aviation Administration, "Agency Capture,  "  and Airline Security, 10  AM.  U. J. GENDER
SOC.  POL'Y & L.  381,  387 (2002)  (analyzing  allegation  that FAA  has  been  "captured"
and  noting that  questions  began  with  formation  of Interstate  Commerce  Commission
(abolished  in  1995)  in  1887).  The  idea  of capture  is  generally  assumed to  stem  from
MARVER H. BERNSTEIN,  REGULATING  BusiNEss BY INDEPENDENT  COMMISSION  (1955).
258.  See Merrill, supra note  7,  at  1042  (arguing that  courts'  assertiveness  between
1967  and  1983  is  explained  by  concerns  about  capture  and  belief that  courts  could  do
something about it, which was replaced by  later pervasive pessimism);  Richard B. Stew-
art,  The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88  HARV.  L.  REv.  1669,  1713
(1975)  ("It has become widely accepted,  not only by public interest lawyers, but by aca-
demic critics,  legislators, judges, and even by  some agency  members,  that the  compara-
tive overrepresentation  of regulated  or client interests  in the process of agency  decision
results  in a persistent policy bias in favor of these interests.").
259.  John Shepard Wiley, Jr., A  Capture Theory ofAntitrust Federalism,  99 HARV. L.
REv.  713,  725-26  (1986);  see MARTIN  SHAPIRO,  WHO  GUARDS  THE  GUARDIANS:  JUDI-
CIAL  CONTROL  OF ADMINISTRATION  65-66 (1988)  (discussing  explanations of regulatory
capture);  Mark  Seidenfeld, A  Civic Republican Justification  for the Bureaucratic  State,
105 HARV. L. REv.  1511,  1565-70 (1992).
According  to the  capture  hypothesis,  instead  of providing  meaningful
input into deliberation about the public interest, industry representatives
co-opt government regulatory power in order to satisfy their private  de-
sires. Regulated  entities are well  organized  and generally  well  funded,
and they often have strong  interests  at stake,  which they  do not  share
with the polity as a whole. These entities have much to  gain by ensur-
ing that they have control over government decisionmakers  and that the
decisionmakers  whom they do control remain in office.
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tomarily used  for this problem is "pathology"-that agencies  were  subject
to  the  pathologies  of interest  groups  and regulated  entities.  The  answer
given by the federal courts, at least initially, was that robust and energetic
reform  activities  would  fix  the  pathologies  of agencies. 26'  For  example,
famed D.C.  Circuit Judge Skelly Wright demanded that the FCC put its ex
parte contacts with industry on the public record, noting his concern "that
the  final  shaping  of the  rules  we  are  reviewing  here  may  have  been  by
compromise  among contending  industry forces, rather than by exercise  of
the  independent  discretion  in the public  interest the Communications  Act
vests  in  individual  commissioners., 2 6 1  Expansion  of citizens'  standing
rights and the "hard  look" doctrine in the 1960s and 1970s are part of this
robust reform approach, aimed at reducing the risks of capture.262
In  general,  agency  capture  is  said  to happen  when "compact  groups
whose members have  high per capita stakes  in a controversy  out-organize
and out-influence  larger  more  diffuse  groups.' ' 2 63  Usually  capture  stories
concern  the  excessive  influence  of regulated  entities.2"  Thus,  the  aca-
demic  literature  contains  accounts  of the  alleged  capture  of the  FAA  by
Id. at  1565.
260.  Merrill, supra note 7,  at  1052.
261.  Home Box  Office  v. FCC,  567  F.2d  9,  53  (D.C.  Cir.  1977),  cert. denied, 434
U.S. 829, reh 'g denied, 434 U.S.  988 (1977).  Wright ordered the Commission to submit a
list of all ex parte communications, but fumed that "it is still not possible to determine the
effect of such communications  on the integrity of the rulemaking.  As a result, the elabo-
rate  public discussion  in  the dockets  here  under  review  may be  a sham  and a  fiction."
Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at  15; cf Action  for Children's  Television v. FCC, 564 F.2d
458  (D.C. Cir.  1977)  (holding that ex parte prohibitions  in rule-making proceedings  are
only  applicable  when  competing  private  claims  to  a  valuable  privilege  involved).  In
Home Box Office, Judge Wright ordered that the substance  of all  ex parte  conversations
be written  down and filed. Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 15.  It is fair to  say that the  In-
trado and Level  3  filings do not reveal  much of the substance  of the conversations  they
record. It is  also  fair to  say that there  were  undoubtedly many  DOJ  contacts  that were
never reflected in public filings.
262.  David  B.  Spence, A  Public Choice Progressivism, Continued, 87  CORNELL  L.
REv.  397,  410  (2002)  (sketching  a  history  of Progressive  movement  and  capture  re-
sponse).
263.  Merrill, supra note 7,  at  1053.  In an important  paper, George  Stigler developed
the  "capture  theory,"  suggesting  that "regulation  is  acquired  by the  industry  and is  de-
signed and operated primarily for its benefit."  George J.  Stigler,  The Theory of  Economic
Regulation, 2 BELL J. ECON. & MGMT.  Sci.  3, 3  (1971).
264.  "In  'captured'  agencies, agency regulators  do not act as  'arms-length'  represen-
tatives  of some  larger  'public  interest'  in their interaction  with regulated  industries.  In-
stead, government  officials  . . . advance  the agenda  of current  firms  in  the industry  by
formulating  regulations  that benefit or at least do not substantially  burden the industry."
David  Dana &  Susan  Koniak, Bargaining  in the Shadow of Democracy, 148 U. PA. L.
REv.  473, 497 (1999)  (exploring the "regulatory contract" phenomenon).BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
the airline industry,265  and the capture of the USDA by the meat and poul-
try industries.266  In all of these cases, the agency  is said to have  lost focus
on its public mission in favor of the interests of regulated private actors.
Capture  theory  is often criticized  as  imprecise  and  over-simplified, 67
both because  it is  difficult  to  say  when private  interests  fail to  coincide
with the overall public interest,  and because  it deals insufficiently with the
messy  world of real  politics.  It  is,  for  example,  often  true  that  agencies
must depend  on outside sources  of information.  It is also true that organ-
ized  interests,  like  regulated  firms,  often provide  that  information.  They
have  incorrupt reasons  to  do  so,  for they  have  a  stake  in the policy that
will emerge and the resources to help.268 By contrast, consumers and other
unorganized  interests  ordinarily  have  stakes  that  are  too  small  to justify
intervening in the agency's work. There is nothing necessarily wrong with
this reality.
Increasingly  pessimistic  public  choice  theory,  under  which  all  gov-
ernmental decisions are  seen as the result of rent-seeking behavior  on the
part of many  different  groups,  has gradually  subsumed capture  theory. 2 6 9
Very roughly speaking, "[m]odern  public choice theory regards all organ-
ized groups demanding  services  from political institutions-including  not
just business  and  producer  groups,  but also  environmental  groups, labor
unions, civil rights groups, and rent control activists-as being subject to a
unitary logic of collective  action. 271 Unlike the capture theorists who sug-
265.  Niles, supra note 257, at 401.
266.  See generally Dion Casey, Agency Capture: The USDA 's Struggle to Pass Food
Safety Regulations,  7  KAN.  J. L. & PUB.  POL'Y 142 (1998).
267.  Dana & Koniak, supra note 264, at 498 ("[I]t  is possible to speak of illegitimate
interest group influence only if one has a coherent normative  baseline defining  legitimate
interest group influence.").
268.  See Richard  B.  Stewart,  The Discontents of Legalism: Interest Group Relations
in Administrative Regulation, 1985  WIs. L. REV.  655,  663-65 (suggesting  that construc-
tive  relationships  between  regulators  and  regulated  industry  can  benefit  society,  avoid
litigation, and do not represent capture).
269.  See,  e.g.,  Daniel  A.  Farber  & Philip  P.  Frickey,  The Jurisprudence  of Public
Choice, 65  TEX. L. REV.  873, 883-906  (1987).  Roughly, public choice is the "application
of the economist's  methods  to  the  political  scientist's  subject."  DANIEL  A.  FARBER  &
PHILIP P. FRICKEY,  LAW  AND  PUBLIC CHOICE: A  CRITICAL  INTRODUCTION  1 (1991);  see
also Daniel  A.  Farber & Philip  P.  Frickey, Foreword. Positive Political Theory in  the
Nineties, 80  GEO. L.J. 457, 458-463  (1992)  (defining public choice as using economics to
focus  on the maximizing behavior of rational beings). Not all administrative  law scholars
accept the "homo economicus"  view that public choice theorists posit. See, e.g.,  Abner J.
Mikva, Foreword, 74 VA. L. REV.  167  (1988)  (condemning view of human nature prof-
fered by public choice analyses).
270.  Merrill, supra note 7, at  1069; see also Jody Freeman, The Private  Role in Pub-
lic Governance, 75  N.Y.U. L. REV.  543,  561  (2000) ("Public  choice theory understands
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gested reforms of agency processes to protect against capture,  early public
choice  theorists  did not necessarily  propose  a path  forward;  rather,  they
aimed to demonstrate that regulatory decisions were inherently biased, and
that  market-mimicking  agency  actions  should  usefully  be  replaced  by
markets  themselves  or  never  delegated  in the  first  place.27 1  Early public
choice  scholarship perceived  reform efforts  as impossible,  and the simple
libertarian  responded  by  pulling up  stakes  and removing  discretion  from
administrative  agencies.
In  the  present  day,  the  delegation  debate  continues  unabated.  The
enormous world of public choice scholarship has become a rich one that is
no longer simply based on seeing venal motives in every step by a regula-
tor.  Today,  "public  choice"  can  mean  anything  from modeling  complex
systems inside agency decision making to empirically examining influence
across a wide range of decisions by a wide range of institutional actors.
My  contribution  to  the  enormous  capture/public  choice  literature  is
modest. I am providing a live case study, showing that prior capture theo-
ries may have  been too  simple in  their focus  on regulated  firms. 2 72  Here,
the  capturing  interests  were  neither regulated  entities nor,  in the  case  of
the  E911  rule,  particularly  visible.  But both  law  enforcement  and  E911
outsourced services  firms are  intensely concentrated interests  (as opposed
to  diversified  public  interests)  that  can  claim  expertise  and  devote  re-
sources  to push  for  their  versions  of regulation.  And both groups  likely
received better treatment from the FCC in these rules than they could have
administrative  decision  as the product of interest  group pressure brought  to bear on bu-
reaucrats seeking rewards such as job security, enhanced authority, or the favor of power-
ful legislators upon whom the agency depends...  treating agency  outcomes as products
of interest group appeals to individual bureaucrats'  preferences.")
271.  See, e.g., David B. Spence  & Frank Cross, A Public Choice Case  for the Admin-
istrative State, 89  GEO. L.J.  97,  98-99  (2000)  (citing  scholars who  feel  public  choice  is
hostile to delegation);  JERRY L. MASHAW,  GREED,  CHAOS,  &  GOVERNANCE:  USING  PUB-
LIC CHOICE TO IMPROVE PUBLIC LAW 6-25 (1997).
272.  I am not the  first to recognize  that unregulated private firms may have  captured
an agency's  decision  making process.  In a  1993  article,  Bradford  Mank  suggested that
contractors  hired by the EPA to conduct Superfund cleanup  activities had formed a "de-
pendent  bureaucracy  that fed on  the program's  structural  incentives,"  a conclusion  that
had  earlier  been reached by  the Congressional  Office  of Technology  Assessment. See
Bradford C.  Mank, Superfund Contractors and Agency  Capture,  2  N.Y.U.  ENVTL.  L.J.
34,  60-63,  80 (1993).  Mank  noted that James  Q. Wilson had argued that unregulated in-
terest groups "have reason  to develop  client relationships" with agencies. Id.  at 61  (citing
JAMES Q. WILSON,  BUREAUCRACY:  WHAT GOVERNMENT  AGENCIES  DO AND  WHY THEY
Do IT 83-85  (1990),  which discusses  academic scientists'  relationship with the National
Academy of Sciences and National  Science Foundation).  Mank suggested  limiting  con-
tractor functions and strengthening EPA enforcement efforts. See id. at 76-77.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
from  Congress. My  assertion  is that, in  both the  E911  and CALEA  con-
texts, rules were written that benefited an identifiably smaller "public" in-
terest at the  expense of a larger, but more diffuse, one:  the interest in con-
tinued online innovation.
In  the  E911  context,  a  largely  invisible  vendor,  Intrado,  making
opaque  "ex  parte"  filings,  orchestrated  a  rule  adoption  that  assured  the
vendor's continued  dominance  and relevance.  Without  even giving VoIP
providers  the time to  show that alternative E911  schemes  could  have pro-
vided better (more  modern,  more  informative)  results  for consumers,  the
Commission forced them to interconnect with hardware controlled  almost
completely  by that invisible  vendor,  at a  cost that vendor  could  control.
Failure to connect in this fashion may force VoIP providers  to cut off their
customers,  creating  unprecedented,  Commission-approved  market  con-
straints.
In the  CALEA context,  an interest group  in the  form of another sister
agency,  the Department  of Justice,  was able  to  obtain rules  that  it  likely
could not have  gotten from Congress.  It is likely that there were broad  ex
parte  contacts  between  DOJ  and  FCC  before  DOJ  sought  a petition  for
certiorari in the Brand  X case.273 The DOJ was even able  to have  the FCC
set a hard eighteen-month  deadline for compliance without  any indication
of what compliance meant. And, as in the E91 1 context, innovation is very
likely  to  suffer:  law  enforcement  appears  to  be  seeking  pre-launch  ap-
proval of any potentially covered  application or connection,  to ensure that
desired data fields are available  to them.
Where an agency  is in thrall to a sister agency, and that sister agency is
asserting itself as a single,  governmental  audience  for a standard that will
have dramatic  effects on innovation, neither traditional "capture"  nor more
recent "public  choice"  theory fits the situation. Traditional  capture theory
never envisioned  that the capturer  would be another  government  agency.
Rather, the  enemies  of the public interest were  viewed  as business  inter-
ests, with unions and civil society viewed tacitly as carrying out the public
interest themselves  in their interactions  with agencies. Under  capture the-
ory, a sister agency would certainly have been viewed as having the public
interest at heart,  and no  "fixes"  would have been called for. As for public
choice theory, there is no market-mimicking behavior being approximated
273.  "A  reliance on impermissible factors renders an agency decision arbitrary."  Bre-
ger  & Edles, supra note  173,  at  1193  (citing  Motor Vehicle  Mfrs. Ass'n  v.  State  Farm
Mut.  Auto.  Ins. Co.,  463  U.S.  29, 46  (1983),  which  concluded  agency's  decision  to re-
scind rule was arbitrary  and capricious).  Because  these contacts  would have been  related
to ongoing litigation rather than an open rulemaking, nothing would have been made pub-
lic about them.
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by the FCC; indeed, because there is no competition for the government's
desire  for information, no "market"  forces can possibly operate  to  set the
scope of coverage and level of compliance.  So public choice criticism will
not help; there  is no "market" to which to devolve the creation of the stan-
dard.
2.  The Limits of Traditional  Answers to Capture
The  traditional  answer to  capture  problems  has  been procedural.  For
example,  Judge  Skelly Wright in Home Box Office thought that having ex
parte filings  put on the record might help.274  But in the E911  and CALEA
settings,  even had there been more information  about the respective  roles
of third party  vendors  or  law  enforcement,  there  are no  other  actors  in-
volved  that have  the  resources  and  concentrated  attention  to act  on these
disclosures.  The internet  is useful  in  spreading  information  about what is
going on at the FCC, but it cannot embarrass the FCC out of this kind of
action;  the  FCC would  likely see  itself as  simply having been convinced
by the  most forcefully,  articulately,  and expertly  advanced  set of consid-
erations  about technical  matters. Additionally, the  leader of the FCC will
certainly not be embarrassed about forwarding his Administration's  objec-
tives.
Similarly,  strengthening  "revolving  door"  prohibitions  (keeping  for-
mer  staffers  from  lobbying  their  agency  for  a longer period  of time)  are
unlikely  to  help.  The  problems  in these  rulemakings  are  not a  matter  of
corruption  or of individual  agency actors  seeking personal  advantage. The
problems  stem from an absence  of organizational  structures that have  the
resources and incentives to fight for the public good when that good is in-
novation. Thus, even if sunlight  and anti-corruption rules might help pre-
vent capture  by the regulated industry  itself, there will still be capture  by
the potential beneficiaries of a central rule-even when those beneficiaries
are  other arms of government  or vendors  who  can help  industry  comply
with the rule.
V.  BETTER WAYS  FORWARD
Many inextricably intertwined factors have led the FCC to assert social
policy control  over internet  services without translating those  policies  for
the internet  age.  Commission staff members,  although operating with the
best will in the world, may have been blinded by their telephony mindsets
to  the  implications  of the  Commission's  current  trajectory.  Capture  by
third party vendors and law enforcement may have  been difficult to avoid,
274.  See Home Box Office, 567 F.2d at 17.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
given  the  intensity  of their  involvement  and  their  superior  technical  re-
sources. And lobbying  efforts  by current  (old-style) communications  pro-
viders have  been extraordinary:  between  1998  and 2004,  the  communica-
tions industry  as a  whole  (including broadcast)  spent  $760 million  to af-
fect the  work of the  Commission  and Congress,  and  the  cable  and  tele-
phone  industries  alone spent  $100  million  in 2004.275  By contrast, the  oil
and  gas  industry  spent  almost  $400  million  between  1998  and  2004  on
lobbying. 276  Since  1997,  about  400  FCC staff and congressional  employ-
ees have  gone to  work in  the "companies  they used  to regulate. '2 77  Both
the  communications  industry  and law  enforcement  authorities  have  great
influence  with key FCC  staff. At  the  same  time,  the FCC's  internal  re-
sources are constrained.278
Thus, the only institution that can help here is Congress. Because  there
are so many more players who can intervene in any given legislative  mat-
ter, and so many more  independent leaders who can have  a point of view,
it takes much  less force  to block something in  Congress than at the FCC.
Congress, unlike the FCC, has no institutional imperative  to come up with
a particular solution that will make  either incumbent telephone  companies
or law  enforcement  happy. Indeed,  if Congress  had decided,  in advance,
that we needed  a single rule  for both E911  and CALEA, it would have  in
effect licensed capture of the political process  to the group with most con-
centrated  and  motivating  interests.  Because  Congress  arguably  did  not
make  such  a  delegation,  we  can  consider  afresh  whether  a  delegation  of
the powers the FCC asserted in the E911 and CALEA Orders is necessary.
Provision  of emergency  services  and  assistance  to  law  enforcement
have  in the  past been deemed  by Congress  to be worthy  social goals  for
telephony.27 9 Now that more  of life is migrating  online, it must be  deter-
275.  See  CENTER  FOR  PUBLIC  INTEGRITY  STUDY,  NETWORKS  OF  INFLUENCE:  THE
POLITICAL  POWER  OF THE  COMMUNICATIONS  INDUSTRY (2004)  [hereinafter  CENTER FOR
PUBLIC INTEGRITY  STUDY],  http://www.publicintegrity.org/telecom/report.aspx?aid=405.
The  cable  TV  industry  has  spent  $37.4  million  on  federal  political  contributions  since
1990,  according  to the Center for Responsive Politics.  That is dwarfed  by the  $102  mil-
lion doled out by phone companies  in that period. Reinhardt Krause, In  Telecom Lobby-
ing, It's the Bells vs.  Cable; AT&T, MCI Deals Near; With  most long-distance carriers
acquired,  it's a new legislative landscape,  INVESTOR'S  BUSINESS DAILY,  Oct.  19,  2005.
276. CENTER FOR PUBLIC INTEGRITY  STUDY, supra note 275.
277.  Id.
278.  In  1999,  the  FCC  established  a  Technical  Advisory  Council  to  assist  it  with
questions requiring  technical expertise.  Press Release,  FCC, FCC Announces Formation
of Technological  Advisory  Council  (Apr. 2,  1999), available at http://www.merit.edu/
mail.archives/mjts/1999-04/msgOO010.html.
279.  See, e.g., 47 U.S.C.  §§  228, 229, 254, 255,  258 (2000)  (requiring  CALEA, uni-
versal service, access  for persons with disabilities, and anti-slamming).
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mined whether these  same social goals are appropriate  for the internet. As
discussed  above, the FCC asserted  power to  implement these social goals
online through regulatory back doors based on either its very broad under-
standing of its  implicit "ancillary"  powers  under the Telecommunications
Act  or  a  willful  misreading  of CALEA.  The  Commission  is  no  doubt
straying beyond its statutory powers,  and the lawsuits that have been filed
likely will  be  successful.  In  order  to  avoid the  capture  described  in  this
Article, Congress  should decide  what list of social policies is the right one
for the internet, and how any such policies should be implemented  in the
online environment.28 °
If  we  assume  that emergency  service  support  should continue  to  be
relevant  for phones,  that consumers  will continue  to expect that 911  will
function  for  phones,  and  that phones  may  use  either  circuit-switched  or
packet-switched  technologies,  then  Congress needs  to work  on the  ques-
tion of "What is a phone?"  Perhaps only those things that are identified as
phones (for example, in special colors, marked "PHONE,"  and using tradi-
tional  handsets)  should  be  mandated  to  have  complete  E911  service.
Through  public  service  campaigns  and other  marketing  efforts,  Congress
could  make very  clear that the  thing  that is  a  "PHONE"  has 911  access,
and "PHONES"  could provide  quite elaborate  and innovative  services  on
top of merely  giving access  to location  information.  This would not pre-
clude other applications, other things that are not "PHONES,"  from having
extensive  safety  features  as  a  voluntary  matter.  This  focus  on defining
"PHONES"  would  serve  consumer  expectations,  and  would  keep  new
technologies from being forced to use an antiquated legacy system.
As  for CALEA, it is not clear why law enforcement  should be entitled
to effectively  force  an  amendment  to  that  law-an  amendment  covering
what they  obtained  through  the FCC's good  offices.  Congress  should,  at
the most, bless law enforcement's  ability  to, with proper legal  authoriza-
tion, gain access  to  streams  of information that they must parse  to obtain
what they are authorized to read. There is no good policy reason to require
pre-approval  of all VoIP  applications  by law enforcement. First, the costs
of such a step far outweigh any possible benefits. Second, there is no prin-
cipled  line  between  VoIP  applications  and any  other online  application,
because  a  bit  is  a bit.  Congress  should  state  clearly  that  CALEA  is  for
"PHONES."  Taking the route requested by law  enforcement of extending
CALEA  to "interconnected  VoIP"  and  broadband  access  will lead to  an-
other outsourced vendor capture problem when VeriSign  claims it can as-
280.  Congress  should also  consider exercising its authority to  circumscribe what ad-
ministrative  remedies  may  be  called  for by the Agency,  and should state  clearly  where
the Agency's authority begins and ends.BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
sist  all possible  actors  with  compliance.  On  a meta-level,  it  seems  clear
that law enforcement  believes  it has authority  to, carnivore-like,  inhale all
possible data and parse it.28 " ' If it can do that, it does not need applications
to be designed in advance so as to be easily tappable.
There  are  better, more  internet-minded  ways  for  law  enforcement  to
obtain the  information  it wants pursuant  to lawful  wiretap orders. Rather
than requiring centralized, FBI approval  of the  design of all online  appli-
cations prior to launch to ensure that they are easy to tap, ISPs could make
streams  of data available  that could be  accessed by law enforcement  only
following  issuance  of a  subpoena  or  other judicial  order.282 Rather  than
forcing  the  standardization  of data,  law  enforcement  could learn  how to
understand  traffic  associated  with  particular  people-already  located  by
ISPs for them-once a subpoena has  issued. Furthermore, it may be wise
to limit  law enforcement's  self-restraint by continuing to require  it to ac-
cess  data  from the  edge  of the  network,  instead of trusting  law  enforce-
ment's overwhelming negotiating strength with ISPs for a path to the cen-
ter of the network.
Law enforcement's  appetite  for data is insatiable,  and we need to  find
some  internet-minded  response  to  its  requests-preferably  one  that  bal-
ances respect  for the rule  of law against  concerns  about innovation.  The
internet,  after all, provides  law enforcement  with potentially  better, more
detailed,  and more  quickly-available  information than it  could ever have
obtained offline. But law enforcement  is causing the FCC to apply teleph-
ony-world rules and assumptions to a changed IP world, with no regard to
the consequences.
VI.  CONCLUSION
The E91 1 and CALEA rulemakings  show that it is inappropriate to al-
low a toxic combination of broad,  unquestioned delegation,  lack of politi-
cal accountability,  resulting  capture  by concentrated  interests  (vendors  or
law enforcement),  and questionable claims of "expertise"  to create a single
281.  Eric  Lichtblau  & James Risen,  Spy Agency Mined Vast Data Trove, Officials
Report, N.Y.  TIMEs,  Dec.  24,  2005,  at Al  ("National  Security  Agency  has traced  and
analyzed large volumes of telephone  and internet communications flowing into and out of
the United States as part of the eavesdropping program that President Bush approved.").
282.  Indeed,  the DOJ has said that it is interested in having all ISPs store  information
for  its use, and it  is more than  conceivable  that the FCC  could use  its newly-enhanced
"ancillary jurisdiction"  over  ISPs  to  ensure  that this happens.  Declan  McCullagh,  Your
ISP As Net  Watchdog, CNET NEWS.COM,  June  16,  2005,  http://news.com.com/Your+
ISP+as+Net+watchdog/2100-1028  3-5748649.html;  see supra Section  IV.A  (discussing
ancillary jurisdiction).
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rule about how intangible  online  services may be offered.  It is far too easy
for old technology  players,  some of them invisible,  to take  over the rule-
making process at the FCC.
These  are just  the  first  two  rulemakings.  There  will undoubtedly  be
many more,  and they will likely  have  similar effects  on innovation.  FCC
regulation of the internet is just emerging,  and governments all around the
world are following  suit. Thus, the U.S. has an opportunity to take the lead
in self-restraint,  but Congress will need to be thoughtful  and acknowledge
the  differences  between  telephony  and  the  internet-something  it  often
seems to have trouble  doing. There  is very little  information  available to
policymakers  about how treating  the internet  as a  telephone network will
affect  our  future.  There  is ample  latitude  for  work on why  (or whether)
adopting an internet mindset--encouraging decentralized,  alternative ways
to reach agreed social goals-will provide a more encouraging framework
for  economic  development.  We have  time  to consider  the  potential  trou-
bles that will be created if this kind of alternative approach is adopted. The
first  step  should be  for Congress  to re-examine  the  enormous  power  the
FCC is asserting over all possible online activities. We should not risk our
collective  online future by continuing to  stumble forward as we have thus
far.
For  online companies,  the  need to  step  up as policy players  and lead
the public  along  a new trajectory poses an  enormous  challenge. Very few
companies  seem willing to take on the FCC's appetite  for internet regula-
tion, for  fear of being  branded anti-law  enforcement,  anti-consumer, pro-
pornography,  or  some  other  headline-grabbing  attribute.  But the  impor-
tance of the internet's future should far outweigh the short-term attractive-
ness of making deals with cable and telephone companies.
The  FCC needs  to recognize that  it has in many senses  been captured
by its own history.  It should not pretend to be  "the internet agency,"  and it
does  not  have  the  capacity  to  draw  lines  that  will  make  sense  in  this
quickly-evolving  set  of circumstances.  Indeed,  no  one  does.  Technical
mandates and requirements based on legacy understandings  and technolo-
gies are  doomed to be unsuccessful  and to  serve only the incumbents  and
outsourced  compliance  vendors  who  demanded  them  in  the  first  place.
The  regulators  need  to  take  the  time  to  evaluate,  within  the  sharply-
defined  mandate  handed  them  by  Congress,  how  to  address  the  social
policies  in which they are interested. It may be that a single  rule is always
inappropriate for the online world.
The  great  advantage  of understanding  how  the internet  works  is that
this network of networks finally makes  possible the kind of collaboration
and self-determination  that is the  stuff of human dreams.  The internet  en-944  BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL  [Vol. 21:873
courages  economic  development  and human  empowerment  on many lev-
els. To cut off all of these benefits in favor of today's  focus on "security"
or "safety"  would be unfortunate  and wholly short-sighted.  In an increas-
ingly  flat world, U.S.  internet  users  gain  few benefits  from  the  kinds  of
regulatory  activities  described  in this  Article.  The  sooner  we  recognize
this in policy as well as in reality, the better off the United States economy
will be.
That a crucial set of misunderstandings, pathologies,  and incorrect  as-
sumptions  has  led  us  down  a  destructive  path  does  not  mean  that  we
should not make  an  effort  to correct  them. Awareness  of the  current, yet
largely unnoticed, trajectory of the FCC presents  a fascinating opportunity
that  could  allow  us,  as a nation,  to  lead the  world  in  encouraging  enor-
mous innovation, creative  growth, and human collaboration.  It is essential
that we try.